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**SOCIAL PROCESSES IN
NEW ZEALAND'S FUTURE**

THE RELEVANCE OF EUROPEAN MODELS

A discussion paper by

DAVID PITT

Prepared at the request of the
COMMISSION FOR THE FUTURE

REPORT NO. CFFR1/78

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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Commission for the Future.

PUBLICATIONS OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE FUTURE

- 1977 *New Zealand in World Society: Towards the Year 2000,*
 P.J. Rankin

 Report on the Commission's Seminar on Forecasting
 Techniques (CFFR1/77)

 Submission to the Royal Commission on Nuclear Power
 (CFFR2/77)

 Report on the First Year of Work (CFFR3/77)
- 1978 *A Programme of Future Studies*

 Annual Report to Parliament

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SOCIAL PROCESSES IN NEW ZEALAND'S FUTURE

The basic questions¹ I have attempted to answer in this essay are:

- (1) What are the present trends in the thinking of futurologists, particularly in the smaller European nations which may have many similarities to New Zealand?
- (2) What kinds of specific models, alternatives, and ideas could be of benefit in the New Zealand situation?
- (3) What are the best means of achieving a maximum of social participation in the process and implementation of future planning?
- (4) I have also added a brief analysis of what may well be specifically New Zealand social problems in the future, and their European analogies and solutions.

This essay is not intended to be a comprehensive planning document or overall view of all the European theories, nor does it suggest that there is a single simple answer to the future. Its basic object is to suggest new approaches to the problems of planning and community development, and a critical reappraisal of some planning myths now current. It seeks to explore issues and ask questions.

First of all, there is quite clearly a major and increasing interest in the future² in government, universities and other institutions. Immediately after World War II European future planning was in a finite frame; on the one hand reconstruction, on the other proposals put forward within the terms of either parliamentary sessions or, in the case of France, five-year packages. By the end of the Sixties, partly because of the needs of the EEC itself, partly because of the American example³, longer term, more comprehensive future perspectives came to be important. The first magic dates were still however short term (e.g. 1980 in The Netherlands, 1985 in France), although in the Seventies this receded a little (notably the Year 2000 projects, the EEC 30+ project⁴, OECD Interfutures project, and even (the secret) East European 25-year plans). The need for planning itself was given greater emphasis by the great ecological scare (culminating in Stockholm in 1972) and the oil price/inflation/recession problem from 1973. Recently in France the long term, the complex (prospective), has been singled out as much more important

than the short term (prevision)⁵.

The output from the futurologists is massive, widely published and read, but there is not much agreement about what the future will be or how to cope with it. There is, as Ian Miles⁶ has put it, a 'poverty of prediction'. Part of the reason is that attempts to give futurology a scientific and quantitative content have not been successes. Prediction is an 'anticipatory art', open as is all art to a wide range of different interpretations and paths. The majority of futurologists can now be called qualitative. There is too a widespread feeling that not enough is known about the processes, that there are wrong statistics, theories and indicators,⁷ that despite the plethora of planning institutes, most governments are muddling along in the fog.⁸

In fact one has the strong feeling that there was considerable disillusion, uncertainty and apathy amongst the futurologists. Some of the earlier urgency, if not panic, has dissipated. The gloomy predictions of the 'ecodoomsters', as Professor Beckerman calls them, the Future Shockers, etc. have not, to the end of 1977, been vindicated. Even the effects of the oil crisis, inflation and the recession have not been apparently of great moment to most of the people or to the relatively smooth flow of government and business. There was a feeling of a 'phony' crisis. As P.C. Roberts⁹ has pointed out, there was something distinctly odd about models (notably those of the Club of Rome) whose underlying fatalistic philosophy involved humans consciously plotting their own suicide. Many systems models too suffered from under-research, oversimplification and premature publication.¹⁰ The European view was selective - the post-industrial society with its American flavour is increasingly rejected.¹¹ The way ahead was still a growth scenario, not a Bellian service society¹², much less Kahn's quaternary phase where there is no economy at all. Certainly there had to be much more flexibility in order to adapt to uncertainties¹³ and to 'concertation',¹⁴ of the different, even discordant elements in the social and economic structure. There was a feeling that major reshaping, and above all chaos, should be avoided; life should run along paths or chreods as Waddington¹⁵ called them, with small experimental (suck it and see) changes, but with a wide tolerance of different modes of development.¹⁶

One can detect then some swing from determinism back to free will,

to a greater control by men and women over their destinies. Future growth was what people wanted, or in the context of most West European countries, what the political elite thought they needed (which took into account in varying degrees what they wanted). The job of those concerned with planning was to 'listen' to this public opinion, and to try to harmonize it with other constraints. But the big problem then becomes - what do people want, and to what degree do these opinions influence those who have the political power. Some research organisations (e.g. the Batelle Institute in Geneva) did not even bother to seek any kind of random sample but simply asked of the political elite what they thought the problems were. The answers were predictable enough - inflation, recession, violence, arms race, etc.¹⁷

There were orthodox opinion polls too, and here public opinion itself was apparently not so dissatisfied or concerned. Gallup¹⁸, for example, in a worldwide study still being analysed, noted that happiness increased with affluence (although others have seen the opposite as true)¹⁹ and that most in Europe were happy (20% very happy though this was less than North America (40%) or Australia (37%)). Certainly there were some worries here and in other surveys²⁰ - e.g. over housing (particularly in The Netherlands), unemployment (especially in the U.K.). People still wanted goods, if not for material ends then for prestige and status, but there was much concern about pollution and the quality of life. Ornaeur, Galtung and others²¹ have been showing in their surveys that youth especially are demanding quality not quantity of life, especially the improvement of urban problems.²²

There were some signs of an increasing conservatism. One example was a swing away from the left in voting patterns, especially in the welfare states e.g. Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Holland. There was a tendency also for the Left to dilute, even to radically change, their positions and to accommodate with the Right. The strong communist parties for example in France and Italy were advocating an abandonment of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' concept in the former case and even of Marxism-Leninism in the latter. A new philosophical movement ('Marx is dead') sees Marxism and East European socialism as an obsolete evil that inevitably leads to totalitarianism.²³ They see the political world of the future as a fluid situation of 'small cells' of people coalescing on issues that affect them, not grand political ideologies.

Generally there seems to be a considerable public antipathy to the huge growth of centralized bureaucracies which have come to regulate all aspects of human existence.

There was still a demand for increasing affluence, but not everyone could share equally in it. There remain, even if there are 'phony' aspects, the oil and energy crises; and even if recession is, as de Jouvenal²⁴ has argued, a monetary myth, there are constraints of employment, prices, etc. Moreover, as Hirsch²⁵ has argued, when everybody has something (his example is the motor car) nobody can enjoy it. Getting what one wants is increasingly separated, he argues, from doing what one wants. There must be laws either limiting the acquisition or the use of goods to prevent a Hobbesian state of affairs. There seems in fact to be a renewed interest in legislation as a basic means of ensuring a just and rational growth and the maximum of individual manoeuvre, and even of preventing 'over regulation'. This applied particularly to the control of wages and prices, and preventing inflation. Many I talked to seemed pessimistic about the acquisitiveness of human nature but it was also recognized (especially in Scandinavia) that social values of restraint needed to emerge.²⁶ In addition to some kind of slowing down of demand, through legislation or restraint, there seems to be a new relativistic expectation of standards of publicly provided facilities. The best has been the worst enemy of the good in this respect.²⁷ For example, pollution control systems have been abandoned even if effective because they do not necessarily meet some (sometimes hypothetical) standards. If there is to be an orderly transition period (and transition institutions) there has to be tolerance of some imperfection. This has been applied as well to tolerance of social imperfections.²⁸ This implies a pluralistic form of society and different alternative routes to development, including some which are similar to those now existing. In overcrowded cities, even in slums, people, as Willmott and Young²⁹ have shown in London, may be quite happy, and reluctant to accept new 'improved' relocations, whilst everywhere, as Peter Marris³⁰ has shown, humans may show stress at many kinds of physical and social change.

To sum up at this point - the problem to many politicians, civil servants and research workers is how to improve the quality of life whilst still maintaining affluence, individual freedoms, etc.

In this process there seems to be some agreement on the importance of what we can call decentralization and anti-authoritarianism. 'Le grand nombre est mauvais. La solitude est mauvaise. Seul le petit nombre est bon' - 'Mass society and the lonely individual are wrong, only the small intimacy is right'.³¹ Somehow urbanization and industrialization must be broken up into small, manageable human units³⁰ (either a return to more rural areas or to genuine communities within the cities themselves, i.e. decentralization) and there must be the maximum of participation in power, wealth and status (i.e. devolution). This is increasingly being seen as the best way of providing incentives for both productivity and happiness. The French plan certainly has provision for increased regionalization and local industries, support for the family and its permanent home, even demographic expansion, control of the automobile etc.³² The Dutch perhaps, and more certainly the Swiss, have managed to avoid the megalopolis, the latter through rating and tax structures and an efficient transport system. Such decentralized communities are thought to provide a milieu in which people have many more incentives to enjoy life and work.

Certainly some dangers are seen in decentralization: the possibilities of sub-nationalist and irredentist political movements; the tendency to form mini-states, especially in areas (and there are many of these in Europe) where there are already ethnic, religious, etc. interfaces; the difficulties of integrating judicial, defence, welfare, economic and transport systems; the dangers that external institutions (including the multinationals) will 'divide and rule' and increase their power. The purely technological problems seem less obvious. The possibilities of cottage industries are considerable, including tourism, but the new technology may go too far in isolating people in homes equipped not only with lifetime stocks of food, internal energy systems, but communications systems like FACSIMILE (to replace letters), VIEWDATA (for news), SEEFACETS (for information retrieval), television 'phones etc. In fact, there is again, particularly in France, a reversion to more simple 'village' contexts rather than high technology solutions (the worst example here being the great social problems that have arisen in high rise apartments).

Decentralization contains important demographic implications. There seems to be a growing feeling that population growth does not necessarily lead, as the ecodoomsters argued, to resource depletion and

depression. The problem is one of bad population distribution which would be partly solved by the process of de-urbanization. The French planners particularly had gone further and were espousing a pro-family and natalist policy just when public opinion had been convinced otherwise. The family, even the extended family, is seen as an important part of the new communities, e.g. in combatting what was described as the 'moral pollution', the soaring crime rates etc. of urban society; and in providing a labour force which would lessen the need for external migration, take up the slack in presently under-used plant, provide new markets and help in 'social security' functions, especially as Europe's population 'ages' and there are many old, lonely and dependent people.³³ Similar arguments were being put forward for a renewed emphasis on migration. And the West Germans are now offering subsidies for couples to have children.

These conclusions are not confined to the European scene. A workshop was convened in July 1977 by the Australian Population and Immigration Council to discuss Australia's population in AD 2000³⁴, in which a strong case was put forward by the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs for renewed migration. In order to 'avoid further contraction in population growth as well as an ageing of our population,' he stated, 'the process of renewal must have its origins elsewhere ... The evidence of other countries shows pronatalist policies designed to encourage natural increase to be of doubtful long term viability or value. Immigration therefore continues to be the one variable amenable to control.'

Implied in devolution also, and important too in improving social planning, was the concept of humanization and participation. The rapid growth after the war in Europe has produced vast, impersonal, bureaucratic institutions, and huge multinational empires of factory complexes and industrial estates. Several major problems were seen; first the ubiquity of unnecessary and irrational rules and regulations, secondly the low level of participation by workers, clients, patients, etc. in the running of the institutions or their own lives, and also the level of alienation in these institutions. Swedish studies suggested that in the factories, specialization was an obstacle to co-operation and in some cases (e.g. Volvo) workers or small teams completed whole products rather than working on an assembly line. In Chicago some hospitals are now assigning a single nurse or doctor to each patient, with a result of improved rates of recovery. Wages, or more precisely wage competition, was also seen

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as an obstacle to a satisfying reward system, and it was felt that other benefits (time freedom, more responsibility, productivity-sharing not necessarily profit sharing, credit facilities, etc.) were more important incentives³⁵. The great need, especially to avoid industrial confrontations, was to give workers not just wages, but status. This is not necessarily an expensive operation - some countries have an extended honours system - medals, holidays for the man or woman of the year, etc., even prizes or bonuses of consumer goods which are the object of wage pressures.

However much a devolved solution is desired, there still seems to be the feeling that there has to be outside (i.e. outside the community) stimulation and assistance if there is to be a start and, once started, if chaos and anarchy are not to ensue. This again underlines the role of planning and a legislative frame and also the vital need for education.³⁶ In a process which involves a knowledge explosion, the universities, or more precisely integrated tertiary institutions, may function to order the data and provide a forum for the diverse interpretations³⁷, as well as providing vocational training or recurrent education, and to assist in the transmission and exchange of values generally, or to promote dialogue, all in close cooperation with the mass media.

In providing a direction, two factors seem important - responsibility and flexibility. There seems to be a growing aversion to doctrinaire positions, whether from the Left or the Right, a return to what Lionel Elvins³⁸ has called 'common sense theories' and worthwhile traditions. Flexibility implied a broadbased education system which did not turn out overtrained and overspecialized persons. The problem however with any kind of 'outside' control was seen to be that it might continue beyond stimulation and even grow into wider political control and censorship. Again, some form of legal safeguards (constitution, bill of rights, etc.) was seen as the best means of preventing abuses of power and safeguarding human rights. Finally, education should have the major function of pointing up the alternative paths, transitional arrangements, etc. available to all people, particularly young people, so that realistic choices could be made.

In practical terms, decentralization (most advanced perhaps in Switzerland) seemed to mean gathering taxation (and spending it) locally, and/or the community being a major recipient for redistributed income. Most countries however seem to be wanting to move away from direct taxation which was seen to destroy incentives, towards value-added or sales taxes,

though the former, in Britain anyway, created a large and prying bureaucracy. Swiss communities also act on the advice of a wide range of representative and participatory committees, and have a wide range of by-laws to administer, even if subject to some kinds of higher guidelines and constraints.

Decentralization however does not necessarily mean lack of movement. Again there seems to be a general feeling that a maximum movement of goods, services, people and ideas is necessary and desirable as a major incentive in itself, as a means of reducing conflict and increasing cooperation, pooling knowledge, etc. Some of the dynamics for movement and mobility might well be provided from the kinship system (many European villages are exogamous), from some redirected urban drift, from increased tourism, from a reconstructed educational system in which work, country service and learning are interleaved.

Part of the process of decentralization and devolution has been a renewed emphasis on the home and family. After all, the word for 'economy', 'oikos', is derived from the Greek word for household. In Sweden for example there is a new campaign to persuade people to eat home-prepared local staple foods; home-made bread, potatoes, eggs, milk, cheese, etc. This is partly because of the recession and to save the costs of producing or importing processed foods, but it is also to save medical costs which are very high. It is argued that home-prepared staples will cut down the costs of treating heart disease, tooth decay, etc. Throughout, too, there is a growing belief that there should be some return to the traditional patterns of mothers staying at home rather than working, even if this means the State paying a subsidy or wage.

One of the major problems that has faced the European countries has been the difficulty and particularly the cost of running the welfare state. Demographically, as the population ages, there are fewer and fewer working people to support more and more dependents. The costs of medical, educational and other centralized institutions have been rising at astronomical rates. Several answers have been proposed for this problem - encouraging older people to stay on in the work force where they can play a major productive role, discouraging waste (e.g. in the use of medicines, etc.), shifting care from institutions back to the family's home (e.g. reducing numbers of hospital beds), whilst still maintaining a minimum essential scheme of social security. Overall a radical review of the welfare state is implied in any scheme of decentralization. Such suggestions have met some opposition in Europe and there certainly have

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than opposed to nationalist trends, though there have to be adequate political means of representing all the diverse factions. This may mean political reforms in New Zealand. Federalist countries, the U.S.A., (motto 'e pluribus unum' - one from many), Switzerland, etc. may in fact have stronger loyalties when needed than those with a more mono-nationalist history. In this essay we have been most concerned with situations of peace and relative affluence. However we have to recognise that we live in a dangerous world, and the recent wars that were the plague of Asia and are now in Africa may well come to the Pacific together with the chill winds of depression. If such situations do eventuate then national frames become more significant.

The national frame is certainly most significant in economic planning. The present national (and international) economic system is widely recognised as inefficient and irrational. A reconstructed international framework in present circumstances can only really be created by a continuance of national government negotiation and diplomacy. Small countries (again the Swedes are working intensively on this³⁹) are very conscious of the problems of their dependency not only economically but also militarily etc. Neutralism in some form or other seems still to be a major asset in assisting trade, at least in the Swedish and Swiss cases.

Recent thinking in West Europe seems still to point to a future scenario in which economic growth is important, and is achieved through the sale, onto a rationally organised international market, of exported goods, even if produced in decentralized and humanized communities. The 'goods' economy is unlikely to be superseded by a 'service' economy, if only because goods are needed to support the service economy itself.

How do all these problems and solutions fit into the New Zealand context?

New Zealand is economically considerably decentralized already, especially in the farming industry, and widespread decentralization has been suggested in the recently published Planning Council Report⁴⁵ and may well be implemented. However some people doubt the long-term viability of the farming sector because of the external market situation and particularly the question of surpluses and protectionism in Europe itself. These problems are however often misunderstood as the surplus and protection are not necessarily related.

Agricultural surpluses, in the EEC at least, and the price support

system, are in some senses an artificial and certainly a political construct. The consumption of butter and of beef or sheep meat products in Europe is actually relatively very low and is decreasing⁴⁶. The Dutch (at least in the village where we lived) say they have butter only on Sundays and meat, in or out of sausages, may be horse meat. We might argue that these are *not* traditional patterns but created by a situation where there is no demand because prices are kept too high, or supply is restricted, quite often artificially. In the summer of 1977 in Holland, for example, most of the cucumbers produced were destroyed rather than let the price drop. Some fault lies with the pressure of European farmers' demands for more income but they are much maligned and misrepresented, since their fiscal problems are really due to their farms being over-capitalized and tied to mortgage or death duty debts or expectancies.

Certainly most of what New Zealand can do to change this is dependent on the efforts of our politicians and diplomats, but there are some hopeful signs in other directions. A consumer backlash is developing and Europe is experiencing Naderism and Lakerism. This is nothing particularly new. What is new is the anxiety of the politicians not to have troubles, and a new sensitivity to public opinion. Urban terrorism in Germany, the 1968 Complex in France, the example of the food riots in East Europe, the political confrontations in Britain, the neo-Hitler renaissance, the Moluccan problem in Holland, the Italian kidnappings have made governments very jumpy and anxious, in a continuing recessionary and inflationary situation, to try to provide bread, if not circuses, to prevent disorders which many feel are very near indeed.

Apart from the traditional wool-meat-dairy basket, there are huge openings in Europe for other New Zealand decentralized industries, particularly in forest products, nut and protein crops, energy crops, etc. Given that (thanks again to Freddy Laker) we may be on the verge of a price breakthrough in aviation freight, as well as passenger fares, light-weight agricultural products might be considered. The Dutch, for example, have had great success with hydroponics, especially in flowers and salad vegetables, which are widely exported. All these activities could be pursued in the kind of plural decentralized social settings we have described. Most require relatively small energy or capital inputs and some can use recycled materials, e.g. waste urban heat for the hothouses.

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A political solution however should not be ignored and may be quite necessary as far as the EEC is concerned. It seems (as a string of ministers to Europe are finding out) that concessions from outside the EEC are very difficult with or without Britain's coat tails. Serious consideration must be given to the possibility of some kind of closer association with the EEC. This might be an associate status of the kind enjoyed by some Mediterranean countries, leading in the Spanish case to an application for full membership - a course of action which must also be seriously considered. For the Eurocrats in Brussels New Zealand has many attractions. In the fight against inflation there is much appeal in cheaper food, in a crowded and polluted continent there seems to be a need for migrant outlets, in a world of 200-mile fishing limits there is the anticipation of fishing and other marine resources. A stable polity, an expanding market and safe investments create more than a good credit risk. And last, but not least, there seems to be some renaissance of the European 'colonial mentality',⁴⁷ in which exotic far-off Pacific Islands are a most desirable 'acquisition'. Of course there would be costs in such a move, particularly those associated with a loss of independence, but this may be no greater than the present debt dependence and multi-national involvement. There may be alternatives to joining the EEC, perhaps the neutralist position that seems to have benefitted countries like Sweden and Switzerland.

There are still external problems even if the problems of access can be solved. One of the most important of these is the attitude to New Zealand products abroad. Although it is true to say that most of the fate of our exports is decided by politicians and their advisers in the political capitals, in the long term consumer demand and opinions are very important. Here there is some evidence, admittedly somewhat impressionistic, that New Zealand products do not have the necessary image. There is not the aura of sophistication that attaches, for example, to many French goods (cf. the French Prestige de la France programme) or to Swiss efficiency and precision, German reliability - or, in the agricultural field, Israeli or Dutch quality. The image is rather one of cheap agricultural products from a remote (= very 'foreign' country) on a par with goods coming from 'foreign', often third world producers. This 'remoteness' affects views of important areas like hygiene, or attitudes to social conditions (cf. the linking of New Zealand and South Africa). Even tourism is affected deleteriously by the image of being too far away physically and socially.

What is probably needed here is a very hard and critical look at the activities of the marketing agencies and some scientific surveys of consumer opinion which may suggest how images might be improved, without, incidentally, necessarily very expensive advertising campaigns. Here one can suggest publicity materials going round to the schools in Europe where of course the consumers of the future are located. We might also usefully piggyback on to existing high prestige symbols rather than, or in addition to, our Pacific image, e.g. 'the Switzerland of the South Seas'.

We now turn to more specifically local New Zealand problems which would exist even if basic policies of decentralization were implemented. One important 'problem' is what might be called 'incentives'. Even though figures are difficult to obtain, productivity, whether measured per capita or by time, etc., is not relatively high in New Zealand, certainly not in relation to product quality. Output levels and increases reflect rather factors such as physical geography (in the case of agriculture) or increased capitalization in the case of manufacturing, which tends to raise prices to consumers. This is a very complex topic and needs much research, but some points can be made. First, wages in themselves are not an adequate incentive, especially when the purchasing power of money is declining. Jobs have to provide other vital ingredients in social life, for example, status, security, pride, craftsmanship, satisfaction, mobility, means of allowing competition with other individuals and groups. All of this probably means changing the factory, mass-produced system to a system of more personal involvement in the work situation and more direct rewards for work done. This may be accomplished, as the Swedes are trying to do, within existing factories (cf. the Volvo experiments) but may ultimately need more radical changes, e.g. a greater labour component in manufacture. This would mean also of course more jobs (and the avoidance of one of the greatest disincentives, unemployment - or more precisely, the dole). But to avoid undue wage push inflation there needs to be a change in the form of rewards as we discussed earlier. A corollary may also be a demographic expansion and a strengthening of family institutions, which (at least historically) may be correlated with increases in work incentives.⁴⁸ Incidentally, an efficient incentive system encourages not only productivity but also other forms of social responsibility such as energy savings, etc.

There are some schemes presently operating which may be worth watching and emulating. One of these is the Zero Defects Scheme which

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General Foods introduced to their employees in February, 1978, at Mount Wellington, Auckland. The scheme which originated in 1962 in the American missile industry, encourages the maximum of discussion between workers and management basically to cut errors down to a minimum, which of course significantly increases productivity. The rewards are in status (certificates, medals, etc.) but there is also the promise of monetary rewards. The flaw in Zero Defects, as in many other management-introduced schemes, is simply that it is imposed from above and not a genuine grass-roots movement. When schemes do come from 'below'⁴⁹ they are much more likely to have the enthusiasm necessary to carry projects through the inevitable troughs and setbacks.

Another problem which has been identified in Europe is what might be called ritual wastage, or the unproductive use of resources. M. Fores and I. Glover⁵⁰ have explained the British malaise as a result of the 'professionalization of everyone' - which has tended to make occupations 'over-contemplative and underactive'. Much time is wasted on protection status, on entry to and definition of the group and on many other ritual activities, including the new breed of professional strikes. New Zealand has this 'British disease' as Fores and Glover call it, which is in stark contrast to the French metier or craft, or the German beruf, both of which imply and involve a calling and intense effort. A related 'disease' in New Zealand is the committee, in itself a ritual whereby professionals particularly engage in unproductive activities and conflicts.

Another important deficiency in the New Zealand context historically has been the absence of planning, especially in the social sphere. However it should not be assumed that now there are planning institutions all will be well. Michael Shanks⁵¹ in his analysis of the British planning experience with the Neddly structures sees a basically political reason for the failure of planning. Arbitrariness in political decision-making, the limitations of the political adversary system and the oscillations in the power group with the political term of office have worked against the necessary continuous and bipartisan direction. It is no accident that the most successful countries in evolving and operating national planning systems have been Japan and France, where in the former case there has been since the War a continuous government and, in the latter, no government with effective power, so that the country was actually run by the civil service. Much the same is true of West Germany and Benelux where there is a proportional representation system and where

any government, based usually on a coalition, could not move far away from its predecessors. Continuity meant not only effective planning but also a stable environment for business investment, enterprise and market strategy. New Zealand has inherited the British two-party system and the difficulties of adjusting planning to the changing currents of political fortune.

Another problem in the British case has been the failure to achieve consensual planning, where there is broad agreement on principles and practices amongst different groups. The British solution has been tripartism - the formulation of national plans by a combined group of government, industry and the unions. Tripartism developed further in Britain than any other European country though elsewhere (e.g. Benelux, Scandinavia, Austria) there were tripartite advisory bodies. But despite the 'social contract' there was never real agreement and the system remained elitist - real groups were neither effectively represented, involved, nor committed to the plans. What was needed was a more populist element as in (for example) Sweden, West Germany or The Netherlands, of having worker representation on the Boards of Directors, or, as in Yugoslavia, encouraging worker co-operatives. Again there are many analogies here for New Zealand which may also founder on the rocks of tripartist elitism.

A further reason for the British failure has been the dominance of economic goals and the neglect of the social dimension - another feature of the New Zealand scene. The problem of social and economic goals is something of a chicken and egg one. It is debatable which comes first but they are obviously deeply interrelated. Here the French experience in the most recent Seventh Plan could be very relevant to New Zealand. Social goals have been important in France, partly because they are fully debated in the parliament and partly because these are clearly tied to the economic goals. The Seventh Plan envisages three economic conditions for 1980 - restoration of the balance of payments, full employment and control of inflation. This provides the necessary conditions for four social goals:

- (1) To provide the economic conditions necessary for full employment and social progress covering demographic growth and control, modernisation of the educational system and development of a modern competitive and balanced industry.

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- (2) To raise the quality of life including the improvement of employment conditions and the status of manual work; a new family policy; improvement of housing and town planning; curtailment of excessive growth of big cities and control of environmental pollution.
- (3) To reduce inequalities, particularly in incomes, and to improve the access of all to public services.
- (4) To achieve a higher degree of devolution of decision-making at the regional level.

The French system could not be transplanted directly into the New Zealand system. There are many glaring political and social inequalities in France which have led to quasi-revolutionary situations twice since the War and which of course have also stimulated the need for social reform. But some features are certainly valuable. The 'bottom-up' tendency in the successful aspects of Plans is important, and the committee of advisory 'wise men' is an important mechanism.

The final failing in the British plans was that they failed to encourage productivity enough. To some extent falling productivity was also due to a structural change, the expansion of the service sector. Once again New Zealand has similar problems and 'bottom-up' planning may be one way of pinpointing possible increases in productivity and improving incentives.

The question of the family itself is a vital area for research and here there are some definite New Zealand problems. New Zealand has a very high number of one-parent families and an increasing number of working women. Relationships here with productivity may be obscure but there may be links with social problems, e.g. crime, delinquency and 'anomie' generally. Solutions may be (as the Swedes have done) to institutionalize 'de facto' and serial marriages or to provide more encouragements to large and more extended families, particularly through more adequate housing and community facilities. Certainly there is some evidence to suggest in New Zealand that women go out to work often primarily for economic necessity, and a similar reason underlies the overtime, moonlighting, second and third jobs, shift work, etc. which is wrecking some families. The problem here may well be the enormous burden of debt⁵² created through hire purchase, mortgages, etc. and perhaps ways need to be found either of controlling interest rates or of subsidizing vital purchases. Again,

some Swiss examples are interesting, where there is not much hire purchase, where housing may be community-owned and let or leased back to individuals, and where credit when needed is obtained through reasonably priced bank loans. This may necessitate a flourishing bank industry and perhaps, as Professor Zeigler has suggested, this involves an undesirable centralization of control.⁵³

Another comparative problem in New Zealand is conflict, particularly in the industrial sphere, which has put New Zealand high on the international strike league. Some elements of conflict may be beneficial. Status competition is significant in increasing productivity. What is of course damaging are the confrontations and inflexibilities that we know only too well, and worse still violence, with its legacy of vendetta, as we have seen most tragically in Northern Ireland. The solutions to these problems are complex - again, status elevation may be one element. New Zealand's strike-prone industries (waterfront, freezing industries, etc.) are those which are rated generally as least desirable, 'lowest class', even if well paid. It is interesting to note how some countries have 'upgraded' such occupations, e.g. building in honours and rank systems, offering workers limited time periods in an industry, many fringe benefits, professionalizing the occupation (maritime operators in the USA), emphasising community service functions, etc.

Worker participation has been one means of reducing industrial conflict as well as increasing productivity and incentives. A recent EEC report has picked out four means of doing this⁵⁴ - collective agreements, information and consultation, participation in decision-making bodies, and shareholding. Collective agreements have been common enough but have been found not to have enough flexibility or exactitude except in regulating problems posed by the multinationals. The need for management to provide information and consultation is soon to be regulated by law in the EEC. Participation was formerly restricted to Germany and France though there are now limited forms of participation in The Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg. Shareholding is not well developed at all. However, the EEC is moving towards more encouragement and regulation of all four modes of participation, and in the New Zealand situation this also could be most useful. What is needed within factories and across industries etc. is much more cohesion and these forms of participation should encourage this.

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Another possible conflict area stems from the multicultural nature of New Zealand society. Here there is some interesting evidence from Canada which, like New Zealand, has had in the past a basically bicultural (French-English) structure which has become, through immigration (mainly from Europe in the Canadian case) a multicultural structure. Several important points emerge from the Canadian studies, particularly the Toronto research directed by Professor A. Richmond⁵⁵. First there is the growing importance of ethnic identity, not just amongst the French, but other groups as well, including the Canadian Indians and Eskimos hitherto shut away on reservations and in the icy north. Conflict situations are developing as identity demands become more strident. Secondly, there is the mobility of new migrants, e.g. from the Mediterranean, who have become highly skilled and wealthy and not, as in earlier phases of migration to North America, a depressed proletariat. Thirdly, there is the decline of long-established Canadian WASP families, not only in rural towns but in the cities, particularly as automation and computerization have removed many white collar jobs and as the small business has become less important. Similar trends may be coming in New Zealand. Certainly ethnic identity is increasing amongst both Maori (e.g. regarding land) and Pacific Islanders and there are increasing signs of tension and conflict.⁵⁶

Lying behind social conflicts may well be the broader problems of class. Although there has been much debate over whether New Zealand is developing a class system (however defined) or not, there is increasing evidence of differences in wealth, power and status.⁵² One of the problems of a decentralized nation where there is additionally not a great deal of taxation income for redistribution is that inequalities may be accentuated. However if there are adequate opportunities for mobility this danger is lessened. Education has a key role here. Dore⁵⁷ has recently argued that elite groups tend to try to protect themselves by restricting entry to their circle, particularly through educational qualifications, producing what he calls the Diploma Disease. Such a situation militates against the most able people from all groups of society (ability is not usually confined to one group) having wealth, power and status. In a decentralized system some local choice might be exercised over those who might have access to higher education (and through it, wealth, power or status) so that these people were in a sense representatives, rather than the products of an artificial examination system. There must remain too adequate provision for deprived groups, for genuine cases of need, and for ensuring

that, even when these functions are delegated, these people are taken care of in a humane rather than an efficient way.

Any conflict situation is exacerbated by economic problems. Despite some slowing down, New Zealand has a chronic, almost Latin American style inflation⁵⁸, which some of the analogies I have suggested, such as Switzerland with its virtual zero inflation, do not have. Again, much research is needed on the social bases of inflation. Apart from imported inflation, much is due to the inappropriate wage context in which social competition is placed. Rising prices also reflect considerable inefficiencies - unnecessarily long chains of distributors that perhaps a decentralized socio-economy would minimise, unnecessary duplication of consumer items (the '57 variety' syndrome), premature obsolescence, etc. It is widely assumed here that such consumer demand reflects some basic consumer motives. The evidence, however, as J.K. Galbraith has recently argued brilliantly, points rather to a demand dictated by companies, particularly the big companies and the multinationals.⁵⁹ Encouragement is possibly needed then for the small local businesses carrying perhaps a more limited range of goods. Even here there may be the possibilities of more participation, e.g. co-operatives.

Another factor contributing to inflation may well be what has been called 'overproduction'. It is assumed in Western market economies that consumer demand is expansive and there is a continuous push for increased production to provide more and more goods. The kinds of things J.K. Galbraith talked about in the Sixties - built in obsolescence, ubiquitous wastage - were and are still part of this pattern. In many cases it is not proved whether the consumer either wants or needs these products and the whole process certainly raises prices.

Underlying many of New Zealand's particular problems is undoubtedly the system of communication, or rather the lack of it. Part of this is related to the transmission of values through the education system and the mass media. Despite some improvements (e.g. ethnic time in broadcasting) the minorities are not heard or, more precisely, are neither listened to nor understood, and sometimes speak only rhetorically. As we have said, a danger of a plural society is a breakdown in communication. Throughout, ways need to be sought of finding institutions which promote dialogue and mixing, especially in the vital youth (and courtship) period during which attitudes and, more importantly, kinship links are formed.

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This means that schools have a vital role and may mean that children, at least teenagers, need to go to school outside their localities - either through bussing, encouragement of private or special function schools or simply the widespread use of exchange schemes, visits, etc. Other youth leisure institutions, e.g. sports, need the maximum of encouragement, but to be successful they do need to be run by the youth themselves.

In general, New Zealand, by comparative international statistics, does not seem to have a pollution problem, as it does not have an energy or a crime problem - but all these may become problems, and certainly in the international statistics one figure does stick out, namely the number of cars per capita. The 'cost' of the New Zealand car population is not really known, but is comparatively very large if overseas income, fuel, accidents, etc. are all taken into account. It is again assumed that New Zealanders have cars for some psychological reason (some have said masculine machismo). This may be important certainly for young people, if only as part of courtship rituals, but the necessity of transport is equally important in the absence of a good public transport system and when jobs are so far from home. Perhaps the car will be 'priced' out of existence but substitutes have to be found.

There are some simple solutions which may help. Staggering working and school hours greatly helps remove one major pollutant - the rush hour. Switzerland is also experimenting, apparently successfully, with traffic-free days, as well as having many car-free streets and even car-free towns. The Auckland Harbour Bridge is letting cars with three or more occupants travel toll-free. Free buses (financed from increases in petrol prices), upgraded rail and ferry services may also help. New Zealand is particularly well-endowed with waterways in cities such as Auckland which were once extensively used.

One of the most promising alternative means of transport is the bicycle, which it is estimated can do something like 1500 miles to the gallon. The Friends of the Earth have recently published a report which the Ministry of Works and Development is circulating, setting out how the bicycle might be promoted in New Zealand.⁶⁰ Although the bicycle, and perhaps most interestingly a revamped tricycle, will have to wait until the distances between communities, homes, jobs, schools are lessened, much can and has been done. One might mention bikeways like that in Auckland's

Tamaki Drive and elsewhere. Christchurch has begun bicycle routes. There has been talk of slow ways and bicycle priority routes and lanes.

A further problem in the New Zealand setting is still the way in which long-term development and conservation of the environment is suffering because of short-term expedients in the name of growth. This was brought to the public notice a long time ago⁶¹, but there is still much ecological despoliation. If the quality of life becomes more important than the quantity of life, then conservation becomes of paramount importance.

Throughout this essay we have been able to point out the benefits of decentralization. We should note however that the concept of decentralization should not necessarily be opposed to urbanization. Cities have been widely blamed for pollution, crime, economic problems, etc. Cities in history have not always been bad. From the time of the Renaissance in Europe cities have been the centres of science, art and civilization. Many people like living in cities, despite the protestations of the experts that they should not enjoy themselves, and the urban drift continues. The same goes for material growth. From the point of view of providing vital services, the concentration of population in a city can be a very efficient context. It is not impossible to be near nature in a city: take the roof-top gardens of New York, or the parks of London. Nor is it impossible to have villages, or really integrated communities, in cities, like the communes of Geneva or the quarters of Paris. There can be cities without cars, as were those of the mediaeval world or modern day Venice. Cities have always depended on immigrants as a source of vitality, a link with other cultures and a supply of labour.

The problem in New Zealand is not one of cities, but of short-sighted people and unimaginative planning. Those who control the destiny of cities have given too little thought to the future and how the quality of life might be improved.

It is no use crying over spilt milk and starting all over again: bulldozing down the cities is impossible. The real question is what can we do now with what we have now - socially and physically. First, the urban sprawl can be turned to advantage by building up a whole string of face-to-face communities. This means decentralizing and integrating work and leisure so that cars (or rapid rail) would not travel to the city centre or across the city. The city centre would become just another one

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of the communities. People would then work and play near home and there would be more chances for parents and children to be at home together. These new communities would have to be really integrated, not just people grouped together. There would need to be adequate housing, perhaps in more energy efficient forms, for example, a cosily clustered village with a village green and surrounded by gardens. There would need to be pleasant places where all kinds of people could meet and mix, perhaps old world markets and teahouses - certainly not the beer swill barns, the pubs, that are the source of so much crime and delinquency today. The communities would need to be vibrant and self-sufficient, with plenty of home-made entertainments, local barefoot medical and welfare services and not a great deal of dependence on piped-in television and visiting bureaucrats.

In these communities women and the elders would play an important role in the home, which might itself become more important, and in daily life outside home, directing the barefoot welfare system. This kind of city could also adapt to our multi-cultural society, since minorities, some of whom show little inclination to leave the city, could have their own communities.

In this ideal future there would have to be links between the communities, or else they would be at war like the city states of mediaeval Italy. Sporting, cultural, educational and other exchanges could be important, even politics, and, generally, participation in regional, national and international life.

There is a final, over-arching problem. Even if we can agree on what are the problems and even the solutions, it is still most important that nobody is forced into any action, that solutions are not dictatorially imposed. A consequence of this is that there must be adequate education and publicity so that alternatives can be appraised. And there must be avenues available for change and choice, not only elections but more referenda, and perhaps 'constitutional initiatives' on the Swiss model.

Whilst discussing the problems we have suggested some solutions and others would follow in any general plan of decentralization. There may also be in existing New Zealand institutions worthwhile local mechanisms which should be encouraged and which may sometimes be more appropriate than overseas models. For one thing, the European success may in some cases be very fragile. In Germany, for example, urban

terrorist conflicts may destroy the economic miracle. In Britain and even in the top-dog economies of Sweden and Switzerland, there is a creeping malaise⁶² and lack of confidence despite, perhaps because of, affluence (in the Swedish and Swiss cases anyway) which may well hasten a depression faster than any adverse balance of trade. Picking out the valuable traditional New Zealand institutions which might be encouraged is perhaps a debatable exercise, but certainly the short list would include:

- (1) The Polynesian institutions of the extended family and the value of mutual self help and respect for worthwhile traditions.
- (2) The tradition of sport as a means of uniting in friendly combat opposed social groups.
- (3) The ubiquity of voluntary associations on every conceivable facet of social life, many of whose activities lead to future welfare and development.
- (4) The value of flexibility, ingenuity, etc. in solving problems (the Taranaki Gate syndrome?) and the emphasis on do-it-yourself.

However, these mechanisms may well need specific action by the researchers, the planners and the legislators to provide an appropriate environment for change.

A first need is perceptive research, in-depth and oriented to ongoing action programmes. There is a great need for a constant and comprehensive availability of indicators that would enable the planning authorities to be aware at an early stage of social changes, and also to be able to evaluate the effectiveness of policies that are being implemented. Much could be done simply by upgrading or re-organising existing statistical services. The time lag is very important here. It is not good enough, as sometimes happens in New Zealand now, for census figures to be available only barely before the next census is taken. Co-ordination is another problem. There are many statistics in New Zealand which could be used if they could be compared (the worst examples here are the different kinds of Maori statistics). Overseas examples (e.g. UNRISD⁶³, EEC⁶⁴, Danish Social Service Research Council⁶⁵) could be useful here as they would also allow international and historical comparisons. These comparisons already make interesting reading. For example, in the 1976 UNRISD Report there are comparative indicators which

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There also needs to be some kind of national sample survey or panel by which public opinion is measured on needed changes and the effects of the process of change and legislation. Again, we already have some useful models (e.g. the broadcasting panel) and in close cooperation with the university social science departments efforts could be made to carry out more qualitative studies of how different kinds of community, in different classes, regions, ethnic groups, etc. conceptualize future needs and wants, as well as the causal patterns of social action and the effects of social plans.

Since youth are to be the society of the future, strenuous efforts need to be made within both school and home contexts to assess the wants and needs of youth, as well as exposing them to a wide range of different scenarios and possibilities.

Action programmes would involve a number of key agencies in the planning field. An independent Commission for the Future is well placed to act as a catalyst to get (or keep) action research moving in a number of critical fields that we have picked out. In some cases the function will be a 'seeding operation', in other cases it will be necessary to co-ordinate work already being done in the Planning Council, in the universities and in government departments to bring together 'funders' and researchers, to increase contact and communication, and to point the work towards futurological and practical ends. The prime criteria would be that research and action were combined and that efforts would be made to carry forward programmes in the communities with the maximum help and participation of the people themselves. The steps that are needed are probably:

- (i) A round robin questionnaire to all interested institutions and individuals pin-pointing current action, research (which in some areas is unrecognised), interests and fields.
- (ii) A round robin questionnaire to funding sources enquiring into current programmes, needs and resources available.
- (iii) The identification of critical problem areas, perhaps those picked out in this report, e.g. inflation, the family, youth, conflict, communication, decentralization, etc. - but also the success stories, e.g. Polynesian extended families, sport, community committees, etc.

- (iv) And then the formation of project teams to plan the sets of questions that need answering, in the context of real communities.
- (v) In the planning, but particularly in the implementation stage, the project teams would be enlarged to include people from the local communities.
- (vi) The final stage would be the preparation of a series of reports for public circulation, perhaps in the form of manuals that could be utilized on a do-it-yourself community basis.

The functions of the Commission for the Future, however, should be wider than an action-research programme. Vital also at all stages of the planning - implementation process is the maximum participation of, and communication with, the people themselves. This means a decentralization of the Commission for the Future itself and much attention being paid to the education role. Without a knowledge of alternatives there can be no realistic decision-making or democratic planning. The best means of achieving this may be to create mini-Commissions for the Future, not only in the main centres, but also in smaller towns and also in the 'other' communities - the institutions, the bureaucracies, the factories, the schools, etc. They would hopefully meet regularly, be involved in the mass media, stimulate and support discussions, classes, model projects, etc. The composition of these committees would be volunteers and those nominated by relevant organisations in the community. Committees would be kept informed of each other's activities by newsletters, regional conferences, etc.

Very important too is the improvement of existing legislation, organisation, implementation, etc. Some tasks seem to be most important. One is communication. Government departments for example function in different conditions today from when they were established and sometimes are transplants from different historical traditions, particularly the British. There is too little communication and combined action across departmental boundaries. Certainly there are inter-departmental committees but these often have a precarious existence if only for financial reasons. Action on most of the topics we have talked about would need inter-departmental attention. Efforts should be made to establish a machinery for these kinds of committees, as well as their analogies at the parliamentary (select committee) and local government levels. This may mean a restructuring of budgetary procedures, at least

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having a general or floating fund. Inter-departmental work needs to be apparent not only at the committee level but also in the daily work of the departments, perhaps through the creation of teams. These teams should be flexible enough to co-opt, contact or contract expert advice outside the public service, e.g. in the universities, or the local communities. There is little doubt that high level advisory bodies in New Zealand do not draw on the best accumulated wisdom available. Again, more effective means need to be found of communication and of avoiding duplication both in the public and the private sectors. A good recent example has been brought to light by Professor Fraser of Massey University⁶⁶ who has called the availability of child care services a 'yellow pages' situation where confused parents do not know where to turn in the face of the competing barrage.

A second important task is the need to replace cost criteria with other measures of effectiveness. Since many costs today are fixed or at least relatively immobile (particularly because of virtually tenured salaried staff in the public service) the more important problem is to utilize personnel most effectively and delegate responsibilities. Emphatically, until this happens, more cash is not the answer. Much more attention needs to be paid to monitoring the implementation of policy, having adequate lines of feedback from the grassroots and some means of gauging progress. Added to conventional auditing functions there needs to be an evaluation unit across the departments. There are some analogies worth pursuing, perhaps social impact studies, or an extension of the Ombudsman principle.

The whole problem of allowing the maximum participation and evaluation by clients also needs looking at. Sweden for example is experimenting with opening the files of government departments to public scrutiny and has found in the social welfare field that this does make for a more critical and considered comment on individuals who may be condemned to a category for life by one careless classification. This is particularly a problem in the social welfare field in New Zealand where many social workers are, if not untrained, then undertrained.

Of course, all this presumes that policies do get implemented, but too often policies, good or bad, disappear in the paper jungle of the bureaucracies. To some extent over-planning can be as bad as under-planning, and think tanks always need to be, as well, action tanks.

Not all faults lie with bureaucracies, whether public or private. A good deal of clarification is needed in the social legislative field. Past tendencies not to over-legislate and to rely on common law may now be suspect, if only because the legal framework is now so complex. Somewhat paradoxically the best mode of ensuring a free and liberal social development may be to have a kind of constitution, perhaps along the Swiss model, or at least a Bill of Rights. This would provide more protection too for minorities, not only ethnic, but women and children as well.

Another problem is in the process of legislation itself. New Zealand has internationally a relatively high rate of amendments, caused in some opinions by inadequate consultation when the legislation is being prepared, and sometimes by an unnatural rush through Parliament. One result of this may be to encourage confusion and perhaps a too great freedom for departments, or heads of departments, in interpreting or implementing legislation. By contrast, Australia has a system of ad hoc committees on social issues, containing not only lawyers, which consult with the grass-roots.

Overall too the pattern of legislation in the social field is still punitive rather than preventive. It may be better (as in France for example) to provide cash to anticipate a problem (e.g. giving young couples a loan to buy furniture, a 'wage' for mothers at home, etc.) in order to avoid putting money into child care, for example, when the marriage runs into problems. Education is a key form of anticipation and prevention and young people are very keen in fact to be involved in meaningful education programmes which need sometimes, perhaps often, to be removed from the rigid, institutional regime of the school. In the criminal law field, or indeed in the family law field, conciliatory and constructive processes are often lacking. The adversary and punitive system often produces more problems as the punished are pushed into further revolt. The law has much more chance of working if the offender wants to cooperate in rehabilitation. Here one could see the legal process ideally working in a small-scale setting within the community, in a family court, trying to work out a solution that will both solve the present problem and prevent future conflict.

One particular field that needs looking at carefully is the benefit system. Here there are real problems of the unintended bad consequences of good intentions. Take for example the Domestic Purposes Benefit system. Before the reduction in the benefit there was a decided movement

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of women away from their husbands contributing to New Zealand's very high (the highest in the world) number of single parent families. Because wages for women are relatively low and now job opportunities scarce, the benefit was, and still is, a better bet. The women were effectively prevented from being united with their husbands and new de facto relations were established, often splitting other families and so the process escalated. How could this situation have been prevented? First, by more careful preparation and research. Secondly, by listening to experts (including in this case some people in the departments concerned). Thirdly, by having some kinds of pilot or trial schemes, to see if there were any fish-hooks. Fourthly, to see what could be done by preventive benefits such as mother wages and family loans that we have discussed.

Similar comments might be made about other benefits. Unemployment benefits may create unemployment by being more attractive economically. National Superannuation may withdraw from the labour market valuable skills and experience. Again, the answer to these problems may be to replace monetary benefits, as in Scandinavia, with other forms of benefit and rights that all citizens have at all times, some of which can be provided through non-monetary services within a system of local communities.

Any solutions, as we have constantly emphasized, will depend in the long run on a popularly accepted programme and genuine guarantees for both the individual and the community. Of course much will be achieved by the political parties through the normal electoral procedures. But Sir Guy Powles⁶⁷ has recently pointed out that New Zealand may be developing at the moment towards a presidential form of government, if not a 'kindly fascism' where a Prime Minister, or Cabinet, or Caucus makes arbitrary decisions based on very little knowledge or contact with people and communities. In this situation it is most necessary for individuals, representative community committees, mini-Commissions for the Future, to have a real voice in the planning process and in particular to be able to determine local destinies as they see fit. Leadership might then come from below and New Zealanders would not be led, easily or gladly, as James MacNeish has put it, towards authoritarianism.⁶⁸

APPENDIX

Twenty Leading Questions for Research and Discussions

1. How can viable local communities be created and maintained, both socially and economically?
2. How effectively are rights of individuals and minorities, including women and children, protected in New Zealand?
3. How can the old people be productively involved in the New Zealand society and economy?
4. What are the causes and consequences of family instability?
5. What alternative forms of benefit exist?
6. What causes crime and delinquency?
7. What are the needs and expectations in the field of housing?
8. What are the social causes and effects of inflation?
9. What are the causes of conflict in industrial situations?
10. How effective are existing mechanisms to control conflict?
11. What are the basic incentives and patterns of motivation in different social groups?
12. How extensive is, and what are the causes of, poverty?
13. What role does education play in the social development process?
14. How effective are welfare bureaucracies?
15. What changes are needed in the legal system relating to social development?
16. What are public attitudes on social and economic development?
17. What are the consequences of different kinds of demographic changes?
18. What are the social effects of different technological changes, including transport?
19. What are the alternatives for leisure time?
20. What is the role of the media?

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FOOTNOTES

1. The data is derived basically from interviews and documentary research, mainly in Western Europe, during the period June - November, 1977, whilst I was on study leave from the University of Auckland. My thanks to the University and to the Commission for the Future for support and, in the latter case, for critical comment. I am particularly grateful to the following for much time and information:-

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In addition to specific, formally structured interviews some of the data and much of the interpretation in this paper comes from my own participant observation in several different situations in Europe for a period of six months. We spent nearly five months in the rural village of Zetten in the province of Gelderland along the Rhine and Waal Rivers. We spent nearly one month in the village of Lutry, now virtually a suburb of the city of Lausanne on the shores of Lac Lemman in Switzerland. Whilst living in Zetten I was attached to the Agricultural University in nearby Wageningen. I am in fact deeply indebted to my colleagues in this University for many hours of discussion and conversation. Where I have not specifically referenced

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material it is usually derived from these discussions or from many more hours in the company of the tradesmen, officials, farmers, workers and professional people in Zetten and Lutry to whom my family are extremely grateful for much hospitality and many kindnesses. For the specifically New Zealand material I would refer those who are interested in more details, statistics and references to: Pitt, D.C., 1977, "Social Change in Australia and New Zealand", *International Review of Community Development*, t.37-38, p.67-110; Pitt, D.C. (ed.), 1977, *Social Class in New Zealand*, Auckland, Longmans.

2. For fuller details of the expansion see *Futures* V/8/2/135ff and McHale, J. & M., 1977, *The Futures Directory*, London, IPC Press.
3. The American future prophets are frequent travellers to Europe and the Hudson Institute has set up a European branch in Paris.
4. Wayland, Kennett, 1976, *The Futures of Europe*, Cambridge University Press.
5. See e.g. Durand, J., 1976, "Prospective et aménagement du territoire", *Futuribles*, #7 p.321-35.
6. Miles, I., 1975, *The Art of Anticipation*, London, Martin Robertson.
7. See particularly the work of J. Galtung who has set up, under the auspices of the UN University and UNITAR, a project to coordinate the work of a network of different institutes to improve this situation.
8. For very interesting and honest examples of government uncertainties see Hofstee, E., 1970, "The Relations between Sociology and Policy", *Sociologia Ruralis* V.X No.4.
9. Roberts, P.C., 1977, "SARUM 1976", *Futures* V.9 No.1, p.3-16.
10. The Club of Rome Reports were good examples, but see also Professor Tinbergen's RIO or Professor Linneman's MOIRA projects, or the work being done at the Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, in Austria.
11. See e.g. Julien, P.A. et al., 1976, "La société post-industrielle: un concept vague et dangereux", *Futuribles* #7, p.309-21.
12. J. Gershuny (1978 - *After Industrial Society*, London, Macmillan) has argued that Bell's post-industrial society needs more, not less, goods in order to provide leisure and services in the home, etc.
13. See e.g. Strangert, P., 1976, "Adaptive Planning and Uncertainty Resolution", *Futures* V.8(5), p.32-44.

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18. Gallup, G., 1976-77. "Human Needs and Satisfaction", *Public Opinion Quarterly* V.40, No.4, p.459-67.
19. See e.g. Hirsch, F., 1976, *The Social Limits to Growth*, London, Routledge Kegan Paul, p.112.
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Recent surveys have included March 1977 EEC, Perception of Poverty in Europe, July, 1977, Eurobarometre, The General Mood of the European Public.

Some very important studies have been done nationally, including CNAF/CREDOC 1974-77, "Besoins et aspirations des familles et des jeunes", CREDOC, Paris, Kende, P. et al., 1975, "Attitudes des consommateurs français face à la crise économique", CREDOC, Paris, NIPO, "Income satisfaction in The Netherlands", August 1977, Holland.

21. Ornauer, H., Galtung, J. et al., 1976, *Images of the Year 2000*, Mouton, The Hague. cf. Landau, E., 1976, "The Questions Children Ask", *Futures* V.8, No.2, p.154-162, Hill, J.P. and Monks, F.J., 1976, *Adolescence in the Year 2000*, Guildford, IPC Press.
22. Bruclain, C. et Grandjean, D., 1972, "Pour une politique des petites villes", *Analyse et prevision* #13, p.131-67.
23. Benoist, J.M., 1970, *Marx est mort*, Paris, Gallimard.
24. de Jouvenal, B., 1972, "Sur la croissance économique", *Analyse et prevision* #14, p.1143-93.
25. Hirsch, 1970, *op cit.*

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26. E.g. in Sweden, the work of the Secretariat for Future Studies, Stockholm, e.g. *Att Valja framtid, To Choose a Future* (1974), see generally their *Programme for Future Studies* (1976).
27. I am indebted to Dr M. Royston, Centre d'Études Industrielles, and Dr A. Maizels, UNCTAD, Geneva, for enlightening discussions on this point.
28. E.g. in the work of Peter Berger, Daniel Moynihan et al., in *America 2000*, 1976, Lexington Books, Boston.
29. Young, M. and Willmott, P., 1957, *Family and Kinship in East London*, London, Routledge Kegan Paul.
30. Marris, P., 1974, *Loss and Change*, London, Routledge Kegan Paul.
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32. Cf. Bieber, A., 1971, "Urbaniser l'automobile", *Analyse et prevision*, #12, p.1193-1221.
33. See the papers of two recent conferences of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg: *The Changing Population Structures in Europe* (Berlin 1975), *The Implications of a Stationary or Declining Population in Europe* (Strasbourg 1976).
34. See the 'Green Paper' of the Australian Population and Immigration Council, 1977, *Immigration Policies and Australia's Population*, Canberra, *Population Headliners*, No.30, September 1977, or more generally the important paper which the Committee under Professor Jerzy Zubrzycki has just produced, Australian Ethnic Affairs Council, 1977, *Australia as a Multicultural Society*, Canberra, Govt. Printer.
35. See the interesting material (e.g. on Norway) in Emery, F., 1977, *Futures we are in*, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden.
36. See for example OECD, 1974, *Participatory Planning in Education*, Paris.
37. Cf. CIBA, 1975, *The Future as an Academic Discipline*, London.
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39. See, for example, Jansen, A.J., 1975, *Constructing Tomorrow's Agriculture* (Wageningen University, Bulletin No.38).

40. Husfliden, The Norwegian Association for Home Arts and Crafts, P.O. Box 38, Møllertgt 4N, Oslo, Norway.

The movement, which consists mainly of individuals working at home, produces a magnificent range of embroidery, furniture, gifts, handwoven textiles, knitwear, rugs, costumes, weaving equipment, woodware, etc. to a large export market.

41. See the work of D. Lundberg or E. Nordyke, 1977, *Peopling Hawaii*, University of Hawaii Press.
42. See e.g. J.H. McCartney, 1977 *French Farm and Village Holiday Guide*, London, BHAM Books.
- The Federation Nationale des Gîtes Ruraux de France, 34, rue Gedot de Mauroy, 75009, Paris, is a non-profit making organisation which coordinates the activities of the 'departmental' offices and the individual owners.
43. Amongst the tax havens are Andorra, Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Liberia, Lichenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Monserrat, The Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New Hebrides, Panama, Singapore, Ireland, Costa Rica, Switzerland, Turks and Caicos Islands. Cf. M. Malone, 1977, *How to do Business Tax Free*, Enterprise Publishing, Wilmington.
44. Secretariat for Future Studies, 1976, *Sweden in the World Society*, Stockholm.
45. N.Z. Planning Council, 1978, *Planning Perspectives 1978-83*, Wellington.
46. E.g. EEC 1977 Basic Statistics Table 128.
47. See Galtung, J., 1973, *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making*, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget.
48. For summaries of the literature here see Pitt, D.C. 1976, "Population and Development", University of Auckland, *Working Papers in Comparative Sociology* No.7.
49. See Pitt, D.C., 1976, *Development from Below*, Mouton, Paris and The Hague, Pitt, D.C., 1976, *Social Dynamics of Development*, Oxford, Pergamon.
50. THES, 24/2/78, *The British Disease, Professionalism*.

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51. Shanks, M., 1977, *Planning and Politics*, London PEP.
52. See for example Pitt, D.C. (ed.), 1976, *Social Class in New Zealand*, London, Longmans.
53. Zeigler, J., 1976, *Une Suisse au-dessus tout soupçon*, Ed. Seuil, Paris.
54. EEC, 1977, *Worker Participation in the European Community*, Bruxelles.
55. Ethnic Relations Group, York University, Toronto.
56. See Pitt, D.C. and MacPherson, C., 1975, *Emerging Pluralism*, London, Longmans; Pitt, D.C., 1976, *Te Roopu Ote Matakite*, Journal des Sociétés des Oceanistes.
57. Dore, R., 1976, *The Diploma Disease*, London, Unwin.
58. The OECD rated it fifth worst of its members in 1977-78.
59. Galbraith, J.K., 1977, *The Age of Uncertainty*, Boston, Houghton-Mifflin.
60. Friends of the Earth, 1977, *Changing Gear - Why and How to Promote Cycling in New Zealand*.
61. At least since J. Salmon, 1960, *Heritage Destroyed*, Wellington, Reed.
62. See for example the series *Le Mal Suisse*, Editions Grounauer, Geneva.
63. See Report No.1, 1976, vols. 1-3.
64. For example, EEC, 1977 (June), *Eurostat, Social Indicators 1960-75*, Bruxelles, 468pp.
65. *Samfund og Fremtid*, 1973, Kobenhavn (Society and Future).
66. Speech to the OECD Conference, Massey, January, 1978.
67. Speech to the N.Z. Law Society Conference, April, 1978, also *Listener* 25/2/78.
68. *Listener* 29/4/78, cf. Revel, J.F., 1971, *Ni Marx ni Jesus*, Paris, Club du Livre.

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