

SOCIETIES IN CHANGE

a question of scale.



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NEW ZEALAND IN THE FUTURE WORLD

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a question of scale

**A Discussion Paper
prepared by
Nick Zepke
Commission for the Future**

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INTRODUCTION

The series of booklets *New Zealand in the Future World* cannot predict what will happen in the next 30 years. Its aims are far more challenging. The 3 booklets to which this is the common introduction attempt to set the basis for a public discussion about New Zealand's future. To do this, they try to identify the most important changes taking place in the present, and to use this knowledge to outline possible pathways for New Zealand to follow. This entails 2 quite different ways of looking at the future. In one, attempts are made to understand the changes the future may bring by observing the thrust of current trends. In the other the attempt is made to design alternative visions of New Zealand's future. It is a difference between what one *expects* might happen and what one would *like* to happen.

Each booklet in this series explores particular issues in depth, looking first at the world scene, and then at New Zealand's opportunities and choices. International relations, economics, trade, energy resources, agriculture, industry, technology, social services, institutions, and lifestyles — it is important that we examine each of these in turn. However, it is even more important to remember that each is but one link in the complex web of society. A change in one area will initiate change in many of the others. The choices we face in shaping the future of New Zealand are similarly linked. A particular choice in one area will define our options in many of the others. Ultimately our choices must be made within the context of the type of society we wish to create.

In recent years vision making about the future has become particularly fashionable. Why? In the late 1960s and early 1970s many began applying the principles of ecology to man's relationship with nature. Research had shown that natural resource limits constrained the growth of other animal populations, and hence many became concerned that unless man's patterns of rapid growth were constrained, crisis would result. Growth in world population, growth in the consumption of energy and materials, and growth in both the number and quantity of pollutants were all identified as potential triggers of crisis. Thus in 1974 Theodore Gordon identified five possible future world

crises: deterioration of the biosphere, severe food shortages, material and energy shortages, imbalances in the distribution of wealth, and nuclear war.

The "biosphere" is the mantle of soil, water, and air which supports life on earth, and its health is threatened by pollutants (for example, chemicals and heat), together with over-use (over-fishing, over-grazing, etc.). Unless the long-term productivity of the biosphere is protected, our future supplies of food, clothing, freshwater, and clean air are in danger. Perhaps one of the most controversial and potentially far-reaching threats is that of a change in global climate. Two contradictory trends are causing concern. The first is a warming trend, triggered by man's burning of fossil fuels, which creates both heat and carbon dioxide (CO₂). CO₂ can trap heat within the earth's atmosphere, creating the so-called "greenhouse effect". The second trend is the cooling trend, which may be associated with changes in solar activity. The interaction of these two trends is a continuing source of controversy among scientists.

At present the earth produces abundant food, yet millions still go hungry in the poorer developing countries. This problem seems likely to continue as population growth outpaces what poor countries can produce for themselves or afford to buy. The problem of maldistribution of supply is compounded by threats to the long-term productivity of the biosphere. Pollutants and over-use are already taking cropland out of production, and changes in climate (locally, regionally, or globally) could have disastrous effects on crop yields. The future will probably bring more death from starvation and increasing malnutrition.

In addition to food shortages, many predict shortages of energy and materials. Man's current dependence on coal and oil cannot be sustained because these fossil fuels were formed millions of years ago and cannot be replaced. And, as we have seen, we may be threatening our own climate by burning them. In the future, solar energy and other renewable sources will become more important, and the technologies for their use are already being developed. Nuclear fusion, too, may be economically

feasible by the 21st century, but it will be neither cheap nor lacking in its own particular problems. Rising energy costs will in turn make food more expensive than many people can afford to buy or produce themselves.

On the shortage of minerals there are two schools of thought. One believes that technological advance can be relied upon (as in the past) to provide minerals from ever-leaner ores, and eventually to produce substitutes for scarce minerals. The other argues that rising energy costs will constrain this pattern, and that we should reduce our consumption of minerals and recycle that which we do use. Even if there prove to be no absolute mineral shortages, the resource-rich developing nations of the world may realise the importance of their minerals to the industrialised nations and begin controlling prices or limiting supply as did OPEC. Poor countries may decide not to export their minerals but to conserve them for their own development.

World imbalance in the distribution of wealth may be a growing source of international tension. The wealth gap between the rich and poor nations has continued to widen over the last 20 years, and rising energy prices, mineral scarcity, and food shortfalls will aggravate this trend. Many people feel that it is not a question of "whether" but "how soon" the poor countries will challenge the rich for a fairer distribution of resources.

Growing international tensions such as these lead many to fear that the future will bring further global and regional wars. Some see it resulting from confrontation between China and Russia, others as the result of tension between smaller countries. Indeed it seems that the only way man might avoid further wars is by comprehensive disarmament, which in turn would require some form of world government.

We have reviewed briefly five crises which the world faces. All five are interdependent, for each is a part of the growing tension which results from increased human pressure on natural resources, and the inequalities in the distribution of those resources. Each crisis is *international* in dimension, having the potential to involve every nation of the world, including New Zealand. All nations must therefore think about these future crises when deciding their national policies on alignment, trade, and aid.

Not all futurists take such an international approach to the future. While agreeing that the world is at a critical phase in its history, many feel that it is also important to look to the changes taking place within societies. In the industrialised nations these changes are fundamental. One member of this group, Daniel Bell,

has coined the term "post-industrial" to describe a new society which is emerging. Most futurists agree that the following five trends are important in bringing about post-industrial society:

- (1) Industrial societies are very complex. To cope, their social and economic institutions have become very large. It is increasingly difficult for individuals to influence decision making in ways other than as members of large organised groups.
- (2) Work and production patterns are being transformed, particularly by new technologies, but also by the changing role of women and the rising prices of many resources.
- (3) Complexity and change are giving rise to a group of highly educated powerful experts who formulate social and economic policy.
- (4) The demand for and role of education is being increased constantly.
- (5) Social values and goals are changing. A new concern for "quality of life" is evident in the developed world.

People differ in their visions of the type of society which should grow from this transition. Some envisage a "superindustrial" way of life, in which advanced science and technology become the central pursuit of society. The continued development of high technology will enable man to overcome any resource limits on wealth and population growth. Technologies like space colonisation, genetic engineering, and nuclear fusion energy will be important in this pursuit. Information and knowledge will thus become central to society, and consequently an intellectual elite will emerge as the new upper social class. The complexity of this society requires the development of a large and centralised political system, whose prime objective is to ensure the continuation of growth, while controlling inflation. The need for efficiency and planning in all spheres of life leads to gigantism and centralisation of all institutions, business, and pressure groups. This vision of society entails an acceleration of existing trends, and many futurists consider its large-scale features to be necessary for the solution of complex national and international problems.

The second view of post-industrial society is based on a belief that the important new frontiers are no longer technical but social. Post-industrial society should be concerned with the development of people, and hence technological advance should be directed more toward providing people with the means of self-development. Futurists like Hazel Henderson feel that economies must decentralise. They envisage the strengthening of

small communities and the development of technologies which are small-scale, resource conserving, and environmentally benign. Quality rather than quantity of material goods and services becomes important. Small-scale development will humanise the workplace, community, and government, thus counteracting the growing feelings of personal alienation and powerlessness.

This second vision calls for a change in the direction of society. The new society envisaged is considered more appropriate for a world facing the five crises we outlined earlier. New attitudes toward material wealth in the rich nations might improve the development chances of the poor, while greater emphasis on human needs and human interaction would improve co-operation within and between nations.

Where does New Zealand stand in a world beset by crisis and in the midst of change? Potentially New Zealand is in a very strong position, but a changing world does present us with challenging questions about our future.

From the viewpoint of resources New Zealand is well placed. Although our oil import bill is currently very high, our endowment of energy resources per head is one of the highest in the world. We have the potential to become self-sufficient in energy, not only in electricity production but also in transport fuels. Hydro-electric capacity could be tripled if all sources were developed (although there are good reasons for leaving some rivers untouched), and the potential for geothermal generation of electricity may be about six times that of existing geothermal stations. We could alternatively use our geothermal steam directly in industry or district heating schemes. A recently discovered coalfield in Southland contains 4,400 million tonnes of coal. How should we best use this precious resource? Burning it to produce electricity is wasteful, so we may choose instead to use it for the manufacture of synthetic petrol, or as the basis of new petrochemical industries. Similarly our natural gas has many possible uses, including the production of methanol to extend and then replace petrol. But natural gas and coal are fossil fuels, and therefore will not last indefinitely. New Zealand must begin now to plan for a sustainable society based on renewable energy sources only, and here we are particularly well endowed. We already know how to manufacture transport fuels from trees and crops, and technologies for the use of wind, wave, tidal, and solar power are advancing rapidly.

New Zealand grows trees and grass well, our good climate compensating for the low natural fertility of our soils. Whereas the latter requires us currently to import large quantities of phosphate, advances in the

technology of undersea mining may allow us to mine our own phosphate from the Chatham Rise. Agriculture will continue to be one of our strengths, and with our population expected to rise slowly to around 4 million by the year 2010 we can be self-sufficient in food for decades to come. Our food surplus for export should be of considerable value in a world beset by hunger and malnutrition. However, we currently sell our food primarily to luxury markets. The potential for expansion of those markets seems hopeful, especially with horticultural and processed foods. But what should be our response to the poorer nations? How can we help them to either produce or buy sufficient food for their needs?

Further resource opportunities have arisen with the declaration of our 200 mile economic zone, the fourth largest in the world. Its fish populations are as yet largely unexploited, but will be of increasing interest to nations whose traditional fishing grounds are becoming depleted. How should we strike the balance between husbanding this resource ourselves and allowing other nations access?

Our forestry resource, too, is extensive, and could feed a variety of industries, ranging from pulp and paper mills, liquid fuels and other chemical manufacture, to building materials and high quality furniture. Our choices on these and other industry options will be shaped by our views on their energy and pollution costs, and by potential markets overseas.

So New Zealand is in a good position with respect to world energy, material, and food shortages. In addition our isolation protects us from regional problems of biosphere deterioration. However, for problems of global magnitude (climate change, ocean pollution and nuclear fallout, for example) we cannot isolate ourselves, and may need to find ways of protecting the productivity of our land and water.

How do we stand with respect to international tension and the possibility of war? Our possible involvement in wars will continue to be shaped by our foreign policy. It may be prudent to continue alignment with one of the major powers, or alternatively to take advantage of our distance from the likely centre of war and develop an independent, non-aligned stance. Should we also attempt to be less dependent on the rest of the world for trade? Greater reliance on our own resources might in turn require inputs of overseas capital and expertise in their development. How do we feel about further foreign investment in New Zealand? What is our role in the Pacific region? Perhaps we should look closer to home for new export markets and for developing nations whom we can assist. In all these issues we should

consider how best we might contribute to the solution of the five international crises facing the world.

In the social sphere our choices have a greater degree of independence from world events. We must decide how to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the "post-industrial society".

How should we respond to the growth of central government and the increasing size of our institutions? We can choose the extent to which power is devolved to regional and community levels. We could also decentralise our health, education, and welfare services in an attempt to revitalise community life.

How can we use changing work and production patterns to avoid a pool of permanently unemployed people? We can turn automation to our advantage by developing service industries like education and research. We can foster new attitudes towards "non-work" by creating an exciting "age of leisure" and we can encourage people who wish to establish alternative "small-scale", craft-based industries.

How should we respond to the increasing power of experts and specialisation? By encouraging semi-professional support workers in health and education, for example, some of the monopolistic power of the professions could be taken away. The fostering of small, co-operative self-help group networks would help de-emphasise the role of administrators and government officials.

How can we best satisfy the growing demand for education? We can teach children how to learn and how to evaluate their actions by a set of moral criteria. We could then provide adults with second and third chances in education by expanding opportunities for continuing education. Educational experiences could range from the formal courses offered by universities as at present to quite informal learning exchanges provided at the community level.

How can we improve the quality of our lives? In addition to questions like the ones just posed we will have to answer questions of resource and land use and New Zealand's place in the world. Most important perhaps, we have to decide what New Zealanders understand by quality of life. We could do this by deciding on national goals which attempt to meet the basic human needs of all our people.

We have touched upon a number of issues facing New Zealand, and all of these will be discussed more fully in this series of booklets. However, in focussing on our individual areas of choice, it is important to remember that these areas are simply components of our total society. A choice made in one area shapes our options in another. For example, if we opt for greater

self-sufficiency, our reduced need to find trading partners may make it easier for us to adopt an independent foreign policy. To maintain our present lifestyle we would need to develop our own heavy industry (for example machinery manufacture), which in turn would raise the total energy requirements of our society. Land use patterns would change as traditional agriculture was replaced with energy farming. Alternatively we could choose not to industrialise, and this would require the adoption of a simpler (possibly small-scale) lifestyle.

So it is important that we look not just at choices in single areas (for example, energy), but at the broader issue of how our society as a whole might develop in the future. The final booklet in this series will attempt to do just that. The options and choices identified in preceding booklets will be brought together; areas of conflict and compatibility will be defined. From this will emerge several "alternative futures" or images of how New Zealand might be in the future.

In this introduction we have been talking about change — change in the world and possible directions for change in New Zealand. But it is not commissions that can bring about change, but people. In publishing these booklets the Commission for the Future hopes to provide background information for those interested in discussing New Zealand's future, and so to begin what it hopes will be widespread debate about where New Zealand should be heading.

A NOTE ON THE USE OF STATISTICS

Social statistics are both important and dangerous. They are important because they give a sense of proportion to ideas. Social statistics are dangerous because they give an illusion of certainty.

The social statistics used in this booklet are indicators of trends past and present, they cannot predict the future. They are useful, however, as reference points from which a discussion of New Zealand's future can flow.

THE QUESTION OF SCALE

TOWARDS A POST-INDUSTRIAL NEW ZEALAND

Change is invading our lives. Kenneth Boulding pictures the twentieth century as a great median strip running down the centre of human history. Almost as much has happened since 1900, he says, as happened in all human history before that.¹ K. W. Marek goes further. He argues that during this century man will see the birth of a new age. "We open our eyes like pre-historic man, we see a world totally new."² Willis Harman agrees. The next 30 years, he claims, will see our present society transformed.³

Four trends are important in bringing about this transformation:

- (1) Our lifestyle is being changed, particularly by new technologies, but also by the changing roles of women and men and the rising prices of many resources. For example, patterns of work are changing as human labour, no longer so necessary for producing goods, is increasingly used to provide services in areas such as transport and public administration.
- (2) To cope with change, institutions in the public and private sectors have grown very large.
- (3) Increasingly a class of highly educated, expert social and economic managers serves the large, central institutions. As a result the demands for and role of education are increasing.
- (4) Many people are bewildered by the changes taking place. They lack the information and lose the energy to try to influence the direction of change. In exchange for a high material standard of living, they delegate decision making to the experts.

One futurist, Daniel Bell, uses the term "post industrial" to describe the new society which is emerging from these and other trends.⁴

Of course futurists like Harman and Bell discuss trends in the developed world. New Zealand is rarely mentioned. Indeed their arguments are often based on examples taken from the most industrialised of western nations: the United States, Britain, or Sweden. Yet, in most respects, this is New Zealand's world also. As early as 1903 an observer of New Zealand society called us a "little America", also noting that we closely resembled England and Scandinavia.⁵ New Zealand sociologist Charles Crothers agrees with this judgment. In 1976 he mapped New Zealand's place in the world by using indicators which measured wealth, culture, and politics in many lands. He found that the small north European nations and the large western countries were most like New Zealand. With these countries New Zealand shared a high standard of living, western culture, democratic politics, and the lack of a strong Roman Catholic tradition.⁶ It is likely that in the next 30 or so years New Zealand will keep these characteristics.

Certainly New Zealand could be moving into a post-industrial society. Figures 1.1 to 1.4 show that agricultural employment has been declining for years and that manufacturing is barely holding its own as more people move into the service sector of the workforce. The figures also suggest that educational qualifications are rising and that there is a movement into professional occupations. Above all, however, the figures hint that New Zealand shares with many western nations centralised methods of decision making.

TOWARDS A POST INDUSTRIAL NEW ZEALAND ?

Fig. 1.1 THE GROWTH OF THE SERVICE SECTOR






Fig. 1.2 THE GROWTH OF PROFESSIONALISM

1.21 THE GROWTH OF PROFESSIONS AS PERCENTAGE OF THE WORKFORCE



1.22 QUALIFICATIONS OF PUPILS LEAVING SCHOOL WITH U.E. AND BETTER




1.23 GROWTH OF PROFESSIONALISM WITHIN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR

	PROFESSIONAL & TECHNICAL	MANAGERS	WAGE EARNERS
1963	0.8%	14.8%	84.4%
1968	1.8%	14.1%	84.1%
1973	2.9%	16.9%	82.8%

SOURCE: STATISTICS OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 1973/74, P.20


Fig. 1.3 THE GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONS ?

1.31 PROPORTION OF INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS WITH MORE THAN 200 EMPLOYEES




SOURCE: STATISTICS OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 1973/74

1.32 PROPORTION OF UNIONS WITH MORE THAN 1000 MEMBERS



SOURCE: NEW ZEALAND OFFICIAL YEAR BOOK, 1967, 1972, 1977

1.33 AVERAGE SIZE OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS



SOURCE: NEW ZEALAND OFFICIAL YEAR BOOK, 1967, 1973, 1978


Fig. 1.4 TOWARDS GREATER CENTRAL CONTROL?

1.41 TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
RELATIVE TO GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

	TOTAL PUBLIC SPENDING % of GDP	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING as % of GDP
1955	31.12	10.27
1960	33.70	11.06
1965	31.78	11.35
1970	32.32	12.91
1975	36.82	15.72
1979	43.01	18.51


SOURCE: NEW ZEALAND PLANNING COUNCIL,
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND ITS FINANCING-1950-1979
NZPC 12a: WELLINGTON 1979

1.42 STAFFING INCREASE OF NEW ZEALAND
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION




MARCH YEARS
SOURCE: REPORTS OF THE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION, 1975, 76, 77, 78.

1.43 TRENDS IN FOUNDING PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
1931-1976 BY DECADE



SOURCE: I.A.Webley, "State Intervention in the Economy" The Use of
Public Corporations in New Zealand. In S. Levine (ed.)
Politics in New Zealand: A Reader, George Allen & Unwin: Sydney, p.41

1.44 NUMBERS OF STATUTORY REGULATIONS GAZETTED
SELECTED YEARS 1955-1977



SOURCE: NEW ZEALAND STATUTORY REGULATIONS

finding alternatives

But obviously we are no mirror image of the United States or Sweden. In comparison with the giants of the western world we are small. We have a small population, small cities, and our institutions are cockabullies on the international scene. In the long term we don't have to depend on overseas supplies for either energy or food as we could be energy as well as food exporters. Our economy is agriculturally based whereas theirs are industrialised. In fact, New Zealand has never industrialised. As the CFF booklet *Resources and Technology: Sustainability?*⁷ points out, we do have the resources and the technology to industrialise. So if we wished we could fashion two faces for New Zealand in the future: one an industrial economic one; the other a post-industrial social face.


It is one assumption of this booklet that for New Zealand the coming of post-industrial society is not inevitable. New Zealand can choose the direction of her social development. We can continue to tread the pathway towards centralisation and largeness, or we can choose to decentralise; to develop institutions which are smaller in scale. It is another assumption that the question of scale underlies any discussion about New Zealand's social future. But what is the question of scale?

It is partly a question about size. How big do we want our population, our government machinery, our farms, our businesses, schools, and industries to grow? Partly it is a question about control. If we wish to rely on centralised decision making by experts, we may also have to learn to conform to a way of life which allows few differences. Alternatively, we could try to draw strength from and encourage *diversity*. But if our goal is a diverse society, we may have to accept major changes. And it is also a question about motivation. What structures can we fashion which are open, intimate, and human enough to make people want to help build New Zealand's future?

Mainly, however, the question of scale is one of balance: of choosing an appropriate scale for each of our activities. Few New Zealanders want to build a monolithic superstate; or for that matter a society made up of many semi-independent communities which have turned their backs on the world. No, most of us want to fashion a New Zealand which retains the "best" of the superstate while replacing all that which we believe to be "bad". The question of scale is therefore a question about the degree to which we decentralise and devolve our society.⁸

This booklet is a discussion starter, not a thesis. It outlines, very baldly at times, important social trends

and highlights options open to New Zealand. The booklet first examines three key areas of change affecting all people. Next it examines the role of government in dealing with these changes. Then, it outlines some of the human factors we have to consider when deciding the kinds of institutions we adopt. Finally, it spells out some choices in greater detail and suggests a set of criteria on which a debate about New Zealand's social future could be based.



MEETING CHALLENGES TO OUR LIFESTYLE

Our lifestyle is being challenged. New technologies, the changing roles of men and women, and the rising prices of many resources are just some of the factors responsible for this. For example, New Zealanders must meet the challenge posed by our vanishing human resources, worldwide population pressures, and our desire to be mobile; for the size, structure, and distribution of our population will help determine our social future. We must also face the challenge posed by changing work patterns. Paid labour probably won't be as important in the future as in the past, and we must find alternatives to our present employment expectations. Demographic factors and new work patterns have helped to bring about fundamental changes in family life so we must find new ways to conduct our most personal relationships. This chapter examines the challenges posed by changes in population, work, and family life and suggests ways of meeting them.

THE POPULATION CHALLENGE

There are three aspects to this challenge. The first is a trend apparent in advanced developed countries like New Zealand. In such countries birthrates are not reaching replacement levels as births and deaths have come close to balancing each other. Indeed in several countries, West Germany for example, there has even been an excess of deaths over births. Efficient contraception and fuller participation by women in the life of their societies have helped to bring this about. Education, in particular, has enabled women to counter the myth that every woman has a "child-shaped void in the heart, mind and body . . .".¹ So the rising status of women has weakened cultural pressures which make childbirth an inescapable duty.

New Zealand's youthful age structure will ensure that it will be about 20 years before deaths exceed births here. Nevertheless, our birthrate is not reaching replacement level. Eventually our fertility levels could decline to a point where they are below the level necessary to ensure long-term replacement.² Then, if the net migration loss of the late 1970s is not reversed, New Zealand faces a large population decline by 2010.

The very fact that our birthrate is so low will ensure social change. We are an ageing population. In 1901, 22.7 percent of our people were older than forty. In

1971 this had risen to 33.2 percent. By 2011 such people are expected to comprise 43 percent of all New Zealanders.³ Questions about financial security and personal satisfaction in old age will have to be answered soon. The future of our traditional work cycle may undergo change as more people become available to work. Women want to be active longer in the workforce as their childbearing and rearing span shortens. Whereas women spent nearly half their lives in childbearing and rearing in 1900-02, this had shrunk to just over one-third in 1974.⁴ In the heyday of the two-generation nuclear family, children were raised in the home by mother. In the future, new arrangements in childcare and work patterns may have to be made. For example, an all-embracing state could take over child-raising or we could develop quite different family forms. Perhaps the Maori extended family or community-centred family groups could come into their own.

The second aspect is that of rapid world population growth. Although recent information suggests that growth is slowing, the rate of world population growth remains about 1.8 percent annually.⁵ If this rate were to continue then by 2050 more people would be added to the world population during one single year than were added to the total population during the entire 1500 years after the death of Christ.⁶ Adds New Zealand demographer James O'Neill, "the current rate of growth . . . cannot exist far into the future: its constant application would produce standing room only within 600 years."⁷

Yet even slowing population growth poses a challenge on a grand scale. The majority of the world's developing countries still face the prospect of population growth outstripping their capacity to produce food, jobs, housing, and education, or indeed their ability to run successful programmes aimed at reducing the rate of population increase.



Men and women in underdeveloped countries are not yet universally educated. They find it difficult to control their own fertility. Despite government programmes, in India for example, age-old male-centred traditions, economic necessity, and religious beliefs continue to keep the birthrate up.

One way of relieving the effects of rapid population growth is for countries to encourage people to leave their homes for foreign places. But few countries now

permit migrants into their domains. Economic problems, lack of space, and the need to maintain cultural balance have been cited by countries as reasons for erecting strong barriers against migration. Despite this it is possible that in the next 30 years we will witness another migration flood. In some areas, such as southern Africa and southern Asia, re-distribution of population may be forced by political events. A racial war, not at all unlikely in southern Africa for example, could see the exodus of millions of whites or blacks to other countries.

some population options

On the surface New Zealand seems to have little to fear from the world overpopulation crisis. However, this security from world population problems is more apparent than real. To people living in overcrowded lands we have plenty of open spaces. Whereas, according to one observer, southern Asia will be crowded by more than 1200 people for every kilometre of cultivated land by 2011⁸, New Zealand will have less than 30.⁹ The Vietnamese boat people have



demonstrated the lengths to which desperate people can go to gain a home. Or events in southern Africa could pressure us into taking more people. So New Zealand cannot escape the pressures resulting from world population shifts, whether physical or political. We cannot remain aloof, do nothing and expect that someone else will solve the planet's population problems. The challenge is to find policies which will enable us to decide who comes to New Zealand. We could continue to rely on the support of our allies to protect us from all foreign dangers. We could choose to bolster our own defence forces in order to repel unwelcome visitors. We could also try to use world population pressures to our advantage by encouraging large numbers of immigrants to enrich our existing pool of ideas.

internal migration

This is the third aspect of the population challenge. New Zealanders seem particularly fond of their mobility. Most of us take at least one trip away from home each year for pleasure and many travel almost weekly to their favourite pleasure spots or to their bach at the beach. Four people in ten shifted their home at least once in the 5 years before 1978, many of these leaving for better jobs at the other end of the world. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the mobility of New Zealanders more graphically.

The future of internal migration is, however, under a cloud. Some commentators argue that limitless mobility is bad socially and economically and should be discouraged. Certainly, thousands of people are moving every year to places offering a more attractive future. While in size and economic opportunity Auckland, for example, swells to bursting, many regional centres stagnate. Loneliness, poverty, and crime haunt the evergrowing suburbs while lack of opportunity afflicts the countryside. Governments have tried to keep people in their regions by providing cheap loan capital and subsidies through regional development councils. In short, they have spent considerable amounts of money to keep people at home.

Yet it is probably undesirable to discourage internal migration in any way. It is doubtful that people uproot themselves for purely economic reasons. Thus, only one-quarter of migrants from one New Zealand "sleepy-hallow" gave better job or business opportunities as their main reasons for leaving. Some left because they were dependants. But most sought the convenience, better schooling, and brighter entertainments offered in

the nearby city.¹⁰ An Auckland study of 603 migrants confirmed these findings.¹¹ It is unlikely that most of these people could have been persuaded to stay home by the infusion of money. In short, capital investment in remote areas will not stop internal migration. A better solution would be for governments to encourage movements into emptying regions. Disillusioned city dwellers searching for a more rural lifestyle may welcome an assisted shift. They could repay such help by starting new, small-scale economic enterprises in the crafts and in horticulture.

THE TRANSFORMATION IN WORK PATTERNS

Throughout the western world people are worried about their jobs. In the past both men and women believed that men who had no paid employment were socially useless. Many men feel like this now. Recent attempts in West Germany to reduce the retiring age, for example, drew many sour responses. "We hang around the home, do some shopping and feel superfluous," sadly commented one man.¹² Since the 1960s women have fought hard to have their rights in the job market accepted. Now, job shortages are threatening to undo their efforts. The question of employment poses a great challenge for New Zealand. Yet advice on how to meet it is bedevilled by conflicting opinions about the causes of underemployment.

Many commentators diagnose an economic disease which can be cured with economic remedies. Monetary treatments for inflation, balance of payments difficulties, and capital shortages are dispensed freely. A heavy dose of "private enterprise" is another cure often prescribed. Some say that we could eliminate unemployment by industrialising New Zealand using our own resources. Underlying such cures is the assumption that economic measures which encourage higher production will solve what is essentially a short-term problem.

The economic view is hotly contested by futurists who feel that underemployment in countries like New Zealand is structural and has mainly social and technological origins.

They believe that the industrial age is dying. New computer and communication technologies enable automated production lines to produce goods without the help of unskilled human labour. In Daniel Bell's post-industrial society, which rises from the ashes of the industrial age, people are employed either as experts who run the automated economy or as workers in

education, medicine, finance, personal, and other services. Not all unskilled workers will be able to make the transition to experts or service workers. Greater emphasis on education and leisure will provide the opportunity for a higher quality lifestyle for the permanent pool of unemployed.¹³

British futurist Jonathan Gershuny also foresees the coming of a service society, though to him this is a displeasing society of exploitation. People are not buying personal services, he argues, but goods which give them the opportunity for self-service. They buy appliances which take care of cooking and cleaning. They buy tools for building, painting, gardening, or for setting up home industries. A kind of dual economy is emerging. In one, an educated elite minority is formally employed in helping to produce the self-service goods. In the other, the majority are unemployed in the formal sense but try to make a living in a world of domestic manufacturing; making piece goods for manufacturers in the formal economy, craft goods for sale at the door, or items for a growing black-market in drugs, liquor, or even distilled fuels.¹⁴

American scholar Fred Hirsch argues that social limits to economic growth will make a return to full employment difficult. Education and advertising created a need for the vast range of consumer goods which have become available this century. The pursuit of material goods, he suggests, fuelled the high economic growth of the post-war era. Such growth must stop when demand slows. For some key goods demand is slowing now because their social costs exceed their benefits. The motorcar, for example, as a luxury item, was a great joy to its owners. When too many people own one it becomes a social liability which congests cities, burns up precious fuel, belches out pollutants, and uses up precious land. Eventually, Hirsch argues, people will give up buying socially costly goods. Even services now thought vital may cease to grow. Employment in education, for example, may eventually be severely cut when qualifications become so common that they lose their value in getting people jobs.¹⁵

For New Zealand these futurists' views of employment seem closer to reality than that of the economists. The steady rise in the proportion of people providing services has already been noted, as has been the trend to ever higher qualifications (see Fig. 1.1-1.4). Figures 2.3 and 2.4 hint that self service is growing. An informal economy seems to be emerging. While the production of luxury consumer goods like television sets is falling off, the production of power

tools is not. Consumption patterns are not as easily gauged. But it does seem that unskilled or semi-skilled people are spending more on items which could be of the self-service kind. Professional and service workers on the other hand are spending less on such items. Document 2.1, indeed, shows that the informal economy is already alive and running in New Zealand.

It has been suggested so far that we are facing a transformation in the patterns of work. Advanced technology will enable fewer people to manufacture more. Surplus labour will either be retrained for service or face the dole. Unemployment is a fact of life now. It will be a major challenge facing the new post-industrial society.

Moreover, population projections suggest that during the next 30 years more people than ever will wish to join the workforce. One recent prediction is that by 2011 an additional 600 000 New Zealanders will be looking for jobs. Many of these could join the 50 000 or so people who are unemployed early in 1979.¹⁶

Societies cannot endure unemployment indefinitely. Social and political costs are too high. Most governments pay their jobless a benefit. These are financed from the taxes paid by those who work. Unless productivity or national income increase by other means, tax revenue is likely to diminish as unemployment takes a firmer grip. And governments face rebellion from those expected to pay taxes. They also face pressures from trade unions who wish to protect their redundant members from a lower standard of living. Most unemployed do want to work for wages because the work ethic is deeply rooted in New Zealand. The social cost of youth unemployment is particularly high. The skills and enthusiasm of unemployed young people waste away. Trained to expect work yet unable to find it, they could contribute to social unrest as they seek security in gangs.

some new zealand options

Eventually, governments unable to grapple with unemployment face rejection and even violent upheaval. What then can be done to overcome this challenge? Two different solutions suggest themselves; both require a change in our belief that formal paid employment is necessary for social and self respect.

In the first alternative, the work ethic would be down-graded. The positive values of leisure and lifetime self-development would be accepted.

THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN ACTION : WELLINGTON, JUNE 1979



TARGET 10 is a Community Participation Programme to assist in completing and furnishing a comfortable lounge-type meeting room for community groups and committees in the Silverstream - Pinehaven - Heretaunga area. It will accommodate up to 100 people, has easy access, and is handy to public transport. Its large new kitchen and spacious setting will make it ideal for a whole variety of meetings and functions.



TARGET 10 AIMS TO RAISE \$10,000 - HOW IT WORKS

As many of us as possible set ourselves a personal target of raising \$10 using our existing skills and resources. This programme is designed to cost you little - deduct your costs; donate the proceeds - receipts will be issued.

THE FOLLOWING SERVICES ARE OFFERED TO DATE:


<u>FOR HIRE:</u>	Concrete Mixer	Contact	Mrs K. Hudson	Phone 288.143
	Concrete Mixer	"	Mr B. McKee	288.139
	Car Trailer	"	Mr D. Camerson	285.126
	Car Trailer	"	Mr A. Kitchen	282.113

PEOPLE SERVICES

* Car washing at owner's home, window washing, raking up autumn leaves	53rd Girl Guide Company C/- Mrs A. McLean Ph. 277.636
* Gardening, Hedge cutting, Lawn mowing, Rubbish collection, etc.	Mr D. Cameron, Ph. 285.126
* Rubbish collected	Mr A. Kitchen Ph. 282.113
* Letter box painting	Mr & Mrs B. Brown Ph. 285.528
* Knitting soldier mittens - Pure wool to fit 3-6 years	Mrs A. Kitchen Ph. 282.113
* Dressmaking - childrens/teenage	Mrs B. Love Ph. 286.336




Fig. 2.3 THE GROWTH OF THE INFORMAL ECONOMY



SOURCES: NEW ZEALAND OFFICIAL YEAR BOOK
MONTHLY ABSTRACTS OF STATISTICS 1972-1978

Fig. 2.4 THE GROWTH OF THE INFORMAL ECONOMY

CONSUMPTION OF GOODS WHICH MAY CONTRIBUTE TO SELF-SERVICE



SOURCE: HOUSEHOLD SURVEY REPORT, P.57
NEW ZEALAND OFFICIAL YEAR BOOK 1978, P.621

Fundamental is the recognition that a person need not work for 8 hours a day, 40 hours a week for 40 years. We can still be useful and productive individuals while working for shorter periods or not "working" at all. Universally reduced working hours would provide employment for more people. So would job sharing. Time out for continuing education, child care, and temporary retirement would further increase work opportunities for others. New Zealand educator Jack Shallcrass, for example, has pointed out how sabbatical leave as enjoyed at present by university teachers could be extended to all workers for study, to serve the community or to "unwind".¹⁷

People brought up on the work ethic, however, will not find it easy to change. New patterns of employment will be particularly hard to adjust to. Yet we may have to accept that there will be a permanent pool of under-employed and that all adult New Zealanders will take their place in this at some stage of their lives. We may have to accept part-time work, job-sharing, periodic contract work, and providing free labour to community services. In the long term, education can help people to prepare for new employment patterns. In the short

term, governments will probably have to regulate for them.

Governments will need to set minimum legal employment standards. Wages, welfare provisions, and job protection will have to be supervised. Particularly, governments will need to enforce the anti-discrimination measures that are being introduced now. Women, youth, racial minorities, and older workers, for example, will almost certainly need to be protected. Governments will also need to provide the services required for the new patterns to take root. Child care centres, educational institutions, and well-organised community welfare and recreation facilities will have to be available for "resting" workers. And certainly to ensure a smooth transition to the new system, governments will have to keep in continual touch with employers and unions.

In the second alternative post-industrial technology is restrained. Manual labour is encouraged at the expense of automation and service work. Futurists like Lester Brown fear that, left unchecked, post-industrial society will create resource shortages, ecological stress, as well as unemployment. He advises the people of the future to "live simply that others may simply live."¹⁸ People could turn their backs on wage-paying jobs to take up life in the informal economy. In smaller communities there are many opportunities for people to cultivate vegetable gardens, raise goats, bake bread, can homegrown food, chop wood for heating, build windmills to generate electricity, grow fish for protein, brew beer, make clothes, and produce craft products to sell in order to buy the few things they can't produce themselves. In cities, the quarter-acre section and its garages could provide many people with the chance to produce things needed by the neighbourhood community.

Whenever we discuss our future, we will meet the ideas of people who wish to pursue different lifestyles. They visualise a more self-sufficient working life in which the gap between job and leisure is completely blurred. It is unlikely that their solution for unemployment is workable for all job seekers. To some extent automation, economic change, and the post-industrial service sector cannot be avoided. So, for most people the first alternative is likely to be the one to soften the impact of underemployment. Yet the more people live self-sufficient lifestyles, the less pressure there will be on jobs for people who wish to work for wages. Therefore governments should encourage people in their search for alternatives.

THE FAMILY

Demographic factors and new work patterns have helped to bring about fundamental changes in family relationships. So profound has been the change that some social commentators are asking whether the family has in fact a future. Some suggest that it is near the point of complete extinction. Others feel that the turbulence we experience now will in fact re-fasten family ties.¹⁹ It could be that both are right. It may be that the two-generation, blood-related "nuclear" family will break up. It may equally be possible that it will co-exist with new family-like relationships.

Certainly the family has undergone fundamental changes before only to rise again in a different form. For example, it underwent a transformation with the coming of the industrial revolution. By 1945 it had changed from an extended unit of three or four generations built around children, their parents, uncles and aunts, cousins and even grandparents to a two-generation unit made up only of parents and their dependent children. Pre-industrial family was the basic economic and social unit. Social life, work, and education took place within its structure. The industrial revolution removed the economic function from its family setting. Men began to earn their living in factories. Women stayed at home to look after their children. When grown, children left their homes to take up employment elsewhere and to start their own families. Separated from their children, parents were also separated from their grandchildren. The extended blood-related family broke up. The focus for its "nuclear" successor turned to child-bearing and child-rearing.²⁰

Since World War II even this nuclear family has undergone tremendous change. In developed societies at any rate, child-bearing ceased to be the primary focus of women's lives as they gained control of their fertility. Today nearly one-fifth of married women have no children. Women who do generally can be back at work by the time they reach 32 because their children have started school.²¹

Other factors have also encouraged women to take advantage of their new-found biological freedom. Technological innovations which wash clothes and provide convenience foods allow more freedom from time-consuming home duties. Faster and, until recently, cheaper transport has enabled them to work away from their homes. The isolation and economic dependence imposed by the roles of homebound wife

and mother could be overcome. While the economic weather was fine in the years before 1970, women were welcomed into the labour force. Just like men, women came to depend on outside employment for finance, satisfaction, and self-esteem. Values too have changed. Many people now accept that there is no moral bond binding women to home and husband. They have a right to an independent life.

So the number of women in paid employment has increased dramatically in recent years. In New Zealand the number of females in the workforce has increased at a rate twice that of males. The percentage of married women actively engaged in the workforce rose from 13 percent in 1956 to over 32 percent in 1976. The percentage would be even greater (40 percent) if married women working less than 20 hours per week were included.²²

Men and children too have had to adapt to these changes. So there has been a restructuring of family relationships. Many men and women could not adapt and there has been a marked trend towards single parent families. The 1971 New Zealand census found that 4.2 percent of all private households were composed of single parent families. By 1976 this had risen to 7.5 percent or 47 917 households.²³ The figure may in fact be nearer 20 percent, as many one parent families are included as boarders, for example, among other household types. And entirely new kinds of structure have evolved. The 1976 census showed that only about one-half of households were composed of two-parent nuclear families. The other half lived in single or solo-parent households; as childless or post-rearing couples; in extended groups or in single-sex partnerships.²⁴ By 2010 many marriages could be between partners of the same sex or between more than two partners.

Such new patterns could further change relationships between men and women. For example, new marriage patterns alone will lead to a greater flexibility in lifestyles. Women will enter these relationships economically independent. Emphasis on early childhood sex-role differences wanes as schoolbooks are rewritten. Exclusive gender languages found in beauty salons, pubs, kitchens, and workshops are becoming comprehensible to both sexes. And laws outlaw job discrimination in terms of sex. Such developments are important. Beyond them though lies the promise that by 2010 women may no longer need to compete in an exclusively male world. Specifically female skills and attributes could contribute equally to our social

development, bringing needed diversity to the pool of ideas we now have, about how to care for people or how to live on a smaller scale, for example.

There are also some cautionary trends to note. Women are still losing their jobs more easily than men and find high-level employment hard to get. Thus in New Zealand in 1978 at a time when only one-third of workers classified as professional or white-collar workers were women, fully two-thirds of the unemployed in that occupation class were females.²⁵ Many men are also finding it difficult to adjust to these new patterns. One psychologist, Samuel Levine, estimates that about half of the British males in stable relationships believe that it is the women's duty to contribute equally to the financial and management aspect of their relationship and that the man should help with child-rearing and home duties. This belief, argues Levine, has disadvantages for men. Just as women have had to learn to cope in a previously male world, so men have to learn to function in the female domain. As yet, they often cannot. With their supremacy in the workplace under challenge, many males also take second position at home. Unable to cope with loss of self-esteem, men often leave orthodox family arrangements.²⁶

The fundamental changes have also affected the lives of children and of the elderly. Much concern has been expressed about children's future in the changing family scene. Yet few alternative child-care facilities have been found to replace family care. There are already signs that new arrangements for children must be found. The rate of offending by young people in New Zealand, for example, has risen markedly since 1960. Whereas 22 percent of persons in prison in 1960 were under 20, by 1974 the proportion had risen to 43 percent. Moreover, while the total rate of first admissions to psychiatric care went down between 1962 and 1974, it rose by one-third for children between 10 and 19.²⁷

The needs of older people are as great as the needs of children. By 2010 more than one-third of New Zealanders will be older than 45. This is the age at which their children leave home, enabling parents to seek new challenges. Yet, as has been pointed out, jobs may be difficult to get. There is a danger that older people will feel dependent and useless. There is also the lurking danger of loneliness. Beyond 65 almost one-third of people live alone. Older women in particular are at risk for three-fifths of females over 65 lived alone in 1974.²⁸

some new zealand options

The formally constituted, two-parent, two-generation family then is changing. It will undoubtedly survive, but by 2010 it is likely that other kinds of relationships will compete with it. The liberation of both men and women from traditional sex-roles will see to that. Yet children and the elderly will continue to need the kind of security and love that the family was supposed to provide. So we will need to find alternatives which will ensure freedom and security.

One alternative is for government to act. Legislation and financial incentives can help to meet diverse needs. Men and women who wish to live in family situations with one acting as a full-time parent can be helped with money and given extra prestige. Laws can ensure that new employment patterns are introduced. Job sharing, sabbatical leave, and continuing education, for example, could provide opportunities to train people for proper parenting. The education system can be used to play down sex role stereotypes. Other needs could be satisfied with new organisational devices. For the aged there could be a more intensive care in special homes, more paid home help, better and cheaper public transport, and more meals on wheels. For children, there could be better care facilities, better training for child carers, and more specialists to look after the physical, mental, and spiritual health of children. For everyone, there could be more preventive, home-based health care.

Another alternative is to encourage the extended family. Three or four generations of people could be encouraged to live together in semi-permanent relationships. Such extended families need not be based on blood ties. Many affinities are possible. Friendship groups, occupational networks, and common spiritual beliefs could be the focus for such family communities. Such groups have many advantages. They help establish personal human relationships. They give the young early security, provide support to working parents, and allow older people to continue to play a useful role. Extended family communities could even provide a foundation for the informal economic structure. They could encourage a handcrafts industry and make many component parts for machines, for example.

Beyond 2010 both alternatives to the nuclear family will be needed. For people who wish to pursue different lifestyles, the community will need to provide dependant-care services. New housing policies will be needed to encourage the foundation of urban extended families. New economic policies will have to be

introduced and fostered by the state. For New Zealand certainly the extended family community does provide an alternative to the vanishing two-parent family. Compared to other developed nations our population is small. We are agricultural and only lightly industrialised. While we cannot use the Polynesian extended family as a model to return to a society composed of blood-related, three- or four-generation families, we can move forward to the co-operative, mutually supportive, loving, social relationships for which the Polynesian family is renowned.

THE EMERGING NEW ZEALAND SUPERSTATE

Among the many challenges facing New Zealand on its journey into the future, three have been spotlighted. Underlying these are other challenges: to the way we manage our resources, our foreign relationships, and to our skill in choosing our tools to overcome these challenges. So a very complex future reveals itself in which social, economic, and technological processes are tangled in one complicated knot. Eventually, it seems, every effort to meet one challenge has a bad effect elsewhere. Advanced methods for extracting resources, for example, ensure economic growth. But as more money is needed to extract shrinking resources, less money is available for wages and salaries. Bountiful energy supplies have enabled freedom of movement, the choking of cities and rural depopulation. Production lines have made for speedy efficiency as well as for boring work and chronic unemployment. Minimum wage laws have helped unskilled workers to a living wage and have encouraged employers to replace people with machines. Urban renewal programmes have improved poor housing, but force the poor into new neighbourhoods because they cannot pay for the renewed homes. Universal education has taught skills and raised expectations of reward for those skills. Affluence has created a consumer society which creates needs to develop more advanced ways of extracting more scarce resources. In short, societies have become so complex and interrelated that they have become very difficult to manage.

Enter "Super State": a centralised political system which can create order out of chaos. It grows in all societies which experience an industrial revolution. As S. N. Eisenstadt has pointed out, the usual way to industrialisation features specialists, a unified nation state and centralisation of decision making. The centralisation of power, explains Eisenstadt, is offset only by the growth of powerful pressure groups which bargain with the state for their own advantage.¹ By the late 1970s the superstate had become a feature in almost every nation on earth. It seems necessary to cut the complexity knot. Rule-making by assemblies of citizens has become impossible. Politicians in a constant battle for political survival cannot cope with the number and complexity of decisions needed to run a modern state. Neither they nor the voters have the knowledge to decide between conflicting evidence

presented by powerful interest groups. So fewer people are making more decisions. Experts advise, while executives in cabinets, politburos, governing parties, and presidential offices decide. As well as advising in policy making, expert bureaucrats enforce the laws and regulations. In short, the superstate is run by experts. True, in most democracies there are checks and balances on the power of the central authority. In New Zealand checks and balances are increasingly in the hands of commissions and tribunals set up by the executive. But such commissions, like the Human Rights Commission, for example, are staffed by yet further experts which add to the growth of bureaucracies.²

Many futurists argue that this trend will continue into the twenty-first century. Daniel Bell, for example, sees it as being central in his post-industrial society. New knowledge will enable specialists to use modelling, simulations, and systems analysis "to chart more efficient, 'rational' solutions to economic and engineering, if not social, problems."³ The major decisions of the future will be the result of the interest conflicts between government advisers, economists, researchers, large social groups, and the military. Rewards and power will be inherited by an educated elite. Robert Heilbroner goes further. He sees the development of a centralised, authoritarian state as necessary for human survival. Democratic capitalism cannot resist pressures for economic expansion and consumption. Yet, only by restricting both will the world survive. Only an authoritarian state can, in his view, create and control public opinion to develop new policies and new values.⁴

Other futurists disagree. They argue that the superstate is neither inevitable nor desirable. Duane Elgin, for example, claims that it is inefficient. Governments, he argues, decline in their performance as they get bigger, more complex, and beyond most people's understanding.⁵ Willis Harman accuses the superstate of being undemocratic. Tradition and laws have failed to halt creeping authoritarianism. He wants people to recommit themselves to democratic ideals so that every citizen has the opportunity to participate in making decisions.⁶ The accusations against the superstate will now be examined and some of the alternatives proposed by its critics sketched.

Fig. 3.1 HOW RELIANT ARE NEW ZEALANDERS ON GOVERNMENT?

3.11 IS THERE ANY SPECIAL PROBLEM
IN YOUR AREA THAT THE GOVERNMENT
SHOULD ACT ON URGENTLY?

NO: 31.6% YES: 53.0% OTHER: 15.4%




3.12 DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECIAL ANXIETIES
ABOUT YOUR FUTURE THAT GOVERNMENT
ACTION COULD DO SOMETHING ABOUT?

NO: 52.4% YES: 43.0% OTHER: 4.6%




3.13 DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECIAL ANXIETIES
ABOUT THE FUTURE OF NEW ZEALAND
OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS THAT YOU
THINK GOVERNMENT ACTION COULD
DO SOMETHING ABOUT?

NO: 27.6% YES: 68.0% OTHER: 4.4%




3.14 THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE FIRM
ACTION TO CONTROL BUSINESS PROFITS.

NO: 41.9% AGREE: 43.8% OTHER: 14.3%




3.15 FARMERS AS THE BACKBONE OF THE
ECONOMY SHOULD GET AS MUCH GOVERN-
MENT ASSISTANCE AS THEY NEED

DISAGREE: 29.5% AGREE: 47.4% OTHER: 23.1%




3.16 THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE FIRM
ACTION TO CONTROL WAGE INCREASES.

DISAGREE: 13.7% AGREE: 72.6% OTHER: 14.7%



3.17 FULL EMPLOYMENT SHOULD BE THE MAJOR
OBJECTIVE OF GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC
POLICY.

DISAGREE: 39.0% AGREE: 50.0% OTHER: 11.0%




3.18 FUEL CONSERVATION MEASURES PREFERRED
BY A SAMPLE OF 1000 NEW ZEALANDERS,
APRIL 1979

Government rationing of amount
of petrol per car.....47.2%

Government imposition of specified
carless days.....6.8%

Individually chosen carless days...31.5%

Other14.5%



Source: Heylen Poll, Auckland Star, April 18, 1979

Source: S. Levine and A. Robinson (ed.), THE NEW ZEALAND VOTER: A SURVEY OF
PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR, Price Milburn: Wellington,
1976, pp 69-88 and 163-173

DEPENDENCE AND BUREAUCRACY

A feature of the superstate is its large and centralised bureaucracy. Surely, vast numbers of specialists and experts with their expensive equipment must be able to handle the complexities of modern life! So people have grown to depend on experts to solve their problems and since 1945 bureaucratic growth has been rapid. (Figure 1.4 traces some examples of the trend towards central control.) In 1976 one-third of New Zealand's workers were employed by some public body. This was a rise of nearly 4 percent from 1970. A large number of organisations soak up this labour. In 1976 there were 500 local authorities and nearly 400 statutory boards and committees, one for every 3500 New Zealanders.⁷ Public bodies ranging from the Potato Board and the Commission for the Future to the Development Finance Corporation and the Human Rights Commission have been created at the rate of two per year since 1940.⁸ Critics like Elgin claim that the bigger bureaucracies grow the more inefficient they will be. Size, they argue, makes them rigid and resistant to change. Few people will eventually understand how the system works. Between now and 2010 limits will have to be imposed on institutional growth if chaos is to be avoided. The critics have a strong case.

It is logical that bureaucracies become rigid and resistant to change. Even simple ones consist of many interrelated parts. The Roman bureaucracies of the first century AD, for example, consisted of judicial, military, civil, and religious parts at a number of levels.¹⁰ At the top level alone this involved 12 formal and informal consultation linkages. As the number of parts in a bureaucracy grows so does the number of linkages. The 900 public bodies in New Zealand, for example, require thousands of co-ordinating linkages to administer the nation efficiently. So a problem solved in one part has repercussions in other parts. Immigration of 600 Vietnamese affects more than the Department of Labour. Departments dealing with housing, health, education, and welfare are involved. Errors have a similar rippling effect. The large new suburbs composed of low cost housing created in the 1950s seemed an efficient solution to absorb the urban drift. Since then increasing numbers of experts in many policy areas have tried to untangle the problems arising from that policy. So in a large bureaucratic system, employees hesitate to make wide-reaching decisions. Innovative ideas, argue the critics, are shelved. Tried and true methods are promoted into criteria according to which policy decisions can be made.

Moreover, the strongest part in a bureaucracy is at the mercy of its weakest links. One strike, for example,

can immobilise a transport system or an export industry. One riot can ignite a civil war. One measure to defeat inflation can create widespread unemployment. As the number of disturbances increases, they reinforce one another. Efficiency declines, and it is impossible to arrest the decline without large-scale changes being made. This too is difficult to achieve. Because policy making in democracies is tailored to fit the periods between elections, long-term effects are rarely considered until it is too late. The long-term problems of Auckland's rapid growth, for example, were not taken into account when economic growth was pursued in the 1960s. Eventually, bureaucrats spend a high proportion of their time fixing up the errors of past decisions. The number of laws which are amended is one example of this. Thus, the Town and Country Planning Act (1953) had 13 major amendments in 23 years, 15 new sections were added to the original 53 and 62 of those old and new sections were amended or replaced.¹¹

These examples suggest that very few people can understand the workings of their government. We have neither the information nor the time to unravel the tangle of legislation or statutory bodies. And eventually only a few inside the system will know what is going on. Specialist literature will be so vast that experts will be fully extended to keep up with the literature in their own fields. There may be very few people with an overall grasp of the implication of policies.

new zealand options

But what effective system to replace the bureaucratic superstate can we find to meet our future challenges? Two feasible alternatives have been proposed. In the more radical proposal New Zealanders would adopt many different ways to overcome our challenges. The influence of experts and professional administrators would be scaled down. This may mean that bureaucrats work primarily at the county or borough level while permanent policy experts fade from the scene. An informal, flexible network of people could be established by elected decision makers. Members of networks could consult to introduce innovative ideas, keep up with latest developments, and identify trends. Networks could discuss issues until they felt able to make recommendations to decision makers.¹² All community members could be involved if they wished. Such networks are not new. They operated successfully in eighteenth century America as Committees of Correspondence. They operate now in hundreds of groups right across the world. The Club of Rome is

such a network. Community groups, service organisations, professional societies, and cultural groups are networks already working in New Zealand. And networks would not be pools of ignorance for they would continue to use the most up-to-date technological aids available. As the scale of operations would be smaller than before, it would be easier to apply the latest innovations.

Such an innovation though requires a fundamental change in values and lifestyle. The second alternative is less drastic. Countries like France and Sweden are already hesitantly decentralising by trying to get bureaucracies to operate at regional levels. They hope that decisions made on a smaller scale will retain expertise while reducing complexity. Brian Easton, a New Zealand economist, has advanced a plan along these lines. In his scheme economic growth, efficiency, participation, and expertise may be able to co-exist on a regional basis. He proposes the creation of seven administrative divisions in New Zealand. Government departments would reorganise themselves into two levels. Policy creation would remain in Wellington. But policy would be implemented from divisional headquarters. Each division would have its own budget and discretion over spending within broad policy guidelines set by central government.¹³

Futurist E. F. Schumacher was right when he observed that for their many purposes people need different structures; some small, some large. "For every activity there is a certain appropriate scale."¹⁴ So the New Zealand of 2010 probably will still need a policy-making central bureaucracy. But many more decisions could be made at the regional level. Many functions such as education, health, and social welfare can be run more efficiently there. Judicial, defence, and transport systems, on the other hand, are probably much more efficient and cheaper when run on a large scale. While the superstate may wither, it will not die. In any case values change slowly. So by 2010 we may accept the kind of system sketched by Easton. More fundamental changes will probably have to wait beyond 2010.

THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY

Heard often around New Zealand these days is the lament that our democracy is in decline. Politician Michael Minogue is just one who blames the superstate

for this. Even policy makers, he argues, cannot keep up with an explosion in knowledge and they, almost as much as ordinary citizens, have to rely on experts for advice. As a result the power of experts swells.¹⁵ But by governments putting their faith in experts trained in predictable ways, many new ideas are shut out. So, since the 1960s, a chasm has opened between conservative and radical forces. On the one side are the believers in order, expertise, and central government. On the other are those who believe in diversity and wide participation by people in government who are challenging the trend to centralisation. Demonstrations and confrontation have been met by violence and restrictive laws. Bastion Point, argue the critics, is one example of what can happen when the social system becomes unresponsive to the demands of opposition. Democracy is in danger.

Critics also accuse the superstate of interfering with private enterprise. Western societies are hounded by inflation, unemployment, and threatening breakdown in the international money system. Because of this, economics has been dominated by politics.¹⁶ Governments are aware that inflation has helped to destroy democracies in the past. Pre-war Germany was only one example. But by stopping spending to curb inflation, governments bring on unemployment. This too is dangerous for the safety of the state. So governments fear to leave the economy uncontrolled. They interfere with market forces by enveloping private enterprise in a web of controls. Individual liberty suffers.

In countries without specific constitutional safeguards individual liberties are further threatened by the superstate, argue its critics. New Zealand has no formal safeguards to prevent governments abusing their power. We have no constitution, no second chamber to safeguard our rights. And in the 1978 election our electoral system excluded one-fifth of voters from direct representation in Parliament. Even the courts offer little protection against executive power. Judicial interpretation of statutes, for example, can and has been neutralised by amending legislation. Governments which set up commissions and tribunals further dilute the influence of the courts. It is often difficult for minorities to obtain fair hearings. For example, judicial officers are chosen almost without exception from a white, male, middle-class group of lawyers which is quite unrepresentative of New Zealand's society.¹⁷ The 1977 United Women's Convention was one group to argue that women, Maoris, and people with different sexual preferences have difficulty in defending their rights before such courts.¹⁸

Again, the problems are easier to identify than are possible solutions. Nevertheless, new ways of reversing these undemocratic trends are needed, argue the superstate's critics. One way often mentioned is to return to individuals their liberty by "de-regulating" society.¹⁹ Many restrictive laws are on the books merely to ease the life of expert decision makers. Such laws must be allowed to lapse. Diverse groups are encouraging de-regulation. Believers in a free market economy are close to alternative lifestyle enthusiasts; consumer protectors are allied with business interests. True, the details of their solutions differ. But they believe in the principle that laws which restrict personal rights should be reviewed regularly. The more conservative "de-regulators" want to gain their freedom mainly in economic areas where the state must cease to control private enterprise. Radicals focus their efforts more on moral issues and it is laws which regulate for example sexual behaviour which they wish to see abolished.

However, many of the superstate's critics wish to restore democracy by means of more laws. The state must pass and enforce laws which protect individual rights. In New Zealand, for example, such regulators want a Bill of Rights and the principle of judicial review established and policed. Disadvantaged groups seek legal protection of their rights. Job-seeking women want to be considered in the light of their qualifications, not according to their sex; cultural minorities want laws to protect their cultural heritage; and, as Ivan Illich has pointed out, people who have slaved for years training for a prestigious profession want that prestige preserved.²⁰ Yet other regulators want their privacy protected at all costs. They want a freedom of information act which will guarantee citizens the right to know, to privacy, to inspect records, to correct wrongful information, to feel secure that only valid information is used by government, and to have rapid action before the courts to enforce these rights.²¹

Yet other restorers of democracy want the power of experts curbed by means of referenda. According to them, this will restore decision making to every eligible adult in post-industrial society. Infrequent elections don't lend influence over policies. Modern campaigns only spotlight personalities and leave issues in shadow. But referenda as used in Switzerland and the United States, they feel, can solve the plight of the powerless individual. On any issue a specified number of citizens can demand a referendum. The result of the ballot is binding on the government. This method is too slow,

argue others. We now have the technology to allow all citizens to take part in daily decisions. They point out that a pay cable television system in Ohio called Qube allows viewers to vote on any issue flashed on the screen.²² This can be used in politics, they say. At a special time every day, for example, problems in search of a decision are flashed on the screen. With the flick of a switch voters record their responses. They are the decision makers because politicians have to implement the verdict of the voters.

Two discussion points emerge from these varied alternatives. One is that democratic government means different things to different people. "De-regulators" emphasise personal freedoms while for "regulators" equality is the key. There have always been tensions between equality and freedom in democracies and the two need to be carefully balanced. While too heavy an emphasis on equality by regulation could sap initiative and drive, untrammelled freedom can breed exploitation of the weak by the strong. In deciding about their future, New Zealanders will have to grapple with two questions: what should be de-regulated? and what should be regulated? The simple answer is that decision makers must be in touch with public opinion.

This rather simple statement leads to the second point which emerges from the discussion of the superstate. Even its harshest critics seem to see government as the cutting edge in meeting our challenges. So another question must be answered: how big and how centralised should our government be? The American political scientist Robert Dahl points out that for most people participation in large units is alien and in very small units it becomes trivial.²³ The challenge is to devise institutions small enough to motivate people to participate, yet large enough for them to feel their efforts are worthwhile.



THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

New Zealand, then, faces many challenges in the next 30 years. To overcome them, most New Zealanders look to the state for leadership, as whenever alternative pathways have been discussed the role of the state has been featured. In some alternatives the sheer power and size of the superstate roll back all challenges. In others the challenges fade away as soon as government is decentralised and people are encouraged to follow their own lifestyles. In 1979 New Zealand is closer to the superstate than to the decentralised society.

But the question of social scale can only be answered by examining how people fare in a large-scale society, what kinds of relationships they can form, and how willing they are to help build a satisfactory future. After all, deciding our future is about deciding how individuals are bound together in relationships for their mutual benefit and protection. So this chapter examines the kinds of social relationships which are emerging now and suggests ways in which they could be altered.

GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS

Daniel Bell has observed that human relationships are increasingly organised on a group basis. People have to join groups to achieve their goals as their claims on society are made on the basis of membership of a group rather than individually.¹ This is natural as the superstate needs order and uniformity to function; criteria best satisfied by large-scale operations. And generally only large, well organised groups can have the array of experts which assure that their members' views are heard. So conflict between groups is public, frequent, and often bitter.

True, such interest groups are not new. What is new is their dominance in human relationships. As economic fortunes have fluctuated since World War I and technology has unleashed its agents of change, interest groups have become indispensable to the process of government. They represent large sections of people, often command knowledge not available to governments and exercise control over their members. They also provide individuals with a last opportunity to influence government decisions.²

By 2010 interest groups could be mere extensions of the superstate. Only central bureaucracies in consultation with such groups could be expected to

make national decisions. The best organised and most unified groups would have the greatest power. Trade unions, certain professional groups, some business organisations, like the trans-national enterprises, already have vast powers. Even if it had the will, the superstate may not be able to destroy such powers now. In 30 years, therefore, New Zealand may be one vast corporation of powerful interest groups. But as interest groups themselves grow, the relationship between members and their leaders becomes formal and distant. Eventually, members could have less chance to influence decisions.³ People may feel as a small cog in a gigantic machine which grinds on regardless of their feelings.

There are good reasons for thinking that relationships based on membership of large groups do not meet people's needs. Individuals have close relationships with only a small number of people during their lives. We tend to identify closely only with our families, our circle of friends and perhaps some of our workmates. Rarely do we interact on personal levels with groups of people beyond these. As de Jouvenal argues, "Mass society and the lonely individual are wrong, only the small intimacy is right."⁴ Figures 4.1-4.4 suggest that alienation may indeed be a feature of New Zealand life. So since the early 1970s a demand for more human, small-scale relationships has been heard as an answer to the alienation which afflicts the superstate.

And many futurists do offer alternatives to the impersonal power plays of pressure groups and central government. Some offer a small-scale society where the growth philosophy is heresy and where electronic referenda enable individuals to make instant policy decisions. Carter Henderson, for example, argues that human relations will only be restored when people work together in small communities and live as self-sufficiently as possible.⁵


It is unlikely, however, that this kind of solution will make relationship problems go away by 2010. Sure, many small community-based economic projects could flourish by then. But self-sufficiency and face-to-face relations cannot be achieved for 3 million people in 30 years. In fact there are good reasons why the trend to large-group relationships may not be easy to reverse. In industrial relations, for example, changing employment patterns could force trade unions to seek greater

strength by expanding their size in order to protect the rights of their members and themselves. Other potentially disadvantaged groups such as ethnic minorities may feel that only a strong central political organisation could help them to achieve their

aspirations. There are intermediate possibilities, however. Many suggestions about changing human nature, humanising work and race relations, and improving education have been put forward. To these suggestions this chapter now turns.


HOW ALIENATED ARE NEW ZEALANDERS ?

4.1 NON-VOTING IN ELECTIONS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGE OF REGISTERED VOTERS




SOURCES: THE GENERAL ELECTION (E9) 1969, 1972, 1975
COMMUNICATION FROM ELECTORAL OFFICE

4.2 WORKING DAYS LOST PER 1000 WAGE AND SALARY EARNERS 1972-76



SOURCE: NEW ZEALAND OFFICIAL YEARBOOK, 1978, P.804

4.3 NET OUTPUT PER PERSON IN MEAT FREEZING & PRESERVING INDUSTRY 1971-74 (NET VALUE ADDED)



SOURCE: STATISTICS OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 1973-74, P.40

4.4 COMPARISON OF COURT CASES

	1967	1975	Percentage increase (corrected for population increase)
MAGISTRATES' COURTS CONVICTIONS			
Common assaults	2,028	3,719	70
Sexual offences	677	576	28
Other offences against the person	1,199	3,472	176
Wilful damage	1,164	2,195	75
Drunkenness	4,915	6,138	12
Offensive conduct or language and vagrancy	4,442	7,581	57
Offences against good order	1,163	11,120	845
Unlawfully on licensed premises and other offences under liquor laws	7,062	6,853	16
SUPREME COURT CONVICTIONS			
Murder, attempted murder and manslaughter	18	25	28
Assaults and wounding	39	153	279
Sexual offences	57	77	21
Robbery, burglary and breaking and entering	52	75	31
CHILDREN'S COURT			
Total number of cases	7,813	13,068	40

Source: *Comment*, August 1978, p.17

Notes: (a) The mean population of New Zealand increased by 13.2 percent from 1967 to 1975
(b) The figures used to calculate the corrected percentage increases were obtained from the 1970 and 1977 New Zealand Official Yearbooks.

CHANGING HUMAN NATURE

There are many who believe that the nature of man can be changed and that there are few limits to what re-made man can achieve. Certainly, barriers to achieving a more human scale for society can be swept away. Such ideas have gained momentum since the mid 1960s.

The specific proposals for change vary. Thousands in the western world, for example, are listening to messages from the east. They believe with the authors of the Bhagavad-Gita that man has the power to control himself and therefore the power to shape his destiny.⁶ Theistic religions are also renewing themselves. Muslims are recalling their newly modernised faithful to a simpler, more spiritual way of life. Some Christians echo this call, others are reaching outward by exploring the social implications of the gospel. They are out and about demonstrating the power of caring. Whatever their specific beliefs, prophets of renewal would probably agree with the model for change proposed by Moral Re-armament's Jens Wilhelmsen. He argues that individuals need to change before society will do so. As more and more people change, society will also. Then progress towards new relationships will be made.⁷

The call for spiritual renewal has been echoed by some environmentalists. Norman Morse, for example, argues for a new ethic which deals with interhuman relationships as well as with relations between mankind and the rest of the natural system.⁸ The belief, current in the 1960s, that the physical environment has little effect on human behaviour has been attacked. So noise pollution, consumerism and overcrowding have been exposed to environmental broadsides. Pointing to the research of social psychologists, Christian Alexander shows that in developed countries like New Zealand people need more than food, clothing, shelter, and sex. They also need an environment which satisfies their aesthetic needs.⁹

A brief look at trends in cities suggest that together these two ideas could influence the future of human relationships. Crime, poverty, and loneliness are being countered by spiritual and environmental means. In our central cities orthodox churches as well as sects such as Hare Krishna try to bridge the gap between lonely, alienated individuals and the rest of society. Sociologist Mike Hill suggests that spiritual revival returns to people a lost sense of identity, a lost confidence to relate positively to others.¹⁰ Other experiments to improve people's views of themselves are not spiritual. Communal townhouses are being built.

While not yet self-sufficient, they do encourage people to live communal lives, to grow their own food, to beautify and to communicate. Similarly new school designs emphasise the "Whanau House" concept in which children can develop family-like relationships.

TOWARDS A MORE HUMAN WORKPLACE

Certainly spiritually reborn people can contribute much towards restoring relationships to a more human scale. Waiting for us in the future world, however, are other factors which will place new stresses on human relationships. Pressures arising from work will become particularly important.

There are some promising changes taking place. One cause of alienation in the past, the assembly line, may soon be run mostly by computers. Even jobs unaffected by technology are likely to be more satisfying. One way of achieving this is to make workplaces physically attractive; another is to remove piece work from the production process. This idea is not new. Alternative lifestyle enthusiasts have been practising this for years. Since 1965 in orthodox manufacturing, too, many companies have encouraged their workers to start and finish all processes. Such job re-designing is likely to occur on a wide scale long before 2010.


Another innovation from the 1960s encourages participation by workers in decision making. In some countries (Germany and Japan are examples) union members are members of management boards. Yugoslavia experiments with workers' councils which in theory control their enterprise. New Zealanders are setting up work co-operatives in urban areas to cope with unemployment. Indeed, our deep-seated belief that organisations must in some way be hierarchical has recently come under attack. Philosopher Ph. Herbst argues that alternative organisational structures can help overcome alienation. Figure 4.5 gives some examples of such organisational alternatives. In addition to improving the quality of working relationships, Herbst suggests, such alternatives will help organisations adapt quickly to change and will enable them to make good use of the rising level of education.¹¹

But such alternatives challenge the position of experts and professionals. While professionals and experts deserve respect, they should not be allowed to dominate. Ivan Illich has recently argued that relationships between experts and their clients are almost like those of lord and villein, priest and sinner

Fig. 4.5 WHAT ARE SOME WAYS OF ORGANIZING SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS ?


IS THE HIERARCHICAL FORM BEST?

GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS BUREAUCRACIES ARE OFTEN ORGANIZED LIKE THIS:




HOW FAR IS IT POSSIBLE TO ORGANIZE OUR WHOLE SOCIETY ON A MATRIX BASIS?

MANY SMALLER BUSINESSES IN PARTICULAR ARE DOING SO SUCCESSFULLY.



TO WHAT EXTENT IS IT POSSIBLE TO ORGANIZE OUR WHOLE SOCIETY ON A NETWORK BASIS?

MANY IMPORTANT PROJECTS WHICH USE THE SKILLS OF A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONS ARE ORGANIZED LIKE THIS. FOR EXAMPLE: THE HAWKES BAY YEAR FOR OUR FUTURE: A COMMUNITY COLLEGE, CFF, COMMISSION FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, LIONS AND OTHER LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS.



⊙ TASKS

□ PERSONS

Source: Ph.G.Herbst, ALTERNATIVES TO HIERARCHIES, Martinus Nijhoff: Leiden, 1976

in feudal times. Like the medieval guilds, professions dominate the economic and political life of nations.¹² Groups of professionals aspire to and receive exclusive rights and powers. Doctors, through their professional association, for example, are fighting hard to retain their monopoly in the treatment of most diseases, lawyers are necessary to effect the simplest legal business, and teachers are demanding the status accorded to professions. Some trade unionists also demand exclusive rights to certain jobs. This trend could have great effects on future relationships. The power of professionals and their organisations helps the superstate to flourish. While people believe they need experts for everything, the state will consult with these experts about everything. Expert committees will mushroom as they obtain the right to regulate what people can consume, decide what makes them healthy and what makes them happy. "Experts" are even given the right to plan your future! It is no wonder that personal relations between professionals and their clients become formal and distant.

But the more cautious 1970s have given birth to a counter trend. The warning cries of people like Illich are being heard. One example of change lies in the health field. Many countries are turning to community-based health care. It is true that this is partly due to economic factors. One recent study, for example, found that in the developed world the share of Gross National Product devoted to hospital care rose by 70 percent between 1962 and 1974. For economic reasons the study noted that there was a limit to institutional growth.¹³ But a call for a more human approach to health care has also been voiced. New Zealand's United Women's Convention of 1977, for example, called for small, personal self-help group networks and for patient advocates.¹⁴ Indeed, there is a growing recognition by health bureaucracies that a majority of illnesses can be treated by health workers who are not professional healers.

What will relationships between individuals and professionals be like then in 2010? Experts are needed! So are institutions which command the use of technical wonders to enable diagnosis and cure; enrich teaching and learning; enliven work and leisure. So doctors, teachers, lawyers will continue to be respected as valued specialists. But closed, self-protective associations of interests are not necessary. Neither are hierarchies in which the place of the individual is determined by the particular skills currently valued by society. The cry for a more human scale of relationships will invade the temples of the professionals also.

RELATIONS IN A MULTI-CULTURAL SOCIETY

New Zealanders come from many different racial and cultural backgrounds. Judging by responses to the workshop programme "Goals of New Zealanders" run by the Commission for the Future during 1978,¹⁵ New Zealanders are alert to the fact that our race relations will help shape our society. While a few respondents look to the birth of a single New Zealand culture based on European traditions, most want to create a "multi-cultural" society. To some this is a society in which differences based on ethnic lines are buried and where everyone has the same rights, opportunities, and responsibilities. If needed, the full power of the superstate would be used to bring about an integrated New Zealand. To others, "multi-culturalism" signifies a society in which different ethnic groups are equal, respected and inter-dependent but are encouraged to keep and develop their own distinctive ways. However, neither "integration" nor "pluralism" may be easy to achieve.

Television can bring into our living rooms the racial hatreds of the world. Between now and 2010 these hatreds may grow to be intense. Open conflict in South Africa, for example, could create new stereotypes in which "goodies" and "baddies" have racial identities. Through the media Afrikaners, for example, could export their belief that they are defending civilization and godliness. Across the world different racial groups may adopt their belief that only their race has the past glory, the purity, and God's blessing deserving to be preserved.¹⁶ Such messages could sour race relations in New Zealand.


Deeply felt attitudes held by the various ethnic groups in New Zealand may also affect race relations. Without thinking that others may have different values, Pakehas feel they hold the only key to a multi-cultural New Zealand. To them, the key must open economic and educational doors and they use the structures of the superstate to improve the economic positions of Maoris, Samoans, and Tongans, for example. And, if equality is to be achieved, this is important. As Swedish researcher Gunnar Myrdal found, it is very difficult for ethnic minorities to advance themselves. Historically they were members of the working class. Low incomes, large families, oppression, language difficulties, and poor motivation combined to limit education opportunities. The result was that a limited range of occupations was open to them. The circle was completed as minority children joined their parents in unskilled jobs.¹⁷ This circle has not been broken in New Zealand as Figure 4.6 suggests. But it is extremely

frustrating for people from a minority culture who accept dominant values to be denied its rewards. Conflict could result.


But other ethnic groups do not always share the Pakeha's passion for economic success. Many urban Maoris, for example, regard their personal relationships

with their kinfolk on some distant, rural marae as far more important. They thrive on the respect bestowed on them for helping their people, value the face to face politics carried out in their small communities and glory in a spiritual world which is far wider than that of most Europeans. In short, they strive towards success

Fig. 4.6 HOW EQUAL ARE NEW ZEALANDERS ?



SOURCE: SOCIAL TRENDS IN NEW ZEALAND, DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS PUBLICATION, 1977, P.86



SOURCE: SOCIAL TRENDS IN NEW ZEALAND, DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS PUBLICATION, 1977, PP.173, 174

as they see it. Success to them, as social psychologist James Ritchie has pointed out, is based on building small-scale, personal relationships,¹⁸ not on climbing the rungs of a ladder provided by the European superstate.

As a result, racial minorities often suffer from identity crises. They learn to value many of the things held dear by the majority, while also wanting to be themselves. Many Tokelauans, Niueans, and Maoris, for example, do seek western education, wish to be good Christians, and to possess material treasures. They also want to hold on to their languages, keep close contact with their relations, and live in a small-scale society. Social psychologist Leonard Bloom generalises that in trying to convert minorities to their way of life, majorities inhibit the development of stable identities among minority groups. He goes on to argue that racial violence and hatred results when a search for identity is frustrated.¹⁹

Two points emerge from this discussion. One is that it is impossible to build a multi-cultural New Zealand from Pakeha foundations alone. Integration seems to offer too little to minorities as a path to the future. The other is that a multi-cultural society is one in which all ethnic groups live together in harmony and equality while encouraging each other to develop their own distinctive ways. But how can this idyll be achieved?

As a first step we could all rethink our approach to race relations. Ethnic minorities must accept that the broad framework of British law, the English language, western style education, and a European style economic system will continue to play vital roles in the New Zealand way of life. Pakehas must learn to communicate face-to-face with other ethnic groups. They must listen as well as speak. Smaller scale structures must be created in which all ethnic groups feel comfortable. Much will be gained, for example, by conducting important meetings on maraes. More flexible housing designs could be developed to suit Polynesian lifestyles.²⁰ Employers must take into account different customs when looking for and using staff. They must learn, for example, that a Polynesian who does not meet the eye of an employer is being respectful, not shifty. Culturally one-sided laws such as some property laws could be re-examined for cultural bias. And minority ethnic groups could be encouraged to speak their own languages, to be proud of their cultures and be taught how to develop their own power bases.

Such steps, however, provide only the bare essential building blocks for a multi-cultural New Zealand. In

addition, Pakehas could learn to adopt facets of other cultures to enrich their own. Maori maraes, for example, could become centres for all New Zealand communities, especially in the cities. They could also become focal points for multi-cultural co-operative enterprises which may help to meet the underemployment challenge.²¹ The embracing of Maori concepts such as fraternity and belonging (*whanaungatanga*); love and understanding (*aroha*) may enable many Pakehas to overcome their own feelings of alienation. Most importantly, though Pakehas could learn to respect the Maori view of land. By trying to build a genuinely multi-cultural New Zealand along the lines suggested we are enlarging our pool of ideas from which to meet our future challenges.

EDUCATION FOR CHANGE

Education can help New Zealanders to develop closer personal relationships, help us overcome challenges, and ease our entry into the post-industrial world. To do these things, education itself must be adaptable to change: it must cater for many different needs, teach people how to learn, and provide them with the ability to make independent decisions.

In its broadest sense education provides the means for passing on knowledge and values from one generation to the next. This is a continuous process and does not depend on schooling. So, even before schooling became universal, young people were educated at home, at worship and at work. The subject matter was usually based on a moral code which was accepted by most. Teaching according to a moral code was carried on by schools and the very organisation of educational institutions tended to mirror the society they served. After the industrial revolution, for example, schools were industrial societies in miniature. Massed classes, authoritarian teachers, rigid routines, rote learning of accepted truths reflected the life in factories.

It can be argued that there is nothing wrong with this. After all, it is the function of an educational system to prepare its charges for life. True. But many of the nation's educational goals still mirror the society created by the industrial revolution. New Zealand society is not like that and if the formal education system is to avoid becoming irrelevant, change must occur. Present alienation and bewilderment won't be cured in the future unless goals and practices are in tune with the times.

Yet it is difficult to describe in any detail what the education system should be like as we cannot know what lies 30 years ahead. So we owe it to our young people to prepare them for any eventuality. They will have to be taught to cope with the diversity they face. Many different educational provisions will have to be made to cope with a wide variety of possible needs.

Western education has already gone some way towards recognising that diversity exists. Within broadly agreed national guidelines, governments consult local communities about the curriculum to be followed in their schools. Even in centralised systems, like New Zealand's, there is now a strong drive for schools and communities to get together in offering suitable programmes. The recent report *Towards Partnership*, for example, recommends that "parents be closely concerned in the education of their children and that . . . schools help parents to take a responsible part in their education."²²

Trends in co-operation are likely to intensify. But partnerships often cause conflict and with the world in flux opinions about what should be the substance of education differ. Some wish traditional concepts of knowledge and skills to be emphasised. Others wish to take education out of institutions altogether. A third wish is for the introduction of curricula emphasising practical skills like farming or computer programming. In democracies, deciding which of the many alternatives to adopt is not easy. Groups of like-minded people exert strong political pressures and right across the western world state education systems have had problems in responding to the diverse aspirations of parent communities.

The future response must be in part structural. While the demand for education is likely to increase, this will not be for compulsory education. In New Zealand there will be fewer children to educate formally. Predictions (medium assumptions), for example, are that by 2001, 70 percent of our people will be older than 19. In 1977 it was 61 percent.²³ So continuing education of adults will become the keystone of the education system. Training, retraining, and refresher courses will be needed. And these should not always be institutionalised. Much of the learning could call for short, periodic commitments. Short courses, weekend schools, evening classes, and self-instructional courses are examples.

Existing school facilities could be used. But so could homes, clubrooms, and factories. Professional educators need not be involved at all. Indeed the diversity of ideas spoken of earlier will lead to organisations putting on courses for their own members. Neighbourhood

committees, local art groups, local history societies, environmental protection committees, churches, and a whole range of occupational groups could become involved. Such network groups may look to their own resources for teachers, course content, and teaching techniques. Some groups may use the latest learning tapes on jointly owned computers. Some may try to learn by going out into the community. Others may prefer to use more traditional instructional methods. Educational institutions will only be used when required. And when taking professional advice, groups will want to be sure that what is taught is presented from their particular viewpoint.²⁴

No doubt traditional subjects will continue to be taught at the compulsory end of the education system. Some uniformity of learning will still be needed. While perhaps not as relevant in 2010 as in the past, reading, 'riting and 'rithmetic will probably still be core disciplines. Computer programming, ecology, and leisure studies may join them as children grow older. Future diversity could mean that the ideas of "deschoolers" like Ivan Illich gain popularity.²⁵ Certainly, mobile education in which students, teachers, and community members interact freely in school as well as on community projects, could be more common.

Change, however, creates its own needs and one of the fundamental needs for students is to learn how to learn. Knowledge, facts, and skills will continue to be perishable. What is learnt in the "Juniors" as fact may be fiction 5 years later. Rules for English usage, for example, are undergoing constant change. Moreover, it is likely that individuals will continue to change their jobs, to move their residence, or to follow new hobbies. Learning efficiency, therefore, will be of great importance. So education must enable individuals to classify and re-classify information, to evaluate fact and fiction, to change categories when necessary, to move from the concrete to the abstract and back, to look at problems from new directions. People must learn to teach themselves: "Tomorrow's illiterate will not be the man who can't read: he will be the man who has not learned how to learn."²⁶

In democracies like New Zealand people will also have to learn to cope emotionally with the perishability of certainty. To offset uncertainty, schools may have to teach their pupils to make rational decisions which are based on widely accepted principles. Given New Zealand's diverse outlooks, such principles cannot be like an absolute moral code. While many people will continue to live according to such codes, some will not. And it could fall to the schools to provide the skills for

decision making. Ivan Snook is a New Zealand educator who has described what such principles may be like. Every decision made, he argues, should aim to minimise the harm it causes; maximise the good it does; be fair to all concerned; have some concern for truth; and respect the freedom of each person to pursue legitimate interests.²⁷

But such principles alone cannot help us to make vital decisions or, indeed, to build closer human relationships in the future. In addition, people will have to be taught how to communicate effectively. In part this means a curriculum which teaches people to articulate their ideas clearly and which shows them how to get access to the media. More important is a curriculum which teaches people how to acquire, interpret, and use information. Every decision requires accurate information. So how well we teach children to handle the information explosion will help determine New Zealand's future. Most important perhaps in the communications process is the ability to listen to the views of others. Without this skill we will find it difficult even to think about following the alternative pathways which this booklet has tried to show exist.



TOWARDS A SCALE WHICH MEETS HUMAN NEEDS

This booklet has tried to convey just three messages. The first is that New Zealand is in a period of rapid social change. We are entering another age in which our patterns of production, our institutions, our social structure, and our values may be quite different from the ones we know. The second message is that such changes pose many challenges. Three have been examined in some detail while others have emerged from discussion of government and human relationships. New Zealanders have to find ways to meet these challenges. The third message is that we can do this in different ways. At present we tend to trust a centralised government to spearhead our transition into post-industrial society. But we don't have to rely on the efforts of a superstate. Whenever alternative pathways have been discussed, the reduction of large-scale living has been mentioned as an alternative.

But is any change of direction possible for New Zealand society? There are many who feel that New Zealanders are conservative people who will change only when there is no other choice. They argue, for example, that the shift in social direction brought about by the welfare state was due to desperation, not to choice. Generally, such sceptics argue, New Zealand institutions resist change. Under a cloak of innovation nothing is ever disturbed.¹ In short, there is really no alternative to the post-industrial superstate.

This booklet has tried to show that powerful forces for change exist in our times. The profound impact of computer technology, for example, cannot be denied. The women's movement could be an agent of profound change. American feminist Charlotte Bunch, indeed, thinks that feminism will eventually have as great an influence on changes in human affairs as had the industrial revolution.² The energy crisis too will bring about change as New Zealand's bountiful supply of alternative energy resources will encourage both economic and social changes.

And New Zealand society is not as resistant to change as the sceptics would have us believe. A look at the weekly television programme *Country Calendar* suggests that inventiveness is alive and well in New Zealand. There is some research evidence to support such intuition. A 1968 study found that New Zealand was the most advanced of fifty countries surveyed in adapting to change.³ Our political system is practical and responds easily to pressures and our media can

penetrate to and inform all levels of New Zealand society. We are heir to liberal, Christian, socialist and Maori traditions, which allow or encourage the development of smaller scale living. Yet our greatest strength, perhaps, is that we are not bound by the ideas of one strong, unifying tradition. We do have the opportunity to seek new directions. What then are some of the main choices open to us?

PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION

How can we use changing work and production patterns to ensure for everyone the means of making an adequate living?

We could aim for a high rate of economic growth and remain heavily dependent on trade with other nations. We could place faith in agricultural and forestry products and pay incentives to increase productivity. We could use our resource endowment to industrialise. Meat, wool, and wood products could be processed before export. Steel, cement, transport fuel, and plastics industries could be developed.

For a large-scale pursuit of economic growth we may have to pay a large social price. Economic success built on industrialisation and the payment of incentives requires high capital investment. For us to be competitive may require the full exploitation of the newest and most expensive, labour-saving technologies. The idea that people have a right to lifetime employment would therefore almost certainly have to be sacrificed. People's working life could be reduced and regulated. As investment in industrial development may take priority, there may be little capital available for huge welfare spending. So, particularly for unskilled people, the age-old gap between their material expectations and their income may not be bridged in the formal economy.

An informal economy could soak up the unemployed.⁴ Those unemployed could join work co-operatives to do voluntary community work, or mutual repairs, or minor construction projects. However, there could be a dangerous side to such an informal economy. Cheap, home-based piece-work labour could be exploited by manufacturers; personal servants could reappear in the homes of the rich; and the manufacture of forbidden goods such as drugs could

become a thriving industry. Social tensions between those in the formal and informal economy could intensify to the point of class war.

Alternatively New Zealand could try to develop a society based almost entirely on renewable resources. We could still grow luxury products for luxury markets, but aim to become more self-sufficient and less dependent on trade. Agriculture could still be central to our economy with forestry assuming a greater role. Some large-scale processing, of wood pulp and wool products for example, could still be done.

But there could be a deliberate effort to limit the impact of job-taking technologies. People could be helped to return to labour intensive farming, especially horticulture. Luxury fruits, nuts, and vegetables could be grown as could grain and root crops. We could export boats, woven goods, computer programmes, educational resources like our knowledge in the biological sciences, and high quality furniture made from our clearwood. This alternative makes a virtue out of the informal economy by utilising the traditional home production skills of New Zealanders. People working in this economy would be self-employed entrepreneurs, not unemployed dropouts, and would not suffer in comparison with formally employed people.

THE GROWTH OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

How large will we permit our institutions to grow?

We certainly could encourage the superstate to grow even more. Specialist bureaucracies could be nurtured by creating more planning, social welfare, and protective public bodies. Centralised interest groups, producer and consumer lobbies could also be encouraged to grow. Together, a strong central government and powerful private interest groups could make all crucial decisions.

A centralised New Zealand is not necessarily undemocratic. True, citizens at the periphery of the centralised decision-making process would have little say in, for example, direct bargaining. Much can be done, however, to maintain such people's democratic involvement. Referenda could be held frequently; people could be encouraged to join pressure groups, political parties and welfare organisations. A new electoral system could be introduced and a Bill of Rights passed.

Alternatively, we could decentralise our developing superstate. This does not mean a New Zealand split into a number of largely independent and parochial mini-states competing with each other. Parliament could still set broad policy guidelines. Some functions could be retained at the centre: justice, defence and transport, for example. But regional and local authorities could have clearly defined powers to administer policy guidelines, particularly in education, social welfare, and health.

A small-scale New Zealand is not necessarily democratic. Indeed local government without any clearly defined powers could promote rather than reduce apathy, allowing government by an elite few. Nevertheless, there is a greater opportunity for wide public involvement when crucial decisions are made at community levels. Bureaucracies would be smaller and there would be little need for nationwide interest groups. And decision makers who live in their own communities would be responsible for their decisions in a very personal way.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

How big a gap should we allow between the powerful and the powerless, the experts and the information deficient, the materially well-off and the poor?

In New Zealand, educational achievement helps to provide jobs, status, and power, so this question is partly one of how generously we provide opportunities for education. We can continue our policy of automatic access to primary and secondary schooling which caters for students over a wide range of interests and abilities. Students wanting professional jobs, however, would have to pass entrance standards. Such a policy of equal access to education seems to be very fair. But research suggests that people who come from minority ethnic groups or from manual-worker backgrounds have less access to higher education than do students from professional backgrounds.⁵

A number of alternatives are open to us if we feel this is either unjust or wasteful of our resources. We could, for example, provide more special help to disadvantaged groups. We could also toughen entry requirements at all levels of the formal education system. In this way we could try to select for advancement students who come from social groups which have in the past been successful in jumping education hurdles. A further possibility is for formal

education to be downgraded. A minimum of early schooling could be supplemented in later years by attendance at open universities, community colleges, and local learning exchanges. This latter alternative would afford the greatest flexibility in a changing world, but could also reduce our pool of formally trained specialists.

Another facet of the question about our future social structure is to decide the degree to which the state should provide a safety net for needy individuals. New Zealanders are not entirely clear about the extent to which they wish the welfare state to be maintained. Although we will probably not bring ourselves to force the weak to fend for themselves entirely without support, we could decide to cut our welfare services markedly. Or we could strengthen the welfare efforts of the superstate. A total assault to bridge the gap between privileged and unprivileged could be launched. In addition to money benefits, work could be guaranteed to all, leisure facilities could be extended and pay could be assigned according to need and not according to qualification.

Alternatively, a small-scale, bottom-up approach to social welfare could relieve the superstate of its burdens. Every effort could be made to strengthen small communities and neighbourhoods because of the support they provide. Churches could take up welfare work in a big way. They could provide much of the physical and emotional support for those in need. We could try to develop a welfare system which tries to prevent rather than cure social ills. Thus, work co-operatives could give rise to new family arrangements. Continuing education could be provided in very informal settings. The Wairarapa Community Action Programme (CAP) and Workers Educational Associations which operate now could become prototypes for many. General health care could be provided in small local health centres by volunteer as well as by para-medical workers and doctors.

A third factor to be considered when discussing our future social structure is the question of social organisation. We could continue to organise our society on a hierarchical basis. Certainly in a large scale setting there is something comforting about the stable structure of organisations in which each person has a clearly defined role and place. But hierarchies also breed stodginess and encourage the rise of a few experts to top positions.

Alternatives tend to be less stable, less certain, and more creative. Particularly in a decentralised New Zealand we could develop more non-hierarchical forms. Matrix structures, for example, develop expertise as

each member of a matrix group has special skills. But as the skills needed to solve tasks change, the status of the task force members alters. Members of network groups, another form of social organisation, come together only when there is a problem in search of a solution. There is no recognised leadership and decisions are made after a series of "brainstorming" sessions have thrown up a wide range of ideas.⁶

VALUES

How can we improve the quality of our lives?

In addition to the questions raised in this booklet, we will have to answer questions of resource and land use and New Zealand's place in the world. Most important, perhaps, we have to explore what New Zealanders understand by quality of life. We must clarify what we mean when we talk about private enterprise, co-operation, or participation, for example. We could do this by deciding on national goals which attempt to meet the basic human needs of all our people.

But how can we agree on one of the hundreds of combinations of choices that have just been projected and represent only a fraction of the possibilities open to New Zealand? One answer is that we do not have to agree on just one social pattern. People are different and try to meet their human needs in different ways. So whatever society we choose to develop should not be a closed one. It will be impossible to meet basic human needs in a society which prescribes only one lifestyle. So the New Zealand of the future could encourage people to practise different lifestyles in different ways. Indeed, we may need different people, approaches, and institutions to meet our many different challenges of the future.

Yet a consensus will have to be reached on some key issues. A society whose members are travelling in completely different directions is no society at all. How can we decide on key issues? We must discuss the future according to more objective criteria than entrenched value positions. The last part of this booklet attempts to provide some criteria founded on the assumption that a more satisfying future for all is one in which everyone can satisfy their basic human needs.

Such needs are without doubt numerous. And for more than 30 years social scientists have produced lists and categories by the dozen.⁷ Underpinning the thoughts of many of them is the work of the American psychologist Abraham Maslow.⁸ He argued that there were five basic human needs which had to be satisfied





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MEETING HUMAN NEEDS:







HOW WELL ARE WE COPING?

NOTES

1. Indicators are highly selective and aggregated
2. ——— Historical trends
3. ——— Linear Projection:
This could happen if
past and present trends
continued unchanged
to 2000 AD



Source: M. P. Venter, Indicators of Social Need, CFF, 1979 (Held at CFF)



before people could function adequately as human beings. He organised these needs into a hierarchy. At each level, certain needs determine the values and patterns of an individual's behaviour. At the survival level, the individual prizes health-care and shelter most highly. Once these desires are satisfied, he moves on to try to satisfy the other needs. Here are the needs in priority order.

- (1) **Survival needs.** People need food, clothing, shelter and health-care in order to stay alive.
- (2) **Safety or security needs.** When the survival needs are satisfied people want to keep and protect what they have. They start trying to stabilise their environment for the future.
- (3) **Social needs.** As their environment becomes more stable, people seek to be part of something larger than themselves. They want to belong, to share, and to give and receive friendship and love.
- (4) **Self-satisfaction needs.** People want to feel good about themselves, to be self-confident, independent, and be recognised and respected by peers.
- (5) **Self-fulfillment needs.** People have a need for growth, self-development, achievement. They want to realize the full range of their potential as human beings.

Can the existing superstate meet these needs best, or could a smaller scale society do better? To help discussion it may be useful to know how well New Zealanders' human needs are satisfied now. Are we doing better or worse in the late 1970s than we did in 1960? If we are meeting needs more adequately now, should we encourage the further growth of the superstate? If we are meeting needs less adequately now than 20 years ago, what direction should we take?

While the indicators used for this discussion are still fairly crude in that they do not distinguish age, sex, racial, and geographical differences and do not exhaust all possible measures of human needs, it is possible to make two general points with them. The first is that in most of the areas measured by the United Nations (UN), New Zealand's quality of life compares very well with that of the rest of the world. For example, in 1970 the expectation of life at birth was 71.9 years for New Zealanders, but averaged only 61.4 years for the 76 countries in the UN survey. Our consumption per person of protein was the third highest out of a sample of 98 countries; our rate of enrolment in higher education was the fifth highest out of 97 countries and

we ranked eighth out of 90 countries in possession of television sets per 1000 people.⁹

The second point that can be made from available indicators is that the internal historical trends are less reassuring. For example, how well are basic survival needs being met when health care over the last 20 years shows trends such as:

- Men's life expectancy from birth increased from 68 years in 1956 to 69 years in 1976. But at the age of 40 men's life expectancy was no greater in 1976 than it had been in 1956.
- Although the total death rate per 1000 infants aged between 1 month and 1 year declined between 1956 and 1976 by 40 percent, it stayed the same at 6 deaths per 1000 for the non-Maori population.
- Since the 1930s we have eaten more than good health demands. In 1976 our average calorie intake was 25 percent more than we needed.
- Although infectious diseases like tuberculosis have been almost eliminated since 1900, 2½ people in every hundred could expect to die of coronary heart disease in 1973 compared to 1 in 100 at the dawn of the century. The chances of dying of cancer have nearly trebled in this period.¹⁰
- Visits to the local doctor (GP) declined by 11.2 percent per head of population between 1960 and 1974.

If there is a question mark over how well we are meeting one of the most basic of human needs, how well do we meet the higher needs in Maslow's hierarchy? The display provides some indications. The trends pictured give rise to more serious questions about our social future. How well are we meeting security needs, for example, when offences against property and accident rates are rising? How well are people's needs of belonging satisfied when *per capita* consumption of alcohol, for example, is rising? How well are self-satisfaction needs met when people find it increasingly hard to own their own homes and when unemployment is mushrooming? Do the trends towards higher educational standards and greater use of library books offset the decline in a person's chance to be self-employed?

New Zealanders have to face questions like these now for they alone have the right to decide the direction New Zealand should take into the future world. Yet decisions about our development are being made daily by decision makers in government and private enterprise in a very piecemeal way. So, if ordinary people are to influence our future, they must speak out now. There are a number of channels open to them.

There are many formal ways of making submissions to government. There are also better ways of being heard. A few determined people can educate the people in the many social networks, like the service club, church, gang or political parties' networks. The media, particularly the community radio network, does publicise new ideas and provides a forum for discussion. People can get involved in the deliberations of local planning bodies or in the discussion programme of the CFF (P.O. Box 5053, Wellington). Once New Zealanders have determined a sense of direction, the strategies for achieving the society we want can be worked out — and that is the task the CFF wishes to tackle next.

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This
discussion booklet
tries to convey three messages. The
first is that New Zealand is in a period of
rapid social change. We are entering an age
in which our institutions, our economy, our
social structure, and our values may be quite
different from the ones we know. The second
message is that such changes pose many challenges.
Three are examined in some detail while others emerge
from discussion of the future of government and
human relationships. The third message is that we
can meet challenges either by trusting a cen-
tralised government to lead us on
our journey into the new world, or
by reducing the influences
of government.