


Who Makes Social Policy?



New Zealand Planning Council

WHO MAKES SOCIAL POLICY?

NZPC No. 20

New Zealand Planning Council
P.O. Box 5066
Wellington

March 1982

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ISSN 0110-6104
ISBN 0-908601-20-4

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The working group would like to thank the following people for their help.

Mr W. L. Renwick (*Department of Education*); Mr Bill Mansfield (*Ministry of Foreign Affairs*); Dr H. J. Hiddlestone, Mr John Martin (*Department of Health*); Mr E. J. Babe, Mr Brian Conroy (*Housing Corporation of New Zealand*); Mr J. N. L. Searle, Mr Bob Cater, Mr Mike Fitzgerald (*Department of Internal Affairs*); Mr J. F. Robertson, Mr Mel Smith (*Department of Justice*); Mr G. L. Jackson, Ms Carol Fuller, Mr David Imray, Ms Margaret Smith (*Department of Labour*); Ms Adrienne von Tunzelmann, Mr Richard Carson (*Legislative Department*); Mr Kara Puketapu (*Department of Maori Affairs*); Mr G. C. Hensley, Mr P. G. Millen, Ms Colleen Pilgrim (*Prime Minister's Department*); Mr S. J. Callahan, Mr Bill Benton, Dr Judith Johnston, Mr Alan Nixon (*Department of Social Welfare*); Dr M. Probine, Mr Simon Arnold, Mr Derek Williams, Mr Selwyn Wilson (*State Services Commission*); Mr B. V. Galvin, Mr Peter McKinlay, Mr Kevin Sampson, Mr Kaese Westrate (*Treasury*); Mr N. C. McLeod, Dr Charles Crothers, Mr Ted Fraser, Mr Bob Norman, Ms Kay Switzer (*Ministry of Works and Development*).

Dame Miriam Dell, Ms Nicky Hill (*Committee on Women*); Mr George Porter, Mr Colin McMahon (*Environmental Council*); Mr Ian Lawrence (*National Housing Commission*); Mr Lance Cross, Ms Janet Alexander (*New Zealand Council for Recreation and Sport*); Mr John Kennedy-Good, Mr David Simmers (*New Zealand Council of Social Service*); Sir Graham Latimer (*New Zealand Maori Council*); Sir Frank Holmes, Mrs Jill Burch (*New Zealand Planning*

Council); Miss Joan Kerr, Mr Michael Volkerling, Mr Jim Booth (*Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council of New Zealand*); Mr Ted Gallen, Ms Barbara Holt (*Social Development Council*); Sir Alan Danks, Mr Hugh Evans, Ms Lynette Motte-Harrison (*Special Advisory Committee on Health Services Organisation*).

Mr John Murray, Mrs Rachael Plimmer (*Combined Methodist and Presbyterian Public Questions Committee*); Mr Peter Clements (*Concerned Parents Association*); Mrs Topsy Ratahi, Mrs Marion Antonievich (*Maori Womens Welfare League*); Mrs Vivienne Boyd, Mrs Ruth Wylie (*National Council of Women in New Zealand*); Mr Kevin Green, Mr Geoff Smith (*National Gay Rights Coalition*); Mr Geoff Stanton, Ms Anne Thompson (*New Zealand Association of Social Workers*); Mr Ross Martin (*New Zealand Chambers of Commerce*); Mr Ken Douglas, Mr Alf Kirk (*New Zealand Federation of Labour*); Mr J. B. Munro, Mrs Marion Bruce (*New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations*); Mr Doug Leuchars, Mr Cliff Penny (*New Zealand Returned Services Association*); Mrs J. Andrews (*Royal New Zealand Plunket Society*).

Mr Tony Friedlander, M.P., Mr Geoffrey Palmer, M.P., Ms Marilyn Waring, M.P.; Mr David Lloyd (*Government Research Unit*); Mr John Henderson, Ms Rae Julian (*Opposition Research Unit*); Mr Barry Leay (*New Zealand National Party*); Mr F. Morgan (*Social Credit Political League*).

Mr T. J. Tetley (*Hospital Boards Association*); Mr J. M. Wright (*Municipal Association*); Councillor Hazel Bibby (*Wellington City Council*); Miss Avery Jack (*Victoria University of Wellington*).

FOREWORD

The Planning Council has repeatedly emphasised that planning is for people—to be used as a means for improving the quality of New Zealanders' lives. The New Zealand Planning Act recognises that in planning, both the Government and Planning Council must be concerned with social, cultural, and environmental issues as well as with economic considerations. As the 1976 Task Force on Economic and Social Planning put it, "Society is not a collection of separate economic, social, cultural, physical, and spiritual parts, but a living organism whose health depends on the soundness and harmonious interaction of the elements which analysts have labelled with these terms".

The Planning Council has been criticised for giving more weight to economic than to social issues. I believe that this criticism is too harsh. We have reported on some of the nation's most vital social issues in our documents *The Welfare State?* and *Employment*, for example. In our general strategy papers, such as *Planning Perspectives* and *Directions*, we have tried to integrate social and economic elements of policy. Nevertheless we have found much more information and research available in areas generally labelled "economic" than in areas labelled "social". This has naturally affected the balance of our analysis and our policy recommendations.

In any event, the Planning Council is a small organisation charged, among other things, with helping the Government to pull together into some sort of national overview the more detailed planning being done by the Government itself, by various advisory agencies, and by the private sector. It is part of our function to monitor the effectiveness of this more detailed planning, to help improve its performance, and to relate it

more effectively to national planning and policy-making.

When we reviewed social development plans and policies in preparing our report *Directions* in 1980-81, we became concerned that the mechanisms for planning social development were not working as effectively as they might. For example, a leading advisory agency, the Social Development Council, had been without a chairperson for some time and there was no clarity about its future role and work programme. The then Minister of Social Welfare and his department agreed that it would be useful for the Planning Council to study the mechanisms which had been established for planning social development and to consider what might be done to improve them.

The present report is largely descriptive and interpretive. It reaches conclusions, but stops short of making recommendations for improvement. I believe that its analysis and conclusions will be useful to many people concerned with social policy, inside and outside the Government system. It will also be used as an important basis for a report on improvements in planning which the Council is currently completing.

The work for this report was undertaken by a group headed by Peggy Koopman-Boyden of the Planning Council, with Judith Davey of the Planning Secretariat and Juliet Elworthy of the Department of Social Welfare. The Council is grateful to the Director-General of Social Welfare for making Juliet Elworthy available for this work on a secondment of several months.

Frank Holmes,
Chairman.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

The aims of this study are:

- To examine and describe the mechanisms for shaping social policy at the national level.
- To show how the responsibility for advising the Government on social policy is allocated.
- To suggest how social planning processes could be improved and better integrated.

Social planning is used here as an umbrella term to describe a series of activities which should operate at all levels in society—nationally, regionally, and locally. Social planning then includes setting social objectives, shaping social policies, and developing ways to implement and evaluate them. This study deals with only part of social planning—it examines how social policy is made at the national level.

Despite many attempts, there is no generally accepted and concise definition of social policy. Often definitions include the term *social welfare*. This, however, has come to be associated with Government-provided services and income, especially monetary benefits. Associating social welfare with social policy thus results in too narrow a definition. *Well-being* is preferred to *welfare*. Thus the aim of social policy is to promote the well-being of people in the broadest sense.

The shaping of social policy and its implementation are closely inter-related.

However, in this report we distinguish between the two and concentrate on how social policy is made. The details of how policies are put into practice, in the programmes of Government departments, are therefore excluded from the present definition, but would not however be excluded from the social planning concept.

It is not the intention of this report to emphasise differences between social and economic planning. Both social and economic policies aim to promote social well-being. The report will show up weaknesses and imbalances in the social policy mechanisms at the national level and will attempt to explain the reasons for this. However, this does not imply that economic planning does not have its own shortcomings. Greater efforts in both economic and social planning, and in their integration, are required for progress to be made.

The questions asked in this study are basic to our understanding of social policy and of the mechanisms which shape it in the central government context:

- Where do the major influences on social policy come from?
- Which bodies or persons are active in this area?
- How do they operate?
- How effective are they?

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

The information in this study was obtained partly from published and unpublished documents, but the more important and more valuable source was a series of about 80 interviews with people directly involved in the processes. Different questionnaires were used for meetings with Government departments, advisory bodies, and interest groups. Often the interviews were unstructured though certain key topics were covered. Meetings with senior officers in 11 Government departments (with the permanent head in 8 instances) took place in April and May 1981. These were followed up by interviews with divisional heads, and often several other officers from a department also took part. The departments were selected for their relevance to, and interest in, social policy. They were:

Department of Education
Department of Health
Housing Corporation of New Zealand
Department of Internal Affairs
Department of Justice
Department of Labour
Department of Maori Affairs
Prime Minister's Department
(Advisory Group)
Department of Social Welfare
The Treasury
Ministry of Works and Development

The executive officers and chairpersons of 11 advisory bodies were interviewed during April–June 1981. The advisory bodies were also selected for their relevance to social policy, and an attempt was made to cover a cross section of interest areas. They were:

Committee on Women (now Advisory Committee on Women's Affairs)
Environmental Council (specifically the Urban Affairs Committee)
National Housing Commission
New Zealand Council for Recreation and Sport
New Zealand Council of Social Service
New Zealand Maori Council
New Zealand Planning Council
Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council
Social Development Council
Special Advisory Committee on Health Services Organisation (SACHSO)
Vocational Training Council

Selecting a cross section of interest groups was most difficult. Groups had to be chosen to represent major topic areas such as health, education, and the Maori people, but they also had to be chosen to represent large and small groups, those organised formally, and those with more flexible arrangements. All had to be operating nationally and to have shown interest in influencing national social policy. The 11 chosen were:

Combined Methodist and Presbyterian Church Public Questions Committee
Concerned Parents Association
Maori Women's Welfare League
National Council of Women of New Zealand
National Gay Rights Coalition
New Zealand Association of Social Workers
New Zealand Chambers of Commerce
New Zealand Federation of Labour
New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations
New Zealand Returned Services Association
Royal New Zealand Plunket Society

Several of these bodies are in fact federations of voluntary organisations and interest groups (e.g., National Council of Women, Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations) which gives them a broad basis of support. The national executive officers and national presidents (or their equivalent) of these groups were interviewed in June and July 1981.

Officers from the bodies which have been listed were not the only people consulted in the course of the study. Discussions were also held with members of parliament, political party officers, cabinet staff, and others concerned with social administration and social research. (A full list is included in the acknowledgments.) Many of the statements made in this report are based, therefore, on the perception of people who are very close to the social planning mechanisms. This closeness may result in attention to the finer details of how the mechanisms work rather than an overall view. It is also possible that insiders and outsiders may view the same mechanisms and processes differently, thus creating contradictions. Hence it has frequently been difficult to arrive at a conclusion which all commentators would agree on.

CHAPTER 2 MODEL OF SOCIAL POLICY FORMULATION

Who makes social policy? Many influences help to shape it, and figure 1 depicts the main elements in a simplified diagram. Although this does not show the nature and strengths of the influences at work, it is an aid to explaining a complex pattern of contacts and interactions. Figure 2 gives more detail of the central policy-makers in figure 1. Later sections of the report examine the various influences on social policy in more detail, showing how

they operate and how effective they are, but briefly the main elements in the model are:

- *The Executive Machinery* which comprises Cabinet (the main body which adopts policy and initiates action on it), its committees, and the officials' committees which serve them.
- *The Government Caucus* which is supported by its committees and the Government research unit.




Figure 1: Model of Social Policy Formulation.




Figure 2: Central Policy-makers Input Systems.

- *Select Committees* which are committees of members of parliament, appointed by the House, and which exist for the life of a parliament or for a specified time.
- *Government Departments* which have a dual role in that they devise policies and administer programmes to implement them. The Treasury in its supervision of expenditure has a special role. So too does the Prime Minister's advisory and liaison group (part of the Prime Minister's Department).
- *Advisory Bodies* which are mostly created by the Government to serve special purposes.
- *Political Parties* which state their policy intentions in party manifestos. The party in power is a strong influence on policy, but even so, not all of its intentions will be put into effect.
- *Interest groups* which include pressure groups, voluntary organisations, professional organisations, trade unions and so on. Their influence acts through lobbying in the widest sense.
- *Regional and local bodies* which have the potential to influence national policies. Figure 1 shows a two-way flow between local authorities and the community, similar to that shown for Government departments.
- *International influences* which work indirectly through individual and group

contacts and directly through international agencies (such as OECD, UNESCO, and WHO), which may ask the New Zealand Government to support international action, for example on working conditions, health standards, or anti-discrimination policy.

- *Informal advice* which comes from individuals who act as informal advisors to ministers. They may, or may not, be associated with the other sources of influence, but their points of view are given greater weight because they are known and trusted.
- *The news media* which channel opinions from the general public and from interest groups. They also inform the public by reporting and interpreting the policy

statements and actions of the decision-makers.

Figure 1 also shows, influence is coming from the general public. People express their needs and aspirations to their members of parliament, and through political parties and interest groups of various types. As consumers of services people may make their views known through local authorities, regional boards (for education or hospital services), and regional offices of Government departments. They also have a direct link to the Government and Government departments by letter writing (a form of lobbying), and inquiries. All citizens have a passive influence on social policies through data-gathering exercises such as the census.

CHAPTER 3 CENTRAL DECISION-MAKING MACHINERY

The Cabinet

The Cabinet is the prime decision-making body in New Zealand's system of government and the body which has the greatest executive power. It is in the Cabinet that policy proposals are brought together, compared and co-ordinated. The role of the Cabinet is described in the Cabinet Office Manual as:

1. to oversee the implementation of the Government's policy mandate from the electorate;
2. to initiate policies that meet new challenges or cope with unforeseen circumstances;
3. to co-ordinate the work of Ministers;
4. to determine the nature of legislation to be submitted to parliament . . . (Section A, para 3.2)

At the same time, the Cabinet system is informal in that it has no basis in law. There is no legislation governing Cabinet committees, their numbers, their powers, or their procedures.

The Cabinet committees may be divided into 3 groups; those with regular meeting times—Economic, State Services, Expenditure, Works, Legislation; those which meet from time to time, but which may have bursts of activity—Family and Social Affairs, Transport, Communications, Defence; and those which meet only when necessary—Civil Defence, Science, and Terrorism. There are also ad hoc groups within the Cabinet system such as the Cabinet Committee on National Development.

The purpose of the Cabinet committees is to facilitate Cabinet business. The processes by which they operate are laid down very clearly in the Cabinet Office Manual. Many of the decisions are reached in the course of preparatory work, and submissions on a Cabinet or Cabinet committee agenda, usually give clear recommendations for action. As a general rule, submissions must originate from, and be signed by ministers. If a recommendation in a submission affects another portfolio, evidence of consultation

must be presented, otherwise the submission may not be included on the agenda. If there are financial implications, a Treasury report must accompany the submission. If there are staffing matters involved, there must be a report from the State Services Commission. Thus additional opinions on the proposals are introduced. These procedures allow the Cabinet to enforce co-ordination between departments.

In 1981 all members of Cabinet committees were ministers, with the Prime Minister *ex officio* on all committees. Ministers who are not on a particular committee are usually invited to join the discussion on any items that concern their portfolios. Departmental officers attend most of the Cabinet committee meetings. Occasionally, interest group representatives may be invited; for example, officers from the Combined State Unions, the Federation of Labour, or the producer boards. More rarely, people from advisory boards may attend meetings (the chairpersons of the Vocational Training Council and Social Work Training Council have attended to discuss training schemes).

A few Cabinet committees are supported by committees of officials representing relevant departments. These committees act as clearing houses for proposals and papers. During 1981 the officials committee which served the Cabinet Committee on Family and Social Affairs was chaired by the Director-General of Social Welfare, and the committee which served the Cabinet Economic Committee was chaired by the Secretary to the Treasury. Otherwise Cabinet committees are serviced by ad hoc groups of officials.

In general the Cabinet committees have more delegated authority than in other governments based on the Westminster model, but their powers vary considerably. For example, the Cabinet Economic Committee can commit expenditure virtually without limit, but the Expenditure Committee operates within specific expenditure limits. Considerable delegated authority is given to the Works and State Services Committees. Others, such as the

Cabinet Committee on Family and Social Affairs, have the power to make only recommendations to the Cabinet, and sometimes these are referred to the Expenditure Committee, so that their financial implications may be examined.

Because they lack formal status, the Cabinet committees can be readily changed or disbanded. Under the 1972–75 Labour Government, a Cabinet Committee on Policy and Priorities (which among other things took over the functions of the National Development Council) temporarily eclipsed the Economic Committee. Now the Committee on Policy and Priorities has disappeared, and the Economic Committee has regained a leading role. In 1975 there was a separate Family Affairs Cabinet Committee, as well as one on social affairs, but these were merged in 1978. Committees concerned with social affairs have, however, never had high status, or substantial agendas. The prominence of economic matters is reflected in the Cabinet committee structure.

Many factors may influence the status of these committees and the political ones must not be overlooked. A committee's status may reflect the portfolio interests and political standing of its members and chairperson. Political tactics and convenience can also determine how, when, where, and by whom an issue is presented. For example, a minister may refer a matter to the Cabinet to test opinion while knowing full well that it will be referred to a committee.

Cabinet Committee on Family and Social Affairs

From its title, the Cabinet Committee on Family and Social Affairs ought to be the key body for the consideration of social policy in the Cabinet framework. Its terms of reference are impressive. They are set out in the Cabinet Office Manual, Annex 6, as:

- To consider and keep under review government policy on family and social affairs.
- To examine all new and existing legislation to ensure that the Government introduces no measures that are inimical to family life and makes all possible effort to include in proposed legislation measures which will strengthen family life.

- To co-ordinate its activities with the Cabinet Economic Committee so that when a proposal in the social field has been developed to the stage at which more detailed consideration must be given to its economic and financial implications, it may report the proposal to the Cabinet prior to any reference to the Cabinet Economic Committee.
- To establish broad priorities between social policies, and in respect of the priority to be assigned to particular social policies, to liaise with the Cabinet Committee on Expenditure.
- To consider any such matters as may be referred to it by the Cabinet.

Its monitoring function is also defined in the Cabinet Office Manual. Departments preparing bills or regulations which have significant implications for family life are asked to confer with the secretariat of the Officials Committee on Family and Social Affairs (provided by the Department of Social Welfare) and to refer them to the officials committee. Although this is supposed to take place as early as possible in the drafting process, in practice it is often neglected. The expectation that such systematic monitoring would encompass a broad range of legislation, have not been fulfilled. In addition, many matters which could usefully have been referred from the Cabinet Economic Committee, or from the Cabinet itself, because of their social implications, bypass the Committee on Family and Social Affairs. The general perception of the Committee is that it is neither strong, nor important, especially compared with Economic or Expenditure Committees.

Many basic decisions on social policy are made by the Cabinet without further consultation, after it has been advised by the Expenditure Committee. This may be taken to mean that social policy is being given the highest consideration because of its importance, or because many social policy issues are sensitive politically. However, if the Cabinet Committee on Family and Social Affairs is not consulted, officials with a detailed knowledge of the issues are not able to contribute. Also opportunities for co-ordination and integration offered by the Committee on Family and Social Affairs and its officials' committee, may be missed.

Social policy issues are treated in this way by the Cabinet for several reasons—some of these also apply to other aspects of social planning. They include the ministers' belief that they already have a good grasp of social matters from their general experience. Facts and statistics and, more especially, the means of making quantitative assessments, are frequently lacking in the social area in comparison to economic planning, in which several sets of indicators have been accepted as valid measurements.

It is also significant that in the social policy departments the greater part of the financial vote is taken by fixed programmes, such as superannuation benefits in Social Welfare and teachers' salaries in Education. Thus there is little financial room to manoeuvre, and this restricts the possibilities of introducing new policy. Little change is likely unless the departmental programmes are radically revised, and this may entail the weeding out of old policies which is extremely difficult in practice.

To illustrate the processes which are involved in the interaction between the Cabinet and a department, an example may be useful. This, however, shows only what may happen. No two issues are likely to follow the same sequence of procedures. Suppose a proposal is developed in the Department of Social Welfare to improve the treatment of young offenders. Other concerned departments such as Justice, Police, and Maori Affairs are consulted, and reports are sent to the Officials Committee on Family and Social Affairs. Although up to 11 departments may be represented on this committee, those present at any meeting will reflect the subject to be discussed. The Convenor of the Officials Committee calls together working groups as appropriate, and decides their composition and who will chair them. Several such groups may exist at any time.

Papers are passed on to the Cabinet Committee on Family and Social Affairs, and if the committee agrees, the proposal is recommended to the Cabinet (or to another Cabinet committee). It may then be referred back to the Expenditure Committee where it is compared with other proposals requiring funding, even though a Treasury report on it will have been attached at an earlier stage. Most proposals therefore have

to pass through several Cabinet committees as they are considered. Sometimes papers may go directly to the minister and be referred back to an officials working group from the Cabinet committee. There is, in fact, no set procedure or sequence of referrals. This makes it harder to keep track of issues and proposals as they are considered, but it does allow flexibility and a considerable amount of informal consultation.

Once the funding hurdle is passed, if the proposal requires legislation, it will go to the Cabinet Committee on Legislation for a drafting priority and finally, in draft bill form, to the Cabinet. After its introduction in the House, the bill would be referred to a select committee, where a wider viewpoint would be brought to bear on it. These procedures are examined in a later section.

Comparison with the Economic and Expenditure Committees

The weak position of the Cabinet Committee on Family and Social Affairs is highlighted when its role is compared with the roles of the Economic and Expenditure Committees. The main terms of reference of the Cabinet Economic Committee are to consider and keep under review economic and financial matters, including trade policy and the development and allocation of national resources. It may authorise and commit expenditure for these activities. The committee has extensive delegated authority although matters of great public interest, and matters on which the committee is divided, are referred to the Cabinet for the final decision.

The Cabinet Committee on Expenditure was established in 1976. It administers the review of new policies; this was previously done by the Committee on Policy and Priorities. This review, which is examined in greater detail below, is tied in with the annual budget cycle; it allows better co-ordination in developing new programmes and reviewing existing policies. It also brings politicians more closely into the resource allocation process.

In contrast to this, the Cabinet Committee on Family and Social Affairs, has no delegated funding authority but can influence policy through the recommendations it makes to the Cabinet. This committee appears not to be fulfilling

its potential for co-ordination and planning in the social area. It is not used sufficiently to explore the social implications of new policies and proposals and to draw upon the expertise of the departments which contribute to its work. It is at a disadvantage in relation to the mechanisms which use financial criteria in their decision-making. These criteria are easier to define and to apply than criteria for assessing social benefit. Information on the social implications of development projects, the evaluation of new and existing policies and the promotion and co-ordination of welfare initiatives arising from work in the Department of Social Welfare and other departments could be brought forward through the Cabinet Committee on Family and Social Affairs. This would improve the input into policy-making at the Cabinet level. However, the political will to use the committee and to recognise its significance and potential is still essential.

Caucus

Both the Government and the Opposition hold regular caucus meetings attended only by their members of parliament. The meetings are informal and all members are considered to be equal, but the proceedings are confidential. This section concentrates on the Government caucus because it has the greater potential to influence policy formulation. (The role of the Opposition Caucus is outlined on page 33.) About half of the Government caucus are ministers and therefore members of the Cabinet. Communications from caucus and its committees to the Cabinet must be channelled through the appropriate minister.

As with many of the institutions of central government, there are different perceptions of the role of the Government caucus, its political strength, and its influence on policy-making. It has been described as having real power, and acting as a constraint on the Cabinet's power. It has been seen as a sounding-board for policymakers. In a more passive role, caucus has also been described as a rubber-stamp for the Cabinet. The power of caucus appears to wax and wane with changes in the political scene, but in mid-1981 commentators agreed that the

Government caucus was increasing in influence, a trend illustrated by much earlier and more thorough consultation of caucus by the Cabinet on legislative proposals.

Any important matter originating in a department and brought through the Cabinet committee procedures, just described, is referred to caucus—sometimes before and sometimes after a Cabinet committee has considered it. This provides a means for ministers to test the general opinion on a proposed policy. Government bills are always referred to caucus before they are introduced into the House. This gives Government members the opportunity to be better prepared for debates than Opposition members. Although decisions made in caucus must be confirmed by the Cabinet, in practice, the Cabinet would be unlikely to pursue a course of action against a majority of caucus opinion. Many factors operate in defining the balance of power between Cabinet and caucus—the amount of unanimity in both Cabinet and caucus, the personalities of the ministers involved, the size of the Government majority, the strength of public interest.

Both Government and Opposition caucuses are served by standing committees, ad hoc committees, and informal groups. All these bodies are composed of members of parliament and although ministers may be members, they do not usually chair them. The frequency of their meetings depends on what is being considered, the wishes of the chairperson, and the time of the year or the parliamentary term. The status of a caucus committee depends less on the regularity of its meetings than on the political strengths and initiatives of its members.

The Government's main social policy caucus committee deals with social welfare and health. The topics were combined because in 1981 they shared the same minister. The Opposition's equivalent caucus committee—Health, Social Welfare, and Education—has an even wider range. This committee, however, tends not to meet formally, but in smaller groups covering the 3 different topics.

Departmental officials can, and do, attend Government caucus committee meetings. Information from departments is

requested through the appropriate minister. A minister generally would not prevent access to relevant information but it should be noted that departmental officials owe their first allegiance to their minister. A conflict of interest could arise in giving information to caucus, i.e. a party-based body. The Opposition caucus does not have direct access to departmental information except by special request through a minister. It is therefore restricted to using published material, or whatever can be gleaned from the answers to parliamentary questions.

Representatives of interest groups may be invited to appear before caucus committees or to present submissions to them. The more sophisticated groups lobby the committees and may become sufficiently well-known to be consulted on matters which concern them. They may also lobby individual members of relevant committees (see pages 35–38).

The strongest influence on both caucuses come from their political parties. Party influence makes itself felt from a variety of sources—from party structures at the national level (including conference remits), and from electorate and branch committees.

The caucuses work closely with their party policy committees in preparing party manifestos, and all sections are discussed by the caucuses and their committees. A large degree of consensus must be reached before statements of party policy intention are finalised, but the manifesto is the party's and caucus must be bound by it (see pages 33–34).

Probably the most important contributions to the deliberations of both caucuses are informal, especially in the social area. These contributions stem from the experiences of individual members of parliament in their electorate work. Such contacts are seen by many members as the best way of gauging public opinion and public needs. This again suggests that politicians feel they are able to form an accurate opinion on social policy matters, and on the social implications of policies, because they are in contact with a wide range of people.

Politicians tend to trust their own judgment more than research-based information, which they may view with suspicion as being likely to be out dated and

biased. Poor presentation of material may also be a factor. It is possible, however, that people ask their members of parliament for help on questions where they feel members can produce results, rather than necessarily on subjects which are concerning them most.

The news media are another source of informal and diffuse influence affecting caucus as well as other elements of decision-making machinery. The media act as a barometer of public opinion, and are closely watched by all politicians.

Parliamentary Research Units

The main role of the research units is to provide information for caucus committees and back-benchers. The Opposition Research Unit also provides information for its spokespeople on specific topics. The research units draw material from a range of sources, official and unofficial, and synthesise it so that it will be relevant and appropriate for political purposes. The extent of their liaison with other parts of the social planning system, such as the advisory bodies, is governed by the interests and personal network of individual researchers.

The Government unit has access to more sources of information, such as the departments and the Prime Minister's Advisory Group. The director of the present Government's research unit attends meetings of the National Party's policy committee, and is therefore closely associated with policy formulation, and specifically with writing its manifesto. Other members of the unit prepare papers which may contribute to policy through caucus committees and the caucus itself, but they have less contact with the party organisation.

To the extent that the research units are able to present research-based conclusions, they are acting to reduce dependence on anecdotal evidence. Thus there is a case for strengthening both research units. At present strict equality is maintained between the two units in their staffing. Possibly the Opposition research unit should receive greater resources, especially more staff, to compensate for the lack of access to departmental information. Departments give advice and interpretations to the Government, but only information to the Opposition, and this

situation is likely to remain, perpetuating the disparity in resources for policy development. Even when the Official Information Bill (at present before a select committee) is passed, the Opposition will be no better off than an ordinary citizen.

Select Committees

It is difficult to generalise on the role played by select committees in the process of shaping social policy. Sometimes select committees are highly influential and their operation may amount to policy-making (even if negatively, i.e. by effectively killing a piece of proposed legislation). But sometimes select committees have no real effect and consider measures long after the policy decisions have been made.

Most select committees, such as Statutes Revision or Public Expenditure, are appointed for the term of a parliament. Others are set up for a particular purpose and are disbanded when their task is finished (for instance, the Electoral Law Committee). The committees consist of 5–10 members of parliament. Although both sides of the House are represented, the Government has the majority, and the chairperson is always a Government member. Ministers can be members, but they do not usually chair these committees. The present select committees which deal with social policy group some topics—Labour and Education, Health and Welfare.

The main function of select committees is to consider and report on bills referred to them by the House of Representatives. However, they can also act as investigative bodies; for instance the 1975 Select Committee on Women's Rights, reported on the role of women in New Zealand society. The committees are able to demand access to papers and records, and that persons appear before them; they may also request reports from Government departments and invite public submissions. Usually no legal counsel is present at their hearings. Members hear submissions and ask questions. The discussion is generally open and non-partisan. Committees may hold hearings outside Wellington—they are among the few bodies able to do so. The reports of select committees are tabled in the House and then published.

The select committee hearings may markedly influence Government bills (for instance, the 1981 Accident Compensation Act amendments were deferred after select committee hearings showed considerable opposition to them). Public submissions can draw attention to social consequences which are not apparent to the Government. The reports of investigative select committees may provide the foundations for legislation; for instance, women's rights (Human Rights Commission Act). However, with a few exceptions, select committees cannot initiate investigations. The committees have no decision-making powers and can only make recommendations to the House. At present all bills go to select committees except for financial bills or those on which urgency is taken. The limited time sometimes given for considering submissions (because of the pressure of parliamentary business) may limit the effectiveness of select committees as a means of bringing in comment from ordinary people. Changes in membership can also limit effectiveness—substitutes can replace the usual committee members.

In the early stages of shaping a policy, select committees may have a strong indirect influence.* They can be used by individual members of parliament and party research units to obtain information. This gives Opposition members access to departmental information.

The content of committee discussions and submissions is taken back to the caucuses and is thus disseminated beyond the membership of the committee. This information may be used subsequently in debating and policy formation. There is, however, some danger in this procedure as it may lead to each side of the committee adopting a uniform position as instructed by caucus. Hence the discussion may no longer be free and the outcomes may be predetermined. Interest groups use the hearings to bring their views indirectly before caucus and as a means of becoming known to parliamentarians.

*The indirect nature of select committee influence is illustrated in Christopher Booth's analysis of the National Party's 1975 superannuation policy:

"The experience of the select committee on Superannuation was little less than a thorough education on the whole subject of superannuation. . . [for National Party members, then in opposition]." (Palmer, 1977, p.99.)

Thus, although the main functions of the select committee are reactive, they can influence how, and if, a policy is implemented, and they can also provide a valuable means of disseminating information.

Commissions of Inquiry

Royal commissions or commissions of inquiry are set up as impartial bodies to investigate and report on matters on which Government or public opinion is divided. For instance, new provisions for social security were considered by a Royal Commission in 1972, and more recently there was an inquiry into contraception, sterilisation, and abortion. The general practice is that commissions consist of a judge, or judges, or other suitable persons appointed by and reporting to the Government (or the Governor-General in the case of a Royal Commission). Although they are appointed by the Government and have their terms of reference set by it commissions of inquiry are independent and politically neutral. Their recommendations, therefore, have considerable strength which protects them from political attack. They are able to take time to make detailed studies, to travel, and to receive and scrutinise submissions from individuals, groups, and Government organisations. Commissions can lay the foundations for legislation, but because their findings are not binding on the Government (and often they have been over-ruled or ignored) some commissions have been seen as a means of delaying political decisions.

The derivation of the 1972 Accident Compensation Act from the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Compensation for Personal Injury under Mr Justice Woodhouse) which reported in 1967, is documented by Palmer (1979). His description of how the New Zealand policy on accident compensation evolved shows the inter-relationships between select committees, commissions of inquiry, and Government departments, and also interdepartmental and caucus committees.

In 1968 an interdepartmental committee and a Government caucus committee studied and commented on the Woodhouse report. A parliamentary select committee,

set up late in 1969, reported in 1970. Its recommendations, which generally upheld the principles of the Woodhouse proposals, were approved by the Cabinet and caucus even before its report went to Parliament. Another interdepartmental committee then drafted the Accident Compensation Bill. This was referred to a second select committee which heard submissions on the Bill, but did not reconsider matters of principle—by then these had been adopted as Government policy. After amendment the bill became law and the Accident Compensation Scheme began in April 1974.

Conclusions

The Cabinet Committee on Family and Social Affairs has the potential and indeed the intended function, of shaping social policy at the highest level. To do this, however, it must be given more strength and influence. In particular, the Cabinet, committees, and all Government departments could be more supportive of the Committee on Family and Social Affairs' aim of monitoring legislation for its impact on the family. Its role could be widened to include seeking comment from the committee and its supporting officials group on the broad social impact of a wide range of policies and proposals—many of them in the economic area. More will be said on the role of the Cabinet Committee on Family and Social Affairs in part 3. The necessity of applying criteria related to social benefits as well as those on financial acceptability is a recurring theme in this report.

Government caucus is at present, growing in influence and its views are crucial in shaping social policy. Caucus should therefore be fully and accurately informed on all social issues. While electorate experience no doubt brings considerable appreciation of needs and aspirations, this should be balanced whenever possible by objective and scientifically based research, which can give a broader picture of the situation. The Government and Opposition research units, have important roles to play here, but both must be supplied with relevant information from advisory bodies and from the research community, and there is also a case for these research units to have more staff.

There are lessons to be learned by ministers and members of parliament on the value and relevance of research findings, and by the researchers on presentation of findings, so that they are concise and easily-understood. The Social Sciences Committee of the National Research Advisory Council and the Social Science Research Fund Committee are bodies which are able to promote relevant research endeavours, and both are working towards these aims. Means should be found whereby these bodies can feed research findings back

into the Cabinet committee system.

Select committees and commissions of inquiry enable information to enter the central decision-making process in a more open way than through the informal network. It is therefore important that groups and individuals be encouraged to make such an input. It would help if more time was allowed for making public submissions, if wider publicity was given to the progress of legislation, and if more hearings were held outside Wellington.

CHAPTER 4 GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

Budgeting and Objective-setting

Any examination of how policy is made in Government departments cannot ignore the dominance of budget allocation procedures. The mechanisms for planning and policy-making are so closely linked with the mechanisms for budgeting that their functions may be confused. If social policy proposals are assessed largely in terms of expenditure this will have the effect of playing down less tangible and less quantifiable social objectives. Departments also tend to be concerned with short-term financial considerations. Although Government departments must supply the Treasury with estimates of expenditure for 3 years ahead, the departments nearly always focus their attention on the first year—the current cycle—in terms of their planning.

Some departments, notably Justice and Social Welfare, are trying to improve their longer-term planning by setting objectives for their various sections and programmes. Progress towards these objectives must be easily measurable and must be regularly evaluated. It is not easy to do this for social policies. Nevertheless, it would improve social policy formulation if such an approach were more widely adopted.

The Budget Cycle

Statements of proposed new policies and changes in existing policies are prepared annually by all Government departments.

GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS CONSULTED

Department of Education
 Department of Health
 Housing Corporation of New Zealand
 Department of Internal Affairs
 Department of Justice
 Department of Labour
 Department of Maori Affairs
 Prime Minister's Department
 (advisory group)
 Department of Social Welfare
 The Treasury
 Ministry of Works and Development

These are reported on by the Treasury before being considered by the Cabinet Committee on Expenditure in the first quarter of the year. This system of forwarding all proposals for policy changes at one time for the Cabinet's consideration is new, and improvements to the system are still being made.

The Cabinet Committee on Expenditure reviews the statements and estimated costs. It may recommend items that should be studied further or where cuts should be made in relation to other economic and financial policies of the Government. Discussions continue between departments and Treasury (with further commentary from the State Services Commission) until the costs and details of the policies are finalised and approved by the Government. (The dominant role played by Treasury is described more fully on page 23). The Minister of Finance's annual Budget statement at mid-year is based on the policies adopted.

Departments wishing to introduce new programmes entailing expenditure must show that they can pay for them by making savings elsewhere in their programme. But the departments concerned with social policy have little leeway for policy innovation, because their funds are heavily committed to programmes that must be maintained at a fixed level. Guidelines such as teacher-pupil ratios, which the Department of Education must observe, or population-based standards for hospital beds administered by the Department of Health, limit flexibility. Existing policies tend to go unchallenged while new proposals receive a thorough critical appraisal. Efficient policy-making requires that both undergo systematic evaluation.

Approaches to Policy Formulation

Government departments differ considerably in the procedures they adopt for making policy, and in the extent to which policy-making is separated out from implementation and administration.

There are two main styles of policy-making in Government departments. A special section or working group may be

given the job of developing policy proposals, based on research and on the experience of the department. Alternatively, officials throughout the departmental hierarchy may be involved in developing proposals in response to the demands and problems which arise in day-to-day routine. Either way the proposals are then discussed by senior departmental officers (a group of divisional heads may form a policy committee) and if approved they are sent to the Treasury and to the Cabinet through the relevant Cabinet Committee.

These methods, or some combination of the two, are used in the departments studied. The Social Welfare and Justice departments have policy development sections. Education has a Policy and Resources Division, and Labour a Research and Planning Division (now being reformed on a more decentralised basis). The Department of Maori Affairs has no specialised policy or planning section, but it is experimenting with a fundamental re-organisation and decentralisation of decision-making through the Kokiri Units.*

It is hoped that policy ideas will be developed within communities through district advisory committees and planning conferences. The Department of Maori Affairs new approach involves the community and interest groups—such as the Maori Women's Welfare League and Maori councils—extensively in the policy-making process. Features of the Kokiri Unit approach could usefully be adopted elsewhere and would repay close study by other departments.

A policy group is able to give a general overview unclouded by the minutiae of administration. However, a separate policy group can become somewhat remote from the work-face—perhaps out of touch with real needs. Other staff may resent being only processors and not contributors and

*The Kokiri Units, which at present operate on a pilot basis only in Wellington, the Hutt Valley, and Porirua, consist of a 3-person departmental unit servicing a management team drawn from members of the Maori community. These assess the needs of their community and plan their requirements, including the disbursement of public funds. The departmental unit acts as the administrative support mechanism and the channel for financial allocation. The Kokiri Units are an example of community self-management. They may eventually replace departmental district officers.

may feel more work satisfaction if they are involved in policy-making. Dispersing the responsibility throughout a department should ensure that the proposals are practical and related to real needs. Research sections may still be used as consultants and to provide data. However, it may be difficult for administrators to take the broader long-term view which is needed for effective planning as they become occupied with day-to-day concerns. It has been suggested that the workload carried by senior Government officials (and Cabinet members) may not permit long-term planning and is not conducive to reasoned reflection (Hall *et al.*, 1975). This is another argument for specialised planning units which are set apart from, but not out of touch with, administrative and operational sections.

It would be generally acknowledged that those who administer policies, especially those who deal with the public, should be consulted in formulating policy. Research is generally believed to provide a valuable contribution and several departments have research groups whose results they seek to incorporate. For example the Management Services and Research Unit of the Department of Health, and the research sections of Justice and Social Welfare produce numerous reports related to problems and policies. Researchers help evaluate programmes and also provide background information for policy-making. Evaluating existing policies and programmes (i.e., assessing how well they are achieving stated objectives) is a fundamental part of planning, but it has often been neglected. The Department of Social Welfare has recently set up an evaluation unit to examine social welfare policies and this is a valuable step forward which other departments should watch with interest. It is also worth noting that other, not strictly social policy departments, such as the Forest Service and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, are attempting to evaluate the social effects of their programmes.

Evaluating social policies is difficult because progress towards social objectives is not easy to measure. Indirect measures frequently have to be adopted as social indicators. The problem of securing "hard data" in the social area as opposed to

superficial perceptions has already been noted.

Within departments, senior officers are able to bring forward and develop policy ideas, or at least "seed" ideas. This can be done through the departmental system, but it is probably done as frequently through a network of personal contacts, possibly stretching across several departments. Personal qualities determine how effective individuals can be, and whether their views are taken seriously, or whether they are dismissed as "enthusiasts", or an extension of pressure groups.

Compartmentalised Approach—Need for Overview

The annual policy review encourages departments to examine their own programmes, but does not encourage them to co-operate. Competition between departments, and defensive attitudes underly the very fragmented approach to social planning in New Zealand. Inter-departmental committees to deal with and co-ordinate matters of common concern do exist, and some are working well, especially where the topics are specific and clear cut (such as nursing education, which involves the departments of Education and Health).

The State Services Commission as a co-ordinating body, is promoting inter-departmental co-operation. However, this can depend on the will of the individuals involved, and "trade-offs", especially in financial terms, may be difficult to achieve. Mandatory requirements, such as can be applied at Cabinet level, (page 13) may be needed to achieve co-ordination.

In Canada, departments of government are grouped together for funding and for making compensatory savings. These groupings with titles such as Social Affairs, Economic Development, and Energy, are known as "envelopes". The system is now being discussed in New Zealand. It assists co-ordination in budgeting and incorporates procedures to encourage long-term planning. On the other hand it may lead to more direct competition between ministries, and co-ordination between departments must extend beyond financial resource allocation. Its adoption would not reduce the dominance of financial

considerations in social planning mechanisms, which has already been noted as a disadvantage.

The Role of the Treasury

The basic function of the Treasury is to monitor Government expenditure. It has considerable influence, especially at present when the Minister of Finance is also the Prime Minister; it is independent in terms of the advice it gives the Government, and has no direct client public. This is not to say that the Treasury applies financial values exclusively in its assessment of proposals. Its endorsement of community-based welfare and health services takes into account their perceived social and economic advantages as well as their being a more efficient use of resources.

The Treasury is, however, much more than an organisation concerned with the supervision of public expenditure. It has a decisive role in national economic planning and in the Government's decision-making process. This is related not only to its influence on annual expenditure allocations for departments, but also because it comments on all proposals put to the Cabinet which entail public expenditure (page 13).

Because of its central role in the policy review and budget cycle, the Treasury is in a position to take an overview of social policy formulation. Its emphasis, however, will always be on the economic and financial aspects of planning. Although the financial implications of social policy are carefully examined by the mechanisms which have been described, there is no corresponding body to monitor the social implications of financial policy.

The Prime Minister's Department

The Prime Minister's Department, or more particularly the Advisory Group within it, is also able to take an overview of social policy. The Advisory Group was set up by the present Prime Minister in 1975. The group has been deliberately kept small and personal. It has a staff of 7. All except the Head of the department are on short-term contracts from either the public or the private sector. The group does not see itself as interfering with departmental operations, or imposing an additional layer of

government. Its main function is to keep the Prime Minister informed of current interests and concerns, especially policy matters, in and between, the public and private sectors. It is able to stimulate and facilitate departmental action, using formal and informal channels—departmental, interdepartmental and governmental (such as the Cabinet committees and the Cabinet system). In keeping the Prime Minister informed, the group is also able to comment on discrepancies in policy and policy-making. In these ways the group exercises an indirect influence on social policy-making.

Diversity of Influences on Policy Formulation

A point which has come out very clearly in discussions with Government departments is the diversity of influences on policy formation and of the ways in which policy proposals emerge. Officials found it difficult to generalise about the policy-making process. The main contributors, apart from a department itself, are likely to be the Government (through political channels), and the community (as individuals or in unorganised or organised groups).

The political manifesto of the party which becomes the Government states its position on specific issues. When directed by the Government, departments are obliged to put these policies into effect, although the commitment may be modified by practical considerations. The departments rarely seem to be consulted over the content of manifestos, although they may be asked by the government of the day to list their areas of concern. Apart from this, departments may influence manifestos indirectly, through research and reports.

Day-to-day political influence on a department comes through its minister. Work for a minister, even routine work, such as drafting answers to parliamentary questions, takes priority in departmental advisory sections. A minister may raise issues with his department after having been approached by an interest group. In this way the views of the department, the

Government, and the community may all be taken into account and progress made towards a position acceptable to all 3.

Consultation with the Community

Departments generally recognise the need to involve the community in decision-making. Some departments have mechanisms to involve relevant interest groups—the advisory bodies are part of this. It is important for permanent heads to maintain working relationships with the interest groups in their areas. Some go further by trying to draw out public opinion. The Kokiri Units of the Department of Maori Affairs are an example (see page 22). The Department of Justice's "social environment" concept also tries to assess departmental activities and objectives within their social contexts.

Departments may attempt to reach a consensus with interest groups and then present this to the minister, but it is recognised that the groups will still make their own representations in areas of dissent. This consultative approach is used in particular by the Department of Education, in whose field are several particularly strong and vocal pressure groups. It is acknowledged that interest groups are a major influence on politicians, especially in the social area, and that their influence may outweigh that of the department. However, in some cases (e.g., in the area of worker-employer relationships which concerns the Department of Labour) rival interest groups may counterbalance one another's influence in which case the department may be able to provide a more objective view.

An approach which suggests that social services should be provided on a community basis is currently being promoted by Internal Affairs, Maori Affairs and Health. This requires that communities and local interest groups are consulted on policy formation. In this case the sources of policy ideas and influence become even more diffuse and difficult to pinpoint. Another issue related to co-ordination in social planning is co-ordination between the public, private, and voluntary sectors, not only at the community but also at the national level. Co-ordination in this sense is one of the objectives of the Department of Maori Affairs. The activities of the Special

Advisory Committee on Health Services Organisation and the New Zealand Council of Social Services (pages 28–30) are also significant here. Much more, however, remains to be achieved in this area, in the interest of efficient social service provision.

Also relevant is the question of freedom of information from Government departments to the public. Several departments, notably Justice and Health, have recognised the need to communicate what they are doing and why, because the better informed that people are, the better they will be able to contribute towards policy development.

Conclusions

At present, because the annual budget cycle and policy review dominates policy-making in Government departments, the emphasis is largely on the short-term financial aspects. It is essential that departments should be encouraged to set objectives and plan independently of, but still in relation to, financial allocation processes and that the budgetary process should become more forward-looking and less compartmentalised. All departments, including the Treasury, need to look more beyond the immediate future and do more medium and long-term planning.

There is a need for greater interdepartmental co-operation in the exchange of information and in research efforts, which would recognise the inter-relationships and interdependence of issues in the social area. This could be extended to the funding aspects of planning through the "envelope" approach.

Within departments, policy-oriented research should be strengthened and given adequate staff and funds. Whether this takes place in a special research section which is apart from, but not out of touch with, the administrative and operational aspects of the department's work, depends on what seems to be the most suitable and efficient system for any particular department. It does not seem necessary that all departments should conform to any one type of planning structure. Indeed, experimentation and innovation should be encouraged.

All departments should, however, pay more attention to evaluating their existing policies and programmes; in fact, this should be mandatory. Techniques appropriate for New Zealand must be developed to do this. The potential for greater efficiency and economy in Government programmes which action-oriented evaluation systems can produce is very great.

CHAPTER 5 ADVISORY BODIES

Most of the advisory bodies examined in this study were established in the 1970s. Some were set up under specific legislation—the Vocational Training Council, the Planning Council, and the Council for Recreation and Sport. Others grew out of sector councils of the National Development Council—the Committee on Women (now restructured as the Advisory Committee on Women's Affairs), the Social Development Council, and the Environmental Council.

Descriptions of the 11 advisory groups studied are tabulated in appendix 1. This includes details of their establishment and functions, membership and meetings, support staff, other resources, departmental contact, publications, and other activities. In many ways the Planning Council stands out from other groups studied. It has much more of an overview role and spans social, economic, and cultural planning in its terms of reference. It is also much better endowed than other bodies with secretariat support and funding, and has greater autonomy. Many of the generalisations made in this section, therefore, do not apply to the Planning Council.

Membership and Chairmanship

Members of advisory bodies are generally appointed by the relevant minister or ministers, but the Government caucus may

ADVISORY BODIES CONSULTED

Committee on Women (now Advisory Committee on Women's Affairs)
Environmental Council (specifically the Urban Affairs Committee)
National Housing Commission
New Zealand Council for Recreation and Sport
New Zealand Council of Social Service
New Zealand Maori Council
New Zealand Planning Council
Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council
Special Advisory Committee on Health Services Organisation (SACHSO)
Vocational Training Council.

have the opportunity to comment on the names put forward. Nominations may be made by the bodies themselves, by senior departmental officials, by chairpersons, or by interested groups. Most members are appointed for the contribution they will make as individuals. However, 8 of the advisory bodies studied have nominees from interest groups or departmental representatives. The current system of appointments to advisory bodies will tend to reinforce conservative and establishment attitudes as ministerial appointees are unlikely to be politically provocative. In some areas it may be difficult to make appointments because of a lack of people who are available and acceptable. There would be advantages in making a more systematic search for potential members aimed at producing a council or committee, with a range of relevant interests and areas of expertise.

Arguments in favour of having departmental representatives on advisory bodies suggest that the representatives have a dual function—as resource people and as a channel for influence to flow from the advisory body back to the departments. The arguments against, suggest that such representatives will present only departmental views and restrain wide-ranging discussion. When a head of department is a member, his decision to attend the meetings himself will indicate how seriously the body is being taken. Often a nominee will be sent, and not always the same person. Lack of continuity of representation is likely to reduce effective participation. The Secretary of the Treasury is automatically appointed to many advisory bodies and it is impossible for him to attend all meetings. Such representation may not always be justified. In 1980, the number of departmental representatives on the Social Development Council was reduced by voluntary agreement; the Treasury representative was one who chose to stand down.

The initiative and strength of a chairperson of an advisory body is crucial to its effectiveness. However, this means that great emphasis may be placed on appointing a politically acceptable person to the

position. It would seem self-evident that someone with expertise relevant to the work of the body should be chairperson, but this does not always happen. For a minister to chair an advisory body is likely to be seen as prejudicial to its independence. However, a minister's membership can be very valuable and can lead to more positive interest, thus facilitating links with the Cabinet as the Planning Council has found. When a chairperson or members are not replaced immediately, the work of the body may virtually cease. This happened to the Social Development Council in 1980, and to the Committee on Women early in 1981.

Payments made to members and chairpersons vary greatly, although all receive out-of-pocket expenses to attend meetings. Some chairpersons receive honoraria—National Housing Commission, Maori Council, Arts Council—but these are rarely substantial. The Planning Council's full-time chairperson receives a salary comparable to that of a departmental head. Honoraria may be paid to members who take on extra responsibilities, for example, Planning Council project conveners. Many chairpersons and members believe that payments to advisory bodies should be more consistent. This matter is, of course, tied up with the question of financial resources for advisory bodies. Another problem is suitable compensation for self-employed people and those with domestic responsibilities who may incur special costs in order to attend meetings. There are also inconsistencies within bodies between members who are receiving a regular salary as well as meeting fees and others who have no other remuneration.

Focus on Wellington

Almost all advisory body meetings are held in Wellington because it is central, accessible and administratively convenient. Only 3 of the 11 bodies studied had chairpersons from outside Wellington; their departmental representatives and support staff are Wellington-based. Where an executive sub-committee exists, often it is made up of Wellington members. This reduces the possibility of input from other regions, and can result in narrow and selective advice being offered by the body.

Membership could benefit by being better balanced regionally, as well as in other respects. Advisory bodies should be encouraged to meet outside Wellington and to seek local input to their deliberations, even if travelling incurs higher costs.

Resources

Most advisory bodies have strong links with a parent department which provides support staff, accommodation, and specialised services. The amount of independent finance available to the bodies varies greatly, but it influences the type and range of activities which can be undertaken.

Staff

Several disadvantages are apparent in the system of providing support staff from Government departments. Staff may have other functions and demands on their time so that they cannot give their full attention to the advisory body. Most bodies have no say in selecting their staff (the Planning Council and the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council are noteworthy exceptions). The advisory bodies become subject to departmental staffing limits and also find it difficult to increase their support team. If bodies have no other way to get work done (such as on contract), their work programmes may be restricted.

Only if staff are sufficiently senior will they be willing to take independent action on behalf of the body. In the absence of a chairperson who has the time and inclination to put in the effort, this can reduce the effectiveness of the body in influencing decision-makers. To some extent the approach taken by a minister and a department in staffing an advisory body will reflect how useful they expect its advice to be. Staffing advisory bodies with departmental officers may have an additional disadvantage in the dual responsibility which such people must accept. Occasionally conflict of interest and political problems may arise.

On the other hand close liaison with a Government department, and therefore ready access to departmental information, can be beneficial. If departments regard the work of a particular body highly, and if it has the active support of senior

departmental officers, the staff link can be extremely valuable, as has been proven, by the good relationship between the Special Advisory Committee on Health Services Organisation and the Department of Health.

Funding

Most advisory bodies are dependent on Government departments for their funds. Their financial resources are sometimes small and are needed for day-to-day running expenses. Budget estimates can be reduced by the department and applications for additional funds for special projects are often rejected. Some bodies, however, are well funded; for example, the Planning Council, the Council for Recreation and Sport, the Vocational Training Council, and the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council. It has been suggested that members with good ideas and enthusiasm for action become discouraged if they see that funds are limited and uncertain, and they tend to lose their interest.

It would be difficult to carry out a cost-effectiveness analysis of advisory bodies. The costs of the bodies may be hard to establish accurately, because of their use of departmental resources. Annual funding allocations, such as those quoted in appendix 1, do not reflect the full costs by any means. Effectiveness would also be extremely difficult to measure quantitatively, especially where matters of social well-being are concerned. Whether advice was taken and acted upon would need to be assessed, along with the body's influence beyond the sphere of central government.

Departmental Link

The physical location of an advisory body in relation to its parent department (if it has one) affects the independence it has in its work. Close contact may be beneficial, as it is for SACHSO, but it may lead to the diversion of staff attention—as it has for the Social Development Council and Council of Social Service. Total separation could create problems for servicing and liaison, but this does not seem to happen. There is a need to preserve a balance between the advantages of independence and those of maintaining a close departmental link.

Means of Exerting Influence

The contact which the advisory bodies have with their ministers varies greatly. Few chairpersons meet regularly with their ministers, and the ministers seldom attend meetings, perhaps only once a year.

Meetings between a minister and a chairperson are generally initiated by the latter. They are irregular—probably not more than 3 or 4 times a year. Ministers pay more attention to some interest groups and local body associations. The substance of the meetings may also concern matters such as membership rather than issues related to policy. Only very rarely do chairpersons of advisory bodies attend meetings of Cabinet committees or officials committees.

The Planning Council is an exception. Its meetings have been attended regularly (at least in part) by successive ministers of National Development as ex-officio members. The chairperson sees the minister at regular weekly meetings, as well as attending meetings of the ad hoc Cabinet Committee on National Development. There is also a close relationship between the chair of the Arts Council and the minister, based on irregular but frequent meetings.

There does not appear to be any provision made for the bodies to advise opposition shadow ministers. It is arguable whether their function could be taken to include advising potential governments, that is, opposition parties. The Maori Council, whose members are not appointed by the Government, maintains contact with all the major parties, in the same sort of way that interest groups and local body associations do.

Most chairpersons interviewed could remember instances where their bodies were asked for advice by a minister but these requests appeared to be comparatively rare, and mainly concerned minor matters, such as inquiries or suggestions from the public.

A lot of dissatisfaction has been expressed that ministers do not consult their advisory bodies enough. It is worth noting that consultation at an earlier stage in the decision-making process was one of the requirements of the Committee on Women, when its restructuring was being considered and this remains an objective of the

Advisory Committee on Women's Affairs. The bodies themselves are often uncertain about what effect their representations to the Cabinet have had. This is another instance where advisory bodies may have a weaker position than the interest groups. Most chairpersons when asked for concrete examples of how their advisory body had influenced policy in specific terms, could give none. But at the same time most were confident that the advisory bodies had "contributed to a climate for change" in a more diffused way.

The influence of the advisory bodies can, therefore, be traced through indirect channels. These flows are shown diagrammatically in figure 3, which should be seen in the context of the whole system

outlined in figure 1. Most of the bodies have the right to publish and have published their own or commissioned reports. Some have an extensive series of publications which are used widely, for example the National Housing Commission, the Planning Council, the Social Development Council, and the Vocational Training Council. As well as publications, programmes of various types, including funding (the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council, the Council for Recreation and Sport), and educational efforts in the broadest sense emanate from the advisory bodies. Influence from these sources may eventually make itself felt on central decision-making, as illustrated in figure 1.




Figure 3: Input and Output of Advisory Bodies.

Role in Fostering Local Initiatives

The influence of advisory bodies must not be judged only by their national activities. There have been calls recently for more decentralisation of decision-making and for greater public participation in all levels of planning. The Planning Council, and the Task Force which preceded it, has been foremost in these calls, but other advisory bodies have participated and some have initiated practical action to bring about change. If decentralised planning is to succeed, an infrastructure must be developed and people must be trained. Several of the advisory bodies have contributed to this. In *Sharing Social Responsibility* the Council of Social Service promoted the co-ordination of the public, private, and voluntary sectors in providing services. It has also encouraged the establishment and growth of district councils throughout the country. The SACHSO concept of area health boards favours devolution of planning and decision-making. Similarly, the regional arts councils are fostering local initiatives.

Other advisory bodies in the social area have effectively directed their attention towards regional and local authorities; for example, the Council for Recreation and Sport in its various programmes, the Urban Affairs Committee of the Environmental Council, through its *Urban Objectives* report and the National Housing Commission, which has put forward ideas on urban renewal and local authority housing. But administering numerous local programmes can divert attention from the advisory role. This potential role for advisory bodies in the decentralisation of decision-making must also be set against their very heavy orientation towards Wellington in terms of personnel and operation.

Overall Effectiveness of the Advisory Bodies

The overall effectiveness of the advisory bodies is reflected in how others see them as well as how they see themselves. Critical assessments of some advisory bodies have been expressed in Government departments. It is suggested that some of them are not doing what they were set up to

do, that their advice is not specific or relevant enough, and that their members are unrepresentative, over-committed, and perhaps pursuing sectional interests. These attitudes, and the lack of departmental support which may flow from them, will in themselves limit the effectiveness of the advisory bodies concerned. Given the dependence of many advisory bodies on a parent department, the attitudes of senior departmental officials towards them must affect their chances of success.

Some advisory bodies have adopted roles and tactics similar to those used by interest groups (for example, lobbying the Government) or are seen to have done so by outsiders. For example, the Council of Social Service has taken up issues such as electricity prices and housing costs rather than restricting itself to its co-ordinating function.

Fragmentation and lack of communication, such as inhibit more effective social planning by Government departments are also characteristic of the advisory bodies. Although overlapping memberships and informal contact provides some liaison, there are instances of serious gaps; for example, the Council of Social Service has never had a joint meeting with the Social Development Council, nor was it contacted over SDC restructuring proposals.

The initiative of individuals is one way of bringing about better liaison. This has already been referred to in respect of chairmanship. To be effective, people involved with advisory bodies must cultivate political awareness and a good network of contacts. To this must be added confidence and a thorough knowledge of the relevant background material. It has been suggested that several advisory bodies, founded in the middle 1970s, are only now reaching the stage of experience where they are becoming effective.

Most Government-appointed advisory bodies have no executive functions and therefore feel powerless. They may also find it difficult to see a clear role for themselves. Where they have a special brief (such as SACHSO) or resources to administer, this dilemma does not arise. It is useful, in fact, to distinguish those bodies with purely advisory functions, and those which also carry out other tasks. An advisory body

which has no well-defined purpose, inadequate staff and funds, and no effective channel of influence upwards to the Government can hardly hope to be influential.

Thus there has been considerable discussion recently about the possible restructuring, amalgamation, or abolition of advisory bodies. The Vocational Training Council and the Environmental Council have been subject to formal review. This resulted in a significant strengthening of the Vocational Training Council, and the transfer of its departmental link from Education to Labour. The Committee on Women has been reconstituted as the Advisory Committee on Women's Affairs with a membership reduced from 12 to 6. The Social Development Council, after a lapse of 15 months, has a new chairperson and has revived its activities, but is still very closely allied to the Department of Social Welfare.

It is a good time to question the reasons for having advisory bodies at all. Their rationale lies in their ability to develop independent advice, unconstrained by the day-to-day administrative procedures which are the major preoccupation of Government departments. Departments can use advisory bodies as sounding boards for policy proposals and also to review the progress of policies, once in place, as expert but impartial commentators. They are able to undertake research, to synthesise research findings and to present these in a way which will be readily understood and applicable. The need for such an approach was outlined on page 20. If their membership is broadbased, representative, and experienced, information and advice can be drawn from an extensive network of contacts throughout the country, but, in contrast to the somewhat similar basis of caucus input, this ought to be independent of party political influence. This discussion underlines the fact that many of the advisory bodies examined, with a few exceptions, do not appear to be fulfilling their potential role in the social planning system at national level.

Conclusions

There is considerable scope to improve and rationalise the contribution of advisory

bodies to social planning. Because only a selection of bodies was included in this study it would be unfair to single out any for criticism; the conclusions must therefore be stated in general terms.

It is essential, however, that both ministers and advisory bodies periodically review work programmes to ensure that these are relevant to their terms of reference and to the needs of society as a whole. (This procedure should perhaps be part of their terms of reference). Often it may be better for the Government to use a task force to provide advice on, or to investigate, specific topics.

The performance of existing advisory bodies could be made more effective by improvements in the methods of selecting members and allocating resources, and by reviewing the links between them and their parent departments. When vacancies occur, members, and especially chairpersons, should be replaced promptly. Departmental representatives and interest group nominees should be retained only if they provide a useful two-way flow of information.

The prestige of advisory bodies, and hence the morale of membership, appears to be improved when they have control over the selection and direction of their support staff, and over the allocation of finance, including adequate assurances of forward funding for their activities. Tied up with this is the question of remuneration for members of advisory bodies. At present the approach to this is inconsistent.

Advisory bodies cannot fulfil their prime function of giving advice to the Government unless regular contact is maintained between them and the minister they serve and, by extension, with other decision-makers in the political area. For their part, ministers do not always appear to be making use of the bodies by consulting them readily and regularly, and on matters where a real contribution to social planning can be made. Similar comments could be made about the attitudes of the departments to which advisory bodies are related. Lack of departmental support is also a constraint on the effectiveness of some advisory bodies.

CHAPTER 6 POLITICAL PARTIES

The main political parties in New Zealand—National, Labour, and Social Credit—have similar hierarchies. They also have similar procedures for developing remits and considering them at their annual conferences. Policy-making by political parties follows a 3-year cycle related to general elections, and thus is approached most actively leading up to an election. Each of the 3 major parties has a policy committee which operates alongside its national executive and keeps close ties with parliamentary representatives, but is fairly independent. The policy councils of National and Labour are of similar composition; each has an equal representation of parliamentarians (including the leader and deputy leader) and party officials. All have some means, usually informal, of developing policy papers for circulation and discussion, so that proposals developed by people who are specialised in a subject to a greater or lesser extent, may be commented on by party members in general. Specialised topic study groups seem to be most developed in the Labour party. The National Party probably needs them less because the Government has access to the Government machinery for investigative work.

Social Credit differs from the 2 main parties in the weight it places on remits endorsed by a conference. Such remits influence but do not bind Labour and National to adopt a policy. The conference of the Social Credit Political League is its policy-making body. Perhaps this approach can more easily be taken by a party without experience of government than by the more pragmatic major parties, in which the parliamentary wing may not always see eye-to-eye with the general membership.

Political ideology, expressed through party philosophy, must be considered as a contribution to the shaping of social policy. This is probably not a dominant influence in New Zealand, where the basic social objectives of the major parties do not differ greatly, and all support the notion of the welfare state. It does, however, make itself felt in such issues as how far the State ought to be involved in providing social services.

Social Credit Political League

Because remits passed at the annual conference become official League policy, the processes whereby they are developed need to be understood. Most remits originate in branches where they are initially discussed and adopted, although specialised groups at a higher level can also submit remit statements. The remits are sent to the appropriate regional council and forwarded to the national policy committee. The policy committee co-ordinates the remits and refers them back with recommendations for change, where required. It is up to the originating branch whether any change is made. Remits may also be developed by regional councils, the dominion council or the policy committee itself, although this is rare. These remits are treated in the same way as those from branches. Once passed, remits become binding policy for all Social Credit candidates, although they are free to state their own views after they have stated the party line. Spokespeople in the topic areas articulate the policy thus decided and a publications committee produces the manifesto.

The Dominion Council is the League's governing body. It has authority between conferences. The Council sets up sub-committees and appoints their chairpersons. They select the members of the sub-committees from those who show interest and are available. Although the Dominion Council has sub-committees on Education and Health, social policy is considered by the policy committee without any specialised sub-groupings (such as are working on agriculture and law reform).

It has been suggested that the views of a variety of social groups are already represented in-house; for example party officials include pensioners, doctors, community health workers, sportsmen, and farmers. Again, it is likely that anecdotal evidence predominates in discussions of social issues. A senior party official, speaking of the conference debate, said: "It is best to let people decide what they want rather than to pressure them in the social area."

Labour Party

Although the Labour Party shares with the other 2 parties the basic hierarchical structure of branches, electorate committees, regional councils, and New Zealand council, its range of specialised national councils is unique. Those with a strong interest in social policy include the Labour Women's Council, the Youth Council, the Pacific Islands Council, and the Maori Council. Each Council has its own conference before the annual conference, when it elects its members from any interested party members. Some do not meet frequently otherwise, but meetings always take place in Wellington. The councils are concerned with recruitment among the groups they represent, as well as with policy concerning them, and provide useful platforms for discussion. They are free to operate as they wish and may set up local study groups. These reflect the interests of the members, perhaps even of one central individual. For example, the Labour Women's Council has groups in Wellington studying women and employment, and an Auckland group studying women and the law. The Women's Council also maintains contact with a network of women throughout New Zealand who receive a newsletter and contribute ideas. From these sources policy proposals emerge which are forwarded to the Policy Council.

In other areas of social policy the procedures may be different. The Labour Education Policy Group is centred in Wellington and does not have local groups. It maintains a two-way contact with interest groups such as the Post-Primary Teachers' Association, and the New Zealand Education Institute, and a network of individuals at the electorate level. Conference remits also form part of its input. Ideas and proposals are again fed into the Policy Council. The Policy Council is therefore an essential mechanism in policy formulation. It is elected every 3 years at the party conference and has representatives from the various councils as well as from senior party members and members of parliament. Its main function is to co-ordinate the various policy suggestions which are channelled to it and to produce the party manifesto. Policy must, however,

be approved (at least nominally) by the Labour caucus and by the New Zealand Council. This would certainly be true for controversial matters.

Caucus committees and shadow ministers or spokespeople also contribute much to the policy process through their own networks of contacts in the electorates and via interest groups. Caucus committees travel around the country on fact-finding missions.

Remits brought forward from branches or electorate committees, via regional conferences and the annual conference, also provide input and are examined closely by the Policy Council, but do not automatically become policy. They are also referred to caucus committees and shadow ministers.

The Policy Council, which must co-ordinate all these inputs, was reconstituted in 1977 and meets frequently. Systems of setting priorities and costing policy proposals have been worked out. It is suggested, however, that the Opposition is hampered in its development of policy by a lack of detailed information from Government departments, which is especially necessary for costing. A policy of more open government and freer access to data would certainly help the Opposition in shaping their policy.

National Party

The National Party supports a hierarchical framework which appears very similar to those of the other 2 main parties. Perhaps because so many suggestions come forward, the National Party is selective in the remits which are brought forward to its annual conference. Remits are developed at branch level and discussed at electorate level, where they may be either accepted or rejected. Policy papers may also be generated at electorate level, depending on the initiative of groups and individuals there. Remits from electorates are examined by divisional committees who discuss, accept or reject them. Policy committees at divisional level are also able to submit material to the Dominion Policy Council, where they are subject to yet another screening process, from which the final selection goes forward to the annual conference. Nevertheless remits which are passed are not binding as policy and

represent only one contribution to the policy-formulation process.

The Dominion Policy Committee is officially a sub-committee of the Dominion Council. It consists of 3 members from Parliament, (customarily the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and a backbencher); and 3 members from the party (at present the President, senior Vice President and the Women's Vice President).

As already noted, suggestions to the Policy Committee can come from divisional committees, from dominion councillors, and also from seminars, such as the Women's Seminar held at Taupo in April 1981. Party members and interest groups write to the Policy Council and ideas from non-party members may also be fed in. Contact with interest groups is strong, especially through overlapping memberships by party people.

The Policy Council drafts sections of the manifesto, with input from all these sources as well as from the Government caucus and its committees, which sees and discusses them before they are incorporated into the final document. As already noted, the party is the strongest group influencing caucus, and it seems that it has the last word. The political strength of the party lies in its

power to refuse a nomination, even of a sitting member of parliament, and this has in fact occurred. However, usually agreement will be reached on a position and a policy acceptable to both party and caucus.

Conclusions

The central policy committee of the political party which forms the Government is a decisive element in the process of social policy formulation. It has close links with the Cabinet and the Government caucus on the one hand, and with a broad network of party members (including expert informants) and interest groups on the other. The comments made on the need for objective and well-presented research findings as a contribution to policy-making also apply here (see Conclusions, chapter 3).

The party in power has freer access to departmental information than opposition parties. Opposition parties should be given access to the information they need to develop their own policies in a responsible way. In addition advisory bodies could do more to maintain liaison with all the major political parties.

CHAPTER 7 INTEREST GROUPS

The Nature of Interest Groups

Interest groups have been defined as privately organised groups which try to influence Government policies without aspiring to political office (Robinson, in Levine, 1979). Although many people regard them with some suspicion and hostility, interest groups have been recognised as both signs and safeguards of a healthy democracy, embodying freedom of association, and political expression (Levine 1979). The groups selected for this study vary considerably in how they see their role in influencing the Government, and their obligations towards their own membership, and to any wider populations associated with them. (Descriptive details of the 11 groups interviewed are tabulated in appendix 2).

Development of Policies

The policies of the interest groups must be assumed to reflect the views of their memberships. In this respect, regular, full conferences play an important role. All the groups studied (except the Public Questions Committee and the Concerned Parents Association) hold annual or biennial conferences. The remits and resolutions from these provide the basis for the organisation's subsequent work. Sometimes these are organised into formal policy

INTEREST GROUPS CONSULTED

Combined Methodist and Presbyterian Church Public Questions Committee
Concerned Parents Association
Maori Women's Welfare League
National Council of Women of New Zealand
National Gay Rights Coalition
New Zealand Association of Social Workers
New Zealand Chambers of Commerce
New Zealand Federation of Labour
New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations
New Zealand Returned Services Association
Royal New Zealand Plunket Society

statements. The Public Questions Committee, which is a servicing group to the Methodist and Presbyterian Churches, has its work programme determined largely by remits from the annual Methodist Conference and Presbyterian Assembly.

Conferences, however, are not the only source of policy; the groups also react to events affecting them as they arise, through their governing bodies. The extent to which members other than the executive participate in handling these issues, varies from group to group. Permanent or ad hoc sub-committees may be set up comprising executive members (for example, the Maori Women's Welfare League), or also involving the rank and file membership (for example, the New Zealand Association of Social Workers). Organisations may also canvass their membership on new issues, but although some groups do this regularly (the National Council of Women, the Gay Rights Coalition), others find that deadlines present problems and that canvassing membership would significantly delay the response required from them (cf local body associations—page 43).

All the interest groups examined have contacts with other bodies with similar concerns, and several have sought consultation on specific policy issues. The Chambers of Commerce have the most developed consultative structure and frequently meet with related interest groups such as Federated Farmers, the Employers Federation, the Manufacturers Federation, and the Retailers Federation.

Some groups have formal or informal links with their overseas counterparts, for example, the Gay Rights Coalition with the International Gay Association; the National Council of Women with the International Council of Women; and the Returned Services Association with the Australian Returned Service League. This type of contact illustrates an indirect international influence which may ultimately affect social policy formulation.

Tactics Used by Interest Groups

The most popular tactics used by groups are to present conference remits to the

appropriate minister or Government department; to make submissions to select committees or departmental committees and to maintain personal contact with the relevant minister or departmental staff. (The tactics used by local body associations are very similar). Although the government of the day is the main focal point for pressure, some groups also have contact with the parliamentary opposition. The National Council of Women sends its remits to all the main political parties and invites them to its conferences; the Returned Services Association invites both caucus committees to meet with its defence sub-committees; and the Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations has written to the main political parties asking for details or relevant policies.

Interest groups vary in the extent to which they seek public support in addition to, or as an alternative to, their lobbying of the Government. Unlike Government advisory bodies, the groups rarely publish substantive reports aimed at the general public. (The National Council of Women's *What Price Equality?* is an exception.) Their publications are mainly newsletters or newspapers for their own members; some groups also provide public promotional leaflets. Groups also vary in their attitudes towards the news media. Many established groups express some dissatisfaction with their treatment by the news media. It seems to them that, unless well-established groups have a sensational story to offer they are likely to be overlooked in favour of small fringe groups. However, the Gay Rights Coalition expressed approval of the sympathetic support it has received from the news media and has prepared a manual for its members on effective use of the news media. The Concerned Parents Association also maintains good liaison with the news media through interviews, news items, and panel discussions.

The Gay Rights Coalition, in line with other similar pressure groups, also tries to gain attention with conventional publicity items such as badges, posters, and stickers. This group has also advocated civil disobedience—by encouraging members not to complete census forms. Another example of stronger action is the use of strikes and pickets by the Federation of Labour. These techniques tend to be used

in addition to, not instead of, the more usual lobbying tactics which have been described. They tend to be resorted to where attempts to pressure the Government are unproductive. 'Militancy may capture the headlines, but this is only the tip of the iceberg . . . Where militancy is resorted to, it is often as a result of the failure of pressure' (Jackson, 1973).

Even where groups do not attempt to appeal to the general public, they are likely to regard the mobilisation of their own membership as important. Some groups see part of their role in encouraging individual members, or member organisations, to take the initiative in promoting change, whether at a local or at a national level (Association of Social Workers, Federation of Labour). Some of them attempt to train members for successful lobbying (the Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations has been running a series of seminars with this aim).

Interest groups have been referred to as being among the chief architects of Government policy (Jackson 1973). However, it is difficult to assess the influence of specific interest groups. When asked to sum up their effectiveness, most of the groups studied could point to at least some action which they had advocated and which had been taken up by the Government. Some groups such as the Returned Services Association, the National Council of Women, and the Plunket Society) could cite many examples. However, several groups saw their contribution as only part of an evolutionary process of shaping social policy and helping to bring about a climate for change (cf Advisory bodies, page 29). Several spokespersons suggested that the only people who could assess the group's impact on the Government were the decision-makers themselves.

Once it is established which approaches to the Government are the most effective, all interest groups should be given equal access to them so that they have an opportunity to contribute to the shaping of policy. Obviously not all interest groups can be guaranteed success in their attempts to influence the Government. An interest group's success should reflect the soundness of its arguments and the extent to which it reflects the wishes of people.

When the interest groups were asked about their most effective means of

influence, 3 main themes recurred—contact with the relevant minister or departmental staff; well-prepared submissions; and mobilising the collective membership.

Contact With Ministers or Departments

The relationship between an interest group and a minister or his department includes more than formal contact over a specific policy matter. It also includes the extent to which the interest group is known and accepted by the Government. Most of the interest groups studied have been recognised as having a role to play in the policy-making process. All except the Gay Rights Coalition, the Concerned Parents Association, and the Public Questions Committee had been asked to nominate members of Government boards or advisory bodies, though some expressed disappointment that they were not entitled to actual representation, and that the final decision on nominations was a political one.

Some groups are closely incorporated within the Government process. For example, the Chambers of Commerce have formal contact with the appropriate ministers about once a month, and more frequent informal contact—especially at social gatherings. The Association of Social Workers is often consulted by the Social Work Training Council and the Advisory Council for the Community Welfare of Disabled Persons. Some groups have such close contact with the Government that they have become incorporated to an extent within the Government structure. Several examples illustrate this:

- The Returned Services Association has daily contact with the Department of Social Welfare and the Ministry of Defence about war pensions, and it works in close association with the War Pension Board and the War Pensions Appeal Board. The Association receives a small annual Government grant to enable representation at overseas conferences.
- The Maori Women's Welfare League is in partnership with the Department of Maori Affairs in implementing the Tu Tangata Whanau scheme. The League receives an annual grant from the department of over \$20,000.
- The Plunket Society, through its nurses, has the main responsibility for

health-care supervision of children under 5. Representatives of the society and the Department of Health meet twice a year to co-ordinate services. The full-time national staff of the Society are paid by the department.

In contrast to these examples, there are instances where interest group and Government relationships are neither close nor positive. The Federation of Labour is frequently called upon by the Government to resolve disputes in the workplace. However, the channels through which the Federation may work, including the Industrial Relations Council, frequently break down. The Human Rights Commission has refused to continue communication with the Gay Rights Coalition. The Concerned Parents' Association feel they do not have satisfactory access to the Department of Education. And the Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations, although they receive a Government grant towards staff salaries, feel frustration at the lack of Government consultation, and note that the issues which they have been concerned with are being referred to other bodies as if they were newly arisen.

Good liaison with the Government does not automatically assure the success of all an interest group's proposals. However, it does provide opportunities to present opinions and strengthens their authority. A group not well-known to the decision-makers has a disadvantage.

The solution does not lie in depriving the established groups of their access to Government, or in seeking to incorporate more interest groups into the Government structure. In the first place, groups may lose their independence and their ability to effect any sort of change by close involvement with the Government. Secondly, some interest groups, by their very nature, would not fit smoothly into the Government structure because their aims and ideals are sharply at variance with the mainstream of Government policy. The decision-makers are likely to find more acceptable those groups whose members are similar to themselves in age, sex, experience, and background; they are less likely to identify with the groups which represent minority interests or radical views. However, if the groups which at

present are not close to the Government are to be given a fair hearing, some changes are needed in the policy-making structure. Greater effort by decision-makers to seek out the full range of interest group opinion could help. Already Government committees and departments write the groups asking for comment on issues under discussion. For example, several of the groups studied had been contacted by the Department of Justice for comment on the system of registry office weddings.

Providing increased opportunity for comment through an effective system of notification about legislation could also help. Information about the parliamentary programme was described by one organisation as "a hit or miss affair". Some groups spoke with gratitude of being contacted by the clerks of the Legislative Department when a piece of legislation likely to be of special concern to them was due for discussion. However, this notification seemed to depend on a personal contact between the department and a representative of the group, or alternatively, to come through an interested member of parliament. Other ways in which groups found out about legislation included public advertisements, and publications such as *The Weekly List and Order Paper*, *Common Concern*, and *The Capital Letter*. The Chambers of Commerce and the National Council of Women receive copies of every bill issued but having to buy copies of bills and publications can constitute a drain on a group's finances.

Submissions

It was generally felt that although access to the Government was essential in seeking to influence decision-making, it was even more important to have a well-prepared submission. Once groups are aware of the form and content appropriate for a submission to the Government, then every effort must be made to ensure that it is of the highest quality.

The quality of a submission is determined largely by the quality of the investigative work which forms the background to it. The Federation of Labour has 3 researchers and the Public Questions Committee and the Gay Rights Coalition each has a staff member whose primary function is to co-ordinate or undertake research. Three

groups have good liaison with organisations which provide them with research information—Plunket receives assistance from the Medical Research Council, the Returned Services Association from the War Pensions Medical Research Trust Board (administered through the Department of Social Welfare), and the Chambers of Commerce have been able to use research staff of member organisations. However, in the main, interest groups tend to depend on their research work being carried out by their general staff, their executive, or their members.

This does not necessarily produce unsatisfactory research, as the staff or members may include people with research expertise. For example, the National Council of Women may draw on professionally qualified members, and the Society for Research on Women is one of its affiliated organisations. However, research work is likely to be time-consuming, and may place a drain on the energies of members and staff (who of course are often not full time and may be unpaid). If non-research staff are continually called on to carry out research, other aspects of the group's work may have to take a lower priority. Finally, for a specific piece of research to be done well, a level of technical expertise may be required which is not readily available to the group.

Interest groups could be helped to produce sound investigative work through being given access to research information and expertise. Such help could be in the form of advice and practical assistance with research tasks. The Social Science Research Fund Committee has formed a pool of consultants prepared to act in this way, and is attempting to make interest groups aware of this service.

Mobilisation of Membership

The commitment of members of interest groups has long been recognised as one of the groups' greatest strengths. Although not all will be active, their membership demonstrates the extent of sympathy with the general aims of the group. The interest groups studied value the involvement of rank and file members and member organisations to develop projects, to contribute research information, and also to

stimulate individual initiatives towards promoting the group's aims.

The mobilisation of members is dependent not only on their own convictions but also on social and organisational factors. The Maori Women's Welfare League suggested that the present economic situation affects participation in League activities. Growing financial pressure on families has meant that an increasing proportion of members are in paid employment and not available to contribute to the League's work. Other groups, which have in the past relied largely on voluntary service, also face the same problems. Greater recognition of the value of unpaid work (perhaps through tax concessions), greater involvement by men, and ultimately a general improvement in the economy could help to alleviate the problem.

All the interest groups surveyed expressed concern about the finances available to them (even when Government grants were received); and the need to spread these funds over all the activities of the organisation, not only lobbying. There may be a case for reviewing the machinery by which the Government makes grants for training seminars and other educative activities of groups (for example, through the Department of Internal Affairs Lottery Boards). Where provision for funding already exists, this should be better publicised.

Financial factors may also determine the effectiveness of communication between the executive and members; for example printing and postage costs may determine the frequency of communication. The Chambers of Commerce whose members are in business are undoubtedly better off than interest groups whose members are mainly women not usually in paid employment. Hence the call for subsidised postal rates for voluntary organisations by a number of bodies, including the New Zealand Council of Social Service. Probably a more realistic approach would be to consider grants from Government for the work of voluntary groups, or tax deductibility for contributions from the public.

The mobilisation of membership depends very much on the communication of information between an interest group's executive and its members. This keeps

members up to date with the concerns of the organisation and gives them background information on which they may act. It also provides feedback on the feelings and activities of the membership. As already noted, lack of time may make it difficult for the executive to obtain this feedback rapidly. This reinforces the need for effective notification of impending legislation and so on, if the maximum time is to be available for views to be canvassed.

Conclusions

The contribution which interest groups can make to the policy-making process has been shown to vary according to the amount of support they can demonstrate, the resources they can muster, and perhaps most significantly, according to the recognition they are granted by central government decision-makers.

It has been emphasised that interest groups are an essential part of the democratic process and of consultative planning.

Without them society would be poorer. The real danger is that we misconceive their role. There is an urgent need to keep all pressure groups in perspective and to integrate them in such a way into the government process that their relative strengths and weaknesses (particularly their representational strengths) are apparent . . . The problem is not pressure groups in themselves, but the way in which we utilise them. (Jackson, 1973.)

Thus, all groups should have the opportunity to state their case. Ways in which access to select committees and commissions of inquiry can be obtained have been noted (pages 18-19).

Government departments, including the Legislative Department, already have considerable contact with interest groups as a basis for disseminating information and calling for comment. It is essential that these processes should be broadly based, because if they are subjective and ad hoc only one side of an argument could be heard, and the lesser known interest groups could lose their chance to contribute. The problem remains, of course, of ensuring that groups which are not organised and do

not have strong representation also have their views heard and their needs attended to.

The point has also been made that if an interest group's submissions to the Government are to be effective they must be well-informed and well-presented. Many interest groups need help to gain access to information (including the results of research), to interpret this data, and to carry

out their own research. Assistance in the form of advice on research design and practice, such as is offered by the Social Science Research Fund Committee, should, if accepted, allow much voluntary effort to be applied more efficiently than at present. Although the effectiveness of individual interest groups may vary, as a sector they have a valuable contribution to make to the planning process.

CHAPTER 8 REGIONAL AND LOCAL BODIES

In this study we are concerned with the influence of regional and local bodies on policy formulation at the national level only and not with their activities in developing their own social policies. Because their influence at the national level is not great it seems unnecessary to describe the different types of local bodies in any great detail. Briefly, those which are or may possibly be, active in the social area are the territorial authorities—cities, boroughs, counties (and district councils), and the regional and united councils into which they are grouped—and the education boards and hospital boards, which are charged with the delivery of important social services.

There are 3 main ways in which regional and local bodies may influence policy-making at the national level—individually, collectively, and through regional planning.

Individual Influence

Regional and local bodies may act individually to lobby the Government on their own behalf, usually to obtain some special consideration (for example, funds for urban renewal or capital works, or special incentives for industry) and on issues such as transport and employment. This action is more likely to relate to aspects of, or variations in, existing policy rather than the shaping of new policy. In this way the local bodies are acting very much as interest groups. This type of attempt at influence may be directed at an individual member or a group of members of parliament as was the case when Wellington city invited the local members to discuss the extension of the airport runway. Sometimes, Government departments may be the target, especially the Department of Internal Affairs (which is concerned with local government), the Department of Health, and the Department of Education. Some local bodies may attempt to lobby a policy-forming council at the national level (for instance, the National Roads Board or the Urban Transport Council), in order to influence policy-making.

A more extreme example of local authority lobbying was seen recently in the

Heathcote County's rebellion against increased electricity prices, which was supported by other Christchurch local bodies. In such cases an appeal may be made directly to the Cabinet. It must, however, be emphasised that it is unlikely that new policy initiatives will be introduced through this process.

United and regional councils are, from time to time, asked to comment individually on Government policy proposals (for example, legislation on urban transport) and may exert some influence by this means.

Collective Influence

Most local bodies are grouped into an association or federation which speaks for the group and attempts to present a united front to the Government. These bodies may act as interest groups, but some have become part of the Government machinery and even take on some of the attributes of advisory bodies. Most of these associations have the familiar mechanisms of annual conferences with remits, which, if passed, are acted on by a national executive. There are parallels here with the political party structure outlined in chapter 6. The strength and influence of the local body associations varies, with an important determinant being the extent of financial independence. Bodies with their own funding source (for example power boards and harbour boards) are in a stronger position in relation to central government than those, such as education boards and hospital boards, which are dependent financially. The Counties Association and the Municipal Association which represent territorial local bodies may also find it difficult to achieve sufficient agreement upon issues to take them to central government.

The annual conference system has many drawbacks as a means of developing policies which can be pressed effectively at the national level. Unless the remits are adequately pre-sorted and discussed in advance, the agenda can become overcrowded. Many matters raised may be parochial, repetitive, or poorly researched.

Remits such as these are easily dismissed by Government departments, and this does little to raise the prestige and influence of the associations and the local bodies which they represent.

The association conferences may be used by central government to address local bodies, for example, in the customary speeches which ministers or permanent heads give to annual conferences. The involvement of local body associations in Government is generally predictable and stereotyped, so that they sometimes act as adjuncts to the Government and as agents to put Government policy into effect.

The Territorial Local Government Council is a joint organisation representing all territorial local authorities. It has been able to present a united front on concerns such as revenue-sharing (see below). The counties are represented by the Counties Association, which has recently been active in the social area, especially in rural issues. Other territorial local authorities, including regional and united councils, are eligible for membership of the Municipal Association, which is looked at in more detail as an example of a local government association. The ad hoc local authorities in the social area are represented in this report by the Education Boards Association and Hospital Boards Association.

Municipal Association

The object of the Municipal Association is to preserve and foster effective and efficient local government. Executive meetings are held in Wellington (where there is a permanent headquarters) and are attended by senior Department of Internal Affairs officers or by the Minister of Local Government (or his parliamentary under-secretary).

The list of statutory and quasi-statutory bodies on which the Municipal Association has official representation is impressive. These include several in the social policy area such as the New Zealand Council of Social Service, the New Zealand Social Work Training Council, the Environmental Council, and the Board of Health. A weekly newsletter is sent to members. In addition to the annual conference, the views of members are sought through questionnaires on policy issues, which often form the basis of submissions to the Government,

although there appears to be some difficulty in obtaining adequate responses in time to be effective (cf. interest groups, page 35).

The 1981 President's Report of the Municipal Association illustrates the association's interest in social policy. Its main concern was revenue sharing, which has been an issue for many years. If this were resolved, the president suggested, energy and resources could be diverted to other urgent matters such as employment or recreation. In 1981 the association produced a booklet *Partners in Government* which was used to inform 1981 parliamentary candidates. Meetings with the Ministers of Local Government and Finance on revenue sharing were also proposed.

Interest in recreational and community services was expressed in the 1981 report, with support for district councils of social service, but always the question of financial responsibility and the fear of becoming involved in large-scale funding holds back major initiatives—for example, in child care services. Attempts to develop a common approach to zoning procedures for child-care centres are proving fruitless, and a remit at the 1981 conference seeking Government support for the salaries of non-profit-making public day-care centres (proposed by Porirua City) was lost. This is an area where consensus is obviously going to be difficult to reach, and pressure on the Government cannot be made in a concerted way.

Remits which are passed at the conference are taken to the appropriate ministers, either directly or through the departments. They are used in submissions to select and caucus committees (along with the views from questionnaires) and supply the basis for the association's lobbying.

Education Boards Association

The Education Boards Association represents the lay body in primary and intermediate education as opposed to the professional input from teacher unions. Each board may present its particular requirements and concerns to the Government, but it may also work through the association which has the familiar structure of an annual conference, remits, and a national executive. Its full-time workforce at the national level is, however,

restricted to an executive secretary (cf. the Hospital Boards Association). The association is regularly consulted by the Department of Education as part of its round of interest groups (see page 24). It has stated its views on subjects such as rural education, vandalism, and early childhood education. Perhaps because of the limitations of an annual conference, the association in the last 3 years has been developing a statement of policy through a policy committee which drafts statements and circulates them among the member boards. This is obviously a time-consuming, and at times a frustrating, exercise, but it resulted in a document for consideration by the education spokespeople of the 3 main parties (including the Minister of Education) in an attempt to influence election policy in 1981.

Hospital Boards Association

The 29 Hospital Boards form an important group of local authorities. They are responsible for spending roughly \$1,000 million per annum. They have a national association with several full-time officers and an 11-person executive which meets monthly. Its meetings have been attended regularly by successive Ministers of Health.

Association policy is developed through a biennial conference which considers formal remits, and through informal mini-conferences in alternate years. If at other times an individual board raises an issue which seems of more than local importance the association canvasses opinion and seeks a consensus view. A recent example was the Cook Hospital Board's concern over Gisborne City's demand for a cash reserve contribution for a new hospital building. This seemed to raise a general principle applicable elsewhere.

The association has regular access to the minister through its executive meetings. It also approaches him and other ministers directly. (The link with Social Welfare in 1980 and 1981 through the joint portfolio of the minister seems to have been valuable). The executive prepares submissions to select committees and other investigative bodies, frequently in response to requests for comment. The association believes it has often effectively influenced national policy

by this means; for example, in commenting on the Accident Compensation Amendment Bill at the select committee hearings (see also page 18).

The Hospital Boards Association like the Municipal Association is represented on a large number of statutory boards and advisory committees. These include the Board of Health, the Hospitals Advisory Council (3 members), the Social Work Training Council, the Nursing Council, and several others concerned with medical manpower and servicing.

Influence Through Regional Planning

The Town and Country Planning Act 1977 in theory enables regional bodies (regional and united councils) to prepare planning schemes which are binding on central government agencies, or at least to provide the framework for negotiating an agreed statutory regional scheme with central government. In this way, national policies may be modified to meet the special needs, circumstances, opportunities, and aspirations of the regions generally, or the specific needs of a particular region. There is also scope for the promotion of co-ordination of planning between central government agencies operating within a region and between the efforts of the private, public, and voluntary sectors (see page 24). This process is in its infancy, and needs time to be worked through fully. However, the Wellington Regional Scheme (in the form proposed by the former Regional Planning Authority), was taken by the Housing Corporation as requiring them to provide more rental accommodation and treated as potentially binding. The West Coast scheme contains statements on the levels of Government investment and employment in the area, which are seen to be essential for its economic future. The staff of the Town and Country Planning Division, of the Ministry of Works and Development, has been augmented to deal with the negotiations on regional schemes which are now beginning to develop.

This process will result in a greater proportion of social policy being initiated at a regional level. At present policies adopted by regional bodies to promote employment

are being studied and compared. The more successful of these policies may eventually be taken up elsewhere.

Conclusions

Parallels have been suggested in the way that local body associations and interest groups operate, and in the contributions they can make to shaping social policy. The associations are experienced in making submissions to the Government, are better endowed with resources, and are more readily consulted by ministers and departments than the less established interest groups.

However, local body associations require a better and quicker response from their

members to calls for comment on topics of overall interest. Territorial local authorities would probably play a greater part in both shaping and introducing social policy if a system could be worked out between central and local government for funding and for revenue sharing.

The potential of the new approach to regional planning (under the 1977 Act) is exciting, but not yet fully realised. It offers the opportunity for central and local governments to negotiate policies appropriate for a particular region through their regional representation. This could have far-reaching effects on national social planning.

CHAPTER 9 INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES

The system of social policy formulation in New Zealand is open to influence from other countries, either individually or through some grouping of nations. Some of the influence is informal advice from overseas visitors, such as economists, political scientists, social administrators, advisors attached to overseas government agencies, and officials at various levels. The New Zealand counterparts of these people, travelling abroad may also bring back ideas based on their experiences, which no doubt influence their thinking on policy. There are also many types of formal delegations concerned with trade, political alliances, cultural exchanges, and so on, but most of them have little influence on social policy. It is difficult to document the influence of such contacts, in the same way as it is difficult to define informal influences within the country itself. This chapter therefore concentrates on examples of influence exerted through international agencies, and in particular through the United Nations/UNESCO, the International Labour Office (ILO), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Their influence may be either direct or indirect.

United Nations/UNESCO

United Nations international conventions are the legal forms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There are many of these covering a variety of topics, but the most important are the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, both of which have been accepted by New Zealand. Briefly, once a convention is "open for signature" at the United Nations headquarters, it is transmitted, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the New Zealand Cabinet which has the power to ratify it. Once this is done, it has the force of a legal treaty and New Zealand law must be made to accord with it, either by amending existing legislation or by passing new legislation. Countries which have ratified conventions are required to report on their actions to a United Nations

committee and can be questioned by this body. To illustrate this procedure—the Race Relations Act was passed to bring New Zealand into line with the United Nations convention. This entailed creating in legal terms a new type of offence in the area of discrimination. For the same reason, discrimination on the basis of sex and religion became an offence under the Human Rights Commission Act 1977.

On a less formal basis, there is no doubt that the United Nations "years" (such as the Year of the Child or the Year of Disabled Persons) have raised the public and Government consciousness and have influenced social policy.

International Labour Organisation

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) also produces conventions which, when ratified, are treaties having the force of law. It is an older body than the United Nations and has influenced United Nations declarations and conventions. The process of developing an ILO convention is complex, and it may take 4–6 years from being first considered by the governing body to being passed at the annual conference. This conference, as the ILO itself, is a tripartite body, each delegation containing representatives of workers, employers, and governments. The conference produces conventions and recommendations, which are guidelines for implementing the conventions and therefore non-binding in the legal sense. As with the United Nations conventions, these are relayed back to the New Zealand Cabinet, accompanying the report of the delegation, and with reports from the Department of Labour and other relevant agencies. As the topic will have been discussed for several years the views of interested bodies will already be well known. For example, 14 different bodies in New Zealand contributed to the discussion on the ILO convention on older workers.

If the conventions are ratified, changes in legislation may follow, as already outlined. Conventions which have been ratified by New Zealand mainly relate to the working conditions of seamen and other special

groups. Although New Zealand has not ratified the equal pay convention, this was recommended by the review committee and existing legislation goes most of the way towards fulfilling its conditions. Once accepted, ratifications are policed by the ILO and regular reports are called for.

Although the Government may agree with the general principles of ILO conventions, as in the case of equal pay, many detailed problems may prevent full ratification. For example, 19 pieces of legislation cover the question of the minimum working age in New Zealand, and the implications of amending all of these are far-reaching. Ratified conventions may subsequently be denounced, as social conditions change. This happened with New Zealand's position on night work for women.

However, ILO conventions have been very influential even without full ratification. They educate governments in international standards. When shaping policies, the Government may ask itself what international conventions are relevant and, through international bodies, can see what other governments have done. Conventions may also be used by interest groups either internationally or locally (for instance the conventions on equal pay and maternity leave) to press the Government to conform with international practice and standards. In New Zealand more use could be made of this source of influence and of the international political pressure which could come with it.

OECD

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has possibly more influence on social and economic policies in New Zealand than the more broad-based bodies, because it is a grouping of countries with similar economic and social experiences. There are also contact people for OECD matters in several Government departments who promote liaison (UNESCO, however, has its own commission in New Zealand). OECD influence is felt through conferences and other meetings and through the investigative teams which it sends to member countries. There are regular overviews of the economic situation,

resulting in reports by the OECD to the New Zealand Government. In addition, specialised teams may be sent for more thorough investigations, for example the recent work on New Zealand's environmental procedures and law.

The 1980 OECD conference on Social Policies in the 1980s, allowed an exchange of views, opinions, and written papers which showed that many social and economic problems are shared by the participant countries—unemployment, the rising burden of welfare benefits, inflation, challenging of state authority. Thus, although no formal conventions were produced (and the New Zealand Government was not directly represented), the ideas and suggestions which arose at the conference are likely to be seriously considered.

The very large amount of material produced by the OECD may create problems of dissemination and assimilation. It has also been suggested that the work of the body is more useful in providing comparative material than innovative ideas.

The OECD rarely produces formal declarations along the lines of the United Nations or ILO, but a conference on the employment of women in April 1980 gave rise to the Declaration of Policies for the Employment of Women. Subsequently, the Committee on Women, recommended to the Cabinet that it should support the declaration, which it did in June 1981. The OECD will now ask how the declaration will be implemented. Again there is a strong indirect influence being brought to bear, in this case through advisory bodies. The Planning Council has used and continues to use material from the OECD social policy conference. Other advisory bodies in the social area, such as the Social Development Council, could do the same. Similarly the declaration on employment is being used by the Advisory Committee on Women's Affairs, and the National Advisory Council for the Employment of Women. More publicity needs to be given to international information on social policies. Much of it is at present retained in Government departments. Wider debate on the issues and on solutions which have been suggested or attempted in other countries would surely be beneficial in developing policies to combat similar problems here.

Conclusions

Overseas agencies, through either direct or indirect channels, provide a large amount of material on social policy which could be of value to New Zealand, but which is at present not made full use of. Adequate machinery should be set up in Government departments to deal with this material, including the appointment of liaison officers with appropriate expertise where these do not already exist. This machinery should aim to bring relevant material to the attention of decision-makers, either directly

or through advisory bodies. The contribution which overseas experience can make in the evaluation of policies and programmes, and in experimentation is considerable, so long as local conditions are fully taken into account.

Interest groups could also benefit from the interchange of information and ideas with their overseas counterparts and international agencies. They may require assistance in creating and maintaining such links and here again liaison officers in Government departments could play a valuable role.

CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSIONS: SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PLANNING

The structure of the policy-making process in New Zealand is comparatively easy to define (see the diagrams in chapter 2). However, the functioning of the system is complex. The process is not a simple or smooth progression of activities and any attempt at a simple explanation is bound to leave out many variables. The complexity lies not only in the range of bodies involved, but also in the range of channels and routes through which the ideas and proposals pass. The absence of a single fixed process should not be regarded as undesirable, it may be a strength in that it can promote innovation, and efficiency may be enhanced by having several channels to work through.

Problems for Planning in the Social Policy Process

Is the policy process a comprehensive reappraisal of problems, with an orientation to long-term planning, or simply a collection of ad hoc responses to current situations and cases? The New Zealand system is probably closer to the latter. This is in part due to the pressure which the system itself imposes on the decision-makers. Ministers are subject to many day-to-day pressures, including constituency responsibilities and the demands of the parliamentary process, in addition to work generated by their portfolios. This is a reflection of the small scale of New Zealand society and the intimate nature of political life. In opposition, politicians may have more time to reflect and to plan policy, but at present, as has been shown, their access to information, especially for Government departments, is restricted.

If politicians are over-extended, they are likely to rely more on their departments, and this may produce a compartmentalised view based on a narrow range of information. It also passes the pressure on to departmental officers, thereby reducing their time for reflection. As already noted,

the departments are so bound up with implementation and administration of policy that staff may find it difficult to see the policy formulation process with any clarity. The annual budget resource allocation cycle is dominant in Government planning and may be confused with it. The yearly cycle is perhaps too short for other than ad hoc planning (if such can be said to exist). Given this situation, how will medium-term planning and policy formulation take place?

Although departments are reasonably efficient in the short-term, narrow-spectrum planning which the budget cycle allows, there are deficiencies in the mechanisms for working across departmental boundaries. Care must be taken to ensure that compartmentalised viewpoints and attitudes, especially where financial resources are threatened, are not allowed to obscure the fact that social needs and problems overlap departmental spheres of influence. Attempts in the past to improve interdepartmental co-ordination, have gone as far as amalgamating departments or parts of departments. The present Housing Corporation, Social Welfare, Transport, and Energy departments were created in this way. Would any improvement be gained from creating a joint Health-Education-Social Welfare department? Administratively such a colossus would be very difficult to manage, and its potential for success seems doubtful.

An alternative suggestion is the adoption of the "envelope" approach to budgeting used in Canada (see page 23) which has been considered by the Treasury and the State Services Commission. However, once again this would be tying planning closely to financial allocation mechanisms.

Another problem which restricts planning is the influence of political factors. Policy-making has been analysed in terms of "demand regulation" (Hall *et al.* 1975). Governments are faced with an array of demands which is taken to reflect the

"public will". These demands, which may entail a policy response, are brought forward by the variety of means outlined in this study. As governments cannot for financial, among other reasons, meet all the demands which are brought before them, they must respond selectively; they must cull, compress, and modify demands, and ultimately reject many. In doing this, political judgments will undoubtedly be applied and these will affect the content and timing of policy.

In this context the role of the informal advice network, and of the news media must not be overlooked. The informal network is an intangible influence and cannot be analysed in detail, but its importance must not be underestimated. Many anecdotes are related in which important discussions on policy matters have taken place, perhaps even by chance, in corridors, lifts and at social functions. The situation is summed up by Larry B. Hill:

New Zealand politics is intimate politics; at the higher governmental levels interpersonal communication, ("old boy") networks are exquisitely intricate. (quoted by Palmer, 1979).

Do the news media influence policy in their own right, or act simply as a forum for public opinion? Certainly the news media take part in a two-way flow of information and opinions between the public and the Government. They are part of the means whereby the "public will" is brought before the decision-makers. They can monitor public attitudes and compare them with departmental attitudes and the claims of the interest groups. On the other hand the news media interpret the actions of the Government and hence influence the amount of support which is likely to be forthcoming. Although they may not create issues the media can either magnify or play them down as they arise.

The news media are limited in making a more substantive and positive contribution to the policy debate by the lack of good interpretive journalism in New Zealand because it is seen as expensive; because the demand for it has not been established; and also because politicians are sensitive to what they interpret as criticism.

The "Image" of Social Policy and Social Planning

A major obstacle to improving the mechanisms for social policy development both in New Zealand and elsewhere, is the difficulty of defining, evaluating, and documenting social policy. In the introduction we saw that the identification of social policy with social welfare and the benefits system would lead to an unacceptably narrow definition. At the other extreme all planning may be seen as social planning, because planning, and government, by its very nature, is an activity concerned with people. Definitions must therefore be ad hoc, and suited to the purposes at hand, as has been the practice for this study.

Social policy formulation is often seen as a more democratic exercise than the formulation of economic policy, because everyone feels that they have some opinion on social issues, and some experience to offer. The importance of anecdotal evidence has already been referred to. Reliance on anecdote also arises from the lack of social data which is itself due to difficulties of definition, but also to the lack of attention to policy-oriented topics, to interpretive and predictive research on the part of social researchers in this country. Social data is less amenable to quantitative measurement and analysis than economic material, and this makes it difficult to evaluate social policy. There are few measurable indices of the output of social policy. Indirect indicators have often proved unsatisfactory. This is in sharp contrast to the acceptance of financial indices such as balance of payment levels and budget deficit rates which are central to economic and financial planning. Added to this must be the world-wide weakness in social impact forecasting techniques, related either to projects or programmes.

An extended critique of the institutions, personnel and funding of social research in New Zealand would not be appropriate here. Social research is now recognised by the National Research Advisory Council and the setting up of the Social Sciences Research Fund Committee in 1979 was a positive development (although there is no specialised institute in the social sciences equivalent to the Council for Educational

Research or the Institute of Economic Research). Up to the present, the response from the social research community in New Zealand to the call for policy-oriented research from the Social Science Research Fund Committee has been disappointing, and a considerable amount of educative work remains to be done to ensure the production of relevant work, which is also of a high quality.

Even when the appropriate research is produced, it must be presented in the most effective way. The National Research Advisory Council and other research bodies are well aware of the considerable suspicion and criticism of research and researchers. Decision-makers must be convinced of the value of research and at the same time researchers must be educated in relevance and good concise presentation. There must be people who can set themselves between the two groups as interpreters and synthesisers of research (and also as advocates of its worth). This is being done to some extent by several bodies, including the Social Sciences Research Fund Committee, the Prime Minister's advisory group, and the Government Research Unit. These last two have direct and privileged access to the decision-makers. Some of the advisory bodies are also working in the area, notably the Planning Council and the Social Development Council (through its family policy papers). As it is the members of parliament who are the "gatekeepers" of the policy process, who form the decision-making bodies of the government caucus and the Cabinet, and who maintain wide contact networks in interest groups and the party (not to mention informal contacts), they should be the targets for efforts to improve the image of social planning and social research.

In the development of social policy, and in the collection and synthesis of information which must precede it much depends on individual initiative. This has already been noted with respect to work in Government departments and advisory bodies. Whether or not such initiative is present depends on the selection of people for the work, job satisfaction, and the amount of resources available. New Zealand is short of people to act as resources in the policy formulation process. There is too much advice of an indifferent quality, too

thinly spread through the system.

The setting up of task forces would probably be a more efficient use of scarce resources than the proliferation of ineffective advisory bodies. This method may also produce the innovative ideas and alternatives which the present system does not encourage. Individual initiative is at work in the system now, but in a random fashion which is unlikely to produce the best effect.

The factors outlined lead to the conclusion that the bodies concerned with shaping social policy are weak compared to those working on economic policy. This is true with respect to the Cabinet and caucus committees, the Government departments (despite their large votes), the advisory bodies, and many of the interest groups.

Need for a More Co-ordinated Approach

The evidence presented in this report points to the lack of a co-ordinated approach to social policy formulation. Such an approach would transcend departmental boundaries, be free from the exigencies of the parliamentary term, and be apart from pressure group influences, while being open to reasonable points of view. In addition, more use should be made of individuals who are able to synthesise facts and think in an innovative, but practical way. The key requirements for an improved approach are co-ordination, evaluation, innovation, and planning, with a concern for people and their well-being as the central focus.

Although there are several mechanisms which meet some of the requirements, no one body in New Zealand at present can measure up to them all. Nor is it realistic, or even desirable, to expect any one body to have a monopoly of expertise and influence in the social policy area. The present system is polycentric, and this situation should remain, but the room for improvement is considerable. The following discussion looks at mechanisms which have, in the Council's opinion, a role to play in an improved approach to social planning, beginning at the Cabinet level and working outwards through the departmental and advisory body structure.

The Cabinet Committee on Family and Social Affairs

Although the current political standing of the Cabinet committee is not high compared to committees which have their functions in the economic sphere, it is a mechanism through which the co-ordination of social policy and the monitoring of social implications could be carried out more effectively at the highest level. Through its officials committee, the Cabinet committee is able to draw on specialised information and advice from the social policy area, which may not at present be given due attention in relation to the financial and political input. Political will is needed to encourage the use of this mechanism, and to allow it to achieve its potential.

The Department of Social Welfare

The department is currently developing an important capacity for evaluation of its own policies and programmes, which could eventually be extended to other areas of social policy. It is also beginning to investigate the social implications of major development projects and of technological change (in consultation with the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research). In addition, the department comments on regional and district planning schemes from the point of view of their social content. The department has close links with several of the advisory bodies in the social area—the Social Development Council, the Council of Social Service, and others of a more specialised nature, and good relationships with the Planning Council.

The Department of Social Welfare is therefore taking initiative in several areas where this report has identified gaps. It may, however, be limited by the demands and restraints inherent in the departmental system.

The Treasury

The Treasury is at present co-ordinating social policy through the resource allocation process, which, in some departments, has become confused with planning (see pages 21–25). Although it may consider aspects of policy other than the financial, Treasury's main role is to co-ordinate and carry out the

Government's expenditure strategy, and the department does not, in general, initiate social policy proposals.

The State Services Commission

The Commission is concerned mainly with the planning and co-ordination of staffing in the Government service. However, it can provide the initiative to encourage greater efficiency within departments and greater interdepartmental co-operation.

It has also conducted research on and commented on a range of issues in the social area, some of which have relevance well beyond the Government sector; for example, child care.

The Ministry of Works and Development

The Ministry of Works and Development has a major part to play in the co-ordination and planning of public works and its influence spreads to the private sector. In addition to this, the Town and Country Planning Division co-ordinates statutory planning. It also sees itself as negotiating "contracts" between central government and regional bodies (see pages 43–44). This would make it influential in producing regional level social policy and in modifying national level policy in accordance with regional needs.

The Prime Minister's Advisory Group

The advisory group has been attributed with a variety of functions; its powers have been debated and perhaps over-estimated. The group's real strength lies in its access to a wide range of information and to top level decision-makers, and its ability to achieve an overview of both social and economic areas within the one group.

The group, however, is not involved in detailed studies, and long-term policy formulation. Despite an evaluative function inherent in its advisory overview role, its involvement in social planning, because of its smallness, may well remain ad hoc in nature. The group has a co-ordinating function within Government machinery and can prompt and facilitate policy development. Its own role in policy initiation, however, remains unclear, and is mainly indirect.

The National Research Advisory Council

The National Research Advisory Council has considerable influence in promoting and allocating resources for all types of research. It is in a position to co-ordinate research efforts, improve research standards, and promote research input into policy formulation; all of which have been shown as particular requirements in the social policy area. The Council can also set in motion ad hoc working parties to explore research resources and needs in areas of concern; for example, in employment or industrial relations.

The Social Development Council

The Social Development Council has not secured a major role in the central decision-making machinery, although it has been influential in promoting discussion of social issues in the community through its publications. Given its wide terms of reference, however, the SDC has the potential to be the leading advisory body in the social policy area. Much depends on the initiatives which it takes under its new chairperson, and whether it can obtain adequate resources for a vigorous and effective work programme. It has already expressed some interest in undertaking a role in social audit work, where there are serious gaps in present knowledge.

The New Zealand Planning Council

The terms of reference of the Planning Council give it the scope to make progress towards a new approach to policy formation at the national level. In the advice which it has given to the Government the Council has stressed co-ordination, evaluation, innovation, and planning. Although it has no executive function, the body has acted almost as a *de facto* policy group for several Government departments, and it has the resources to recruit specialised staff of high quality and allow them to carry out in-depth study which, as has been pointed out, is rare in Government departments for reasons of time and political circumstance, and in other advisory bodies through lack of resources.

The Planning Council thus has a special position as an overview agency which sets it apart from other advisory bodies. These

advantages should now be used to undertake work more specifically in the social planning area and on the inter-relationship of social and economic planning. The Planning Council has the potential to fill some of the gaps which have been identified in this report.

Summary

As already noted, none of the bodies listed, on its own, can ensure an improved and better integrated approach to social planning. Nor would it be advisable for the responsibility to be directed to one agency. The Council does not suggest the establishment of any new body, but believes that those already in existence could meet the requirements if they were strengthened and given the appropriate resources. The Council would like to see the central role of the Cabinet Committee on Family and Social Affairs in shaping social policy recognised and reinforced. The work of this committee should be supported by strong advisory bodies, among whom the Social Development Council and the Planning Council have the greatest potential to make a worthwhile contribution. The Cabinet committee would also receive contributions to its deliberations and decision-making from the departments concerned with social policy, and, in its turn would have a vital role in co-ordinating the operation of these departments.

In addition to strengthening specific functions of existing bodies, as has been suggested, there are more general themes which emerge from this report which should be developed if the input into social policy is to be upgraded and the policy formulation process itself is to be improved.

Greater co-ordination of effort is required between bodies active in shaping social planning—between Government departments, and between departments and advisory bodies, interest groups and so on. Links could be built up on the basis of consultation and a freer exchange of information—information on present activities and future intentions. Vertical linkages are also important, whereby relevant input can flow upwards to the Cabinet; for example, from advisory bodies which have developed expertise in specialist areas. More use could also be made of

international bodies in terms of contributing information.

This report has stressed that there are gaps in information and methodology in the social area. Efforts to promote high-quality policy-oriented research on social issues would reduce this deficiency. Progress is also required in developing monitoring and evaluative techniques, and techniques for social impact assessment. Better presentation of research results, especially in the political context, should also be part of an improved research initiative.

A more democratic approach to policy formation is also needed, allowing greater participation by consumers and greater consultation with representative interest groups of all types and at all levels in society. This is in line with the approach advocated by the Planning Council in *Directions* when the concepts of partnership in planning and the Welfare Society were explored.

In the same report the Council stressed that all bodies which are concerned with planning should look beyond the short-term issues and exigencies. A tendency to confuse planning with financial

management (which is only part of the short-term planning process) has been illustrated in this report. The approach to planning favoured and promoted by the Council is one which begins with setting clear objectives. Policies are developed to achieve these objectives, and progress towards them must be measurable so that effectiveness can be assessed. This exercise has proved difficult especially in the social area, but must still be attempted if the needs of people are to be met effectively and efficiently.

At the same time as improvements are made within the social policy area, efforts must be made to integrate social planning with other types of planning—economic, environmental—at the national level.

This integration must also extend to planning at the regional and local levels. The problems now facing New Zealand society are complex and inter-related, and those who are addressing these problems should neither ignore social trends, nor treat social issues as secondary to the economic necessities. Only an integrated approach to planning is likely to be successful in the long term.

APPENDIX I: ADVISORY BODIES CONSULTED

| Year established | Means of establishment | Aims | Minister to Whom Responsible | Membership | Private Members' Terms of Office |
|--|---|--|---|--|--|
| 1975 (from 1969 NDC Committee) | Cabinet Directive. No statutory terms of reference. | To promote objectives of World Plan of Action for International Women's Year, and the United Nations Decade for Women; to assess New Zealand's progress towards these; to advise the Government through the Government's spokesperson on women's affairs. | Government spokesperson on women's affairs. | 12 members appointed by Minister on merit. One ex-officio member from National Advisory Council on Employment of Women. | 2 years (not renewable after 1977). |
| 1970 | Cabinet directive. No statutory terms of reference. | To advise the Minister for the Environment on matters relating to the state of the environment, its environmental quality trends; to publish information on environmental quality; to co-operate with other bodies on matters of mutual interest. | Minister for the Environment. | 8 members appointed by Minister on merit. 3 members nominated by Counties Association, Municipal Associations, regional planning authorities, 5 departmental representatives. | 3 years (renewable). |
| 1972 | Act of Parliament. Statutory terms of reference. | To advise the Minister of Housing on housing provision; to keep the housing needs of New Zealanders under review; to promote research into housing development; to co-ordinate bodies involved in housing provision. | Minister of Housing. | 6 members appointed by Minister, to get a broad representation of the housing industry at the professional level, the Secretary to the Treasury, 2 assistant director-generals of the Housing Corporation. | 3 years (renewable—length of new term at Minister's discretion). |
| 1973 | Act of Parliament. Statutory terms of reference. | To promote the fullest use of leisure by New Zealanders, and their total wellbeing; to advise the Minister for Recreation and Sport on relevant matters; to investigate developments in recreation and sport and disseminate information on these. | Minister for Recreation and Sport. | 10 members appointed by Minister for their general background in sport and recreation, the Secretary of Recreation and Sport. | 3 years (renewable). |
| 1975 | Act of Parliament. No statutory terms of reference. | To advise the Minister of Social Welfare on community welfare needs; on the adequacy of welfare services; on the rationalisation and co-ordination of social services; and on needed social services research. (Time horizon: 2-5 years.) | Minister of Social Welfare. | 6 members nominated by national voluntary bodies by District Councils of Social Service, and 2 by Minister of Maori Affairs, approved by Minister of Social Welfare; 6 departmental representatives. | 2 years (renewable). |
| 1962 | Act of Parliament. Statutory terms of reference. | To consider matters advancing the social and economic development of the Maori community; to promote the preservation of Maori culture; to promote harmony between Maori and non-Maori. | Minister of Maori Affairs. | 30 representatives of district Maori Councils—3 elected by each district council. | 3 years (renewable in that members may be re-elected). |
| 1977 | Act of Parliament. Statutory terms of reference. | To advise the Government on planning for social, economic, and cultural development; to comment on proposals and priorities; to advise on co-ordination of activities; to provide for consultative planning; and to foster discussion among agencies concerned with planning. (Medium-term time-horizon.) | Minister of National Development. | 12 members appointed by Minister on merit, Secretary to the Treasury, Minister of National Development. | Up to 4 years (renewable). |
| 1975 (structure revised from 1964 Council) | Act of Parliament. Statutory terms of reference. | To promote professionalism in the arts; to develop the practice and appreciation of the arts; to encourage accessibility and regional development of the arts; and to foster public education, promotion, and research relating to the arts. | Minister for the Arts. | 3 members appointed by the Minister on merit; 3 members representing the Broadcasting Council and the Departments of Education and Internal Affairs, the chairmen of 3 regional Arts Councils, and the chairman of the Maori and South Pacific Arts Council. | 1-2 years for Chair, 3 years for other members (renewable). |
| 1971 (as Social Council) | Cabinet directive. No statutory terms of reference. | To keep under review social aspects of development, and social policies needed to achieve a desirable quality of life; to present social development proposals to the Minister and advise the Minister of their implications; to promote social research. (Time horizon: 10-25 years.) | Minister of Social Welfare. | 9 members appointed by the Minister on merit, 3 departmental representatives. | 2 years (renewable for a second term of 3 years). |
| 1976 | Act of Parliament. No statutory terms of reference. | To advise the Minister of Health on the co-ordination of activities and planning for all public, private, and voluntary organisations providing health care, in order to promote the health of the community, provide for adequate treatment and preventative services, and ensure effective use, distribution and availability of health resources. | Minister of Health. | 18 members appointed by the Minister on merit (most are health service personnel). | 3 years (renewable at Minister's discretion—rare). |
| 1968 | Act of Parliament. Statutory terms of reference. | To raise awareness of the need for vocational training; to determine the extent of this need; to encourage the implementation of training. | Minister of Education and Minister of Labour. | 13 members, including an independent chairman Director-General of Education or his deputy, 7 nominations from the Ministers (from nominations from Employers' Federation, Federation of Labour, Manufacturers' Federation, Technical Institutes Association, Authority for Advanced Vocational Awards); 3 special ministerial appointments. Also 2 associate members, representing the state sector and the University Grants Committee. | 4 years for Chair, 3 years for other members (renewable). |

APPENDIX I: ADVISORY BODIES CONSULTED—continued

| | Yearly Allocation | Source | Secretariat | Meetings | Decision-making | Subcommittees | Publications |
|--|---|---|--|---|---|--|--|
| Committee on Women | \$58,000 (1981-82). Also basic administrative costs (including staff salaries). | Vote Treasury. | 3 support staff provided through Treasury; some temporary and contract workers. | 6 times a year for 1 or 2 days; in Wellington. | By consensus. Some voting over controversial issues, but rare. | 2 permanent sub-committees—monitoring Health Conference recommendations and co-ordinating resource material on women. | Submissions; 4 bibliographies; 2 conference reports; 3 monographs; newsletter. |
| Environmental Council | \$38,000. Also basic administrative costs (including staff salaries). | Vote Commission for the Environment; Ministry of Works and Development finances 1 staff member. | 4 support staff (2 not exclusive to E.C.); 5 provided through Ministry of Works and Development | 10 times a year for 1 day in Wellington. Committee has one of its meetings a year outside Wellington. | By consensus. | 2 committees (Urban Affairs and Environmental Movement). Other working parties as required. | 2 public reports on urban concerns and objectives; 1 booklet for schools; newsletter. |
| National Housing Commission | \$90,000 (1981-82). Also basic administrative costs (including staff salaries) and publications. | Vote Housing. | 3 support staff provided through Housing Corporation. Some contract research workers. | 11 times a year for 1-2 days; 3 annual meetings out of Wellington. | By consensus. Voting rare. | Ad hoc committees as required. | 45 research reports since 1978. |
| New Zealand Council for Recreation and Sport | \$300,550 (1980-81) Also accountability services provided through Department of Internal Affairs. | Vote Internal Affairs; \$175,550; Lottery Board grant: \$115,000; IYC grant: \$12,000. | 4 administrative staff provided through Department of Internal Affairs; 6 full-time staff on contract; 3 part-time staff employed by Council; others employed as required. | 5-6 times a year for 2 days in Wellington. | By consensus. A vote may be taken on contentious issues. | 8 standing committees; 1 executive (for urgent business); 1 on recreation; 0 on aspects of recreation. | Annual report; 2 newsletters; leaflets on recreation issues; public reports on family and children's recreation; many internal reports. |
| New Zealand Council of Social Service | \$22,000 (1980-81). Also basic administrative costs (including staff salaries), and publication. | Vote Social Welfare. | 3 support staff provided through Department of Social Welfare (not exclusive to New Zealand Council of Social Services). | 6 times a year for 1 day in Wellington. | By vote. | 4 working parties reflecting Council's current social service concerns. | Submissions. Major public report in 1978, <i>Sharing Social Responsibility</i> ; newsletter; occasional bulletins. |
| New Zealand Maori Council | \$50,000 (1980-81). | Vote Maori Affairs. Also funds from district levy and from contribution of Maori Trustees. | 2 support staff; also access to typing and clerical services of Department of Maori Affairs. | 4 times a year for 1 1/2 days, usually in Wellington. | By vote. | Standing administration committee, to deal with urgent business. Other ad hoc committees as required—1 in mid 1981. | Submissions: Co-producer of magazine with Department of Maori Affairs for Women's Welfare League. |
| New Zealand Planning Council | \$703,500 (1981-82). | Vote Treasury. | 1 Director, 3 administrative and clerical staff, 11 professionals, employed on Government departments. | 6 times a year for 2 days; usually in Wellington. | By consensus. | Executive committee, to handle urgent business; task forces as required. | Annual Report; 19 public reports of general interest; 11 public reports on more technical and specialist issues. |
| Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council of New Zealand | \$4.1 million (1981-82). | 62.8 percent from Vote Internal Affairs; 37.2 percent from Lottery Board. | 25 support staff, including administrative personnel and cultural officers. Advertised for and appointed by the Council. Some contract researchers. | 6 times a year for 2 days; has a policy to meet outside Wellington at least once a year. | By vote. | 4 subcommittees, 3 concerned with making grants to individuals, institutions and group projects, and one concerned with promoting regional arts development. | Annual Report; many public reports and policy documents on arts issues; newspaper. |
| Social Development Council | \$11,000 (1980-81). Also basic administrative costs (including contract research costs). | Vote Social Welfare. | 3 support staff provided through Department of Social Welfare (not exclusive to Social Development Council); occasional contract research workers. | 6 times a year for 1 day; in Wellington. | Usually by consensus following a proposal. An occasional vote on a controversial issue. | Executive committee, to handle urgent business. Other sub-committees as required. | 17 public reports since 1971, (the majority discussion papers on family policy issues); 2 reports circulated to Government departments and members of parliament only. |
| SACHSO | Shares of funds allocated to Health Department's review and development activities (1980-81: \$74,500 to R and D). Also basic administrative costs, including staff salaries. | Vote Health. | 1 support staff member provided through the Department of Health, exclusive SACHSO. Other departmental staff may provide support as required. | Once every 6 weeks, for 1 day in Wellington. Also 4-5 special meetings a year. | By consensus. | 3 subcommittees reflecting SACHSO's current health services concerns. | 1 public report on pilot health services schemes; regular bulletins on activities. |
| Vocational Training Council | \$2.1 million (1980-81) | Minister of Finance. | 19 Head Office support staff (administrative and investigative); 6 regional officers. Director employed by Council; other staff from Department of Education. | 5 or 6 times a year, for 1 day, usually in Wellington. | By consensus. | Standing committee to handle urgent business; 1 committee to liaise with state sector training; 7 advisory committees relating to specific training fields. | Annual report; regular newsletters; a wide range of publications relating to Polytechnics and women in the workforce and to the supervisory, management, apprenticeship and new technology fields. |

APPENDIX II: INTEREST GROUPS CONSULTED

| Year Established | Aims | Funds | | | Conferences |
|----------------------------|--|---|------------------------------------|---|--|
| | | Number of members/ branches/affiliates | Yearly income | Source | |
| 1977 | To inform the churches on public affairs. To speak on their behalf to the Government and community. To report on its work from the churches to investigate social affairs. To initiate research into social affairs. | 30 members (plus 4 corresponding members). | \$8000 (1981-82 financial year). | Methodist and Presbyterian churches. | None: receives remits from Methodist Conference and Presbyterian Assembly. |
| 1974 | To affirm parents' rights over children's education. To inform parents of educational developments and trends. To foster acceptable standards and methods of education, and to resist the introduction into schools of questionable materials and teaching. To help parents protect their children from permissive influences. | 11 branches. | No set funds; as donated. | Members' donations. | Writing and producing newsletters; occasional speaking tours of Chairman. |
| 1951 | To promote the well-being of the Maori and the people of New Zealand generally. To enable members to play an effective part in the cultural, social and economic development of the community. | About 3050 members, 175 branches. | \$24,010 (Jan 1980-Jan 1981 year). | Government grant, now increased to \$25,000; subscriptions; interest. | Annual conference of National Council (4 days). |
| 1896 | To unite organised societies of women; to promote the spiritual, moral, civil and social welfare of the community; to work for the legal, economic and social advancement of women. | 38 affiliated organisations, 35 branches. | About \$32,000 (1980-81). | Government grant for staff wages (\$12,000); lottery board grant for overseas travel/conferences (\$5,000); subscriptions and donations; trust grants; some special fund-raising campaigns. | In alternate years: 1. National Conference (31 days); 2. National Executive (21-3 days). |
| 1977 | To liberate lesbians and gay men through promoting a social revolution to establish a society free from repressive social institutions; to work for the rights, interests, and well-being of all lesbians and gay men; to support the liberation of other oppressed groups. | About 35 affiliated groups, 8 with associate status. | About \$1400. | Subscriptions and donations; "pledge fund" system; some bequests. | Annual general meeting (1 day); annual planning meeting (2 days). |
| 1964 | To promote effective social welfare services in the community. | About 600 members, 8 branches. | About \$20,000. | Subscriptions. | In alternate years: 1. Conference (4 days); 2. General meeting. (2 days). |
| 1915 (in its present form) | To promote business interests and reflect the views of the business community. | 41 affiliated local Chambers of Commerce. | About \$200,000. | Subscriptions from constituent members. | Annual National Conference (21 days). |
| 1936 | To act as a co-ordinating and representative body for trade unions in New Zealand, promoting the interests of working people and enhancing the dignity of labour. | About 440 000 members; 197 affiliated trade unions; and 26 regional trades councils and trade union committees. | About \$230,000 (in 1980). | Capitation fees from membership. A very little from rent of premises. | Annual Conference (4 days). |
| 1969 | To strengthen voluntary welfare organisations; to act as an advisory body; to ensure that decision-makers are provided with input from the voluntary sector where required. | 26 member organisations. | About \$14,000 (1980-81). | Government grant towards staff wages; subscriptions; donations; interest. | Annual general meeting (1 day). |
| 1916 | To promote the welfare of ex-servicemen and women and their dependants; to remember New Zealand war dead; to perpetuate the comradeship born of service; to assist youth to lead a better life. | About 87 800 members; 134 local RSA affiliated; 7 other organisations affiliated. | About \$282,960 (1979-80). | Government grants to allow travel to overseas conferences; subscriptions and capitation; some advertising revenue. | Annual Dominion Council meeting (21 days). |
| 1907 | To promote a preventive health service for women and children. | About 80 000 members; 121 branches, and 630 sub-branches. | About \$7 million. | Government grant of \$6m for wages, and some transport; subscriptions and donations; bequests; trust grants. | Biannual conference (3 days). |

APPENDIX II: INTEREST GROUPS CONSULTED—continued

| National Staff | Governing body | | | Publications |
|---|--|---|--|--|
| | Payment | Status | Meetings | |
| Combined Methodist and Presbyterian Church Public Questions Committee | Paid through church grants to committee. | 1 research officer secretary (part-time). | Committee meets about 10 times a year; meetings last 2 hours; in Wellington. | Submissions; material for church papers; some background reports and pamphlets. |
| Concerned Parents Association | Unpaid. | 1 member undertakes research in own time. | Meets as required; in Christchurch. | None. |
| Maori Womens Welfare League | Secretary paid through general league funds; PEP worker paid through Government. | 1 national secretary (full-time); 1 PEP worker (part-time). | 3 times a year; for 1½ days; in Wellington. | Submissions; newsletters (4 times a year) for branches and subscribers; co-producer of <i>Ti Tokanga</i> magazine with Department of Maori Affairs and Maori Council; annual report. |
| National Council of Women of New Zealand | Through Government grant. | 1 full-time secretarial position (filled by 2 part-time workers). | 5 times a year; for 2½ days; usually in Wellington. | Submissions; 5 public reports; monthly newsletter and occasional magazine for members; information pamphlet; handbook for members; annual report. |
| National Gay Rights Coalition | Unpaid. | Members fill following positions in their own time: editors (2); returning officer; resource centre administrator; international secretary. | Every 2 months for up to 2 days. Policy of meeting in regions, not in Wellington. | Submissions; monthly newspaper; newsletter for member groups; handbook on use of media; badges, stickers, posters, cards, pamphlets. |
| New Zealand Association of Social Workers | Secretary paid stipend, and editor paid through general NZASW funds. | 1 part-time secretary. Members fill positions in their own time: treasurer; editor. | Every month for about 3 hours. Meeting held where Executive is located. | Submissions; newsletter (6 times a year) and journal (4 times a year); for members and subscribers; code of ethics for members; annual report for members; some public reports. |
| New Zealand Chamber of Commerce | Paid through NZCC general funds. | 5 executive staff; 7 clerical and general support staff (most full-time). | Every 6 weeks (executive committee); 4 times a year (Council). For 1 day, in Wellington. | Submissions; monthly magazine; confidential newsletter for member groups; handbook on use of media; badges, stickers, posters, cards, pamphlets. |
| New Zealand Federation of Labour | Paid through general FOL funds. | President, secretary, 3 research staff, 6 administrative and clerical staff (all full-time). | Every 2 weeks (executive); 1 day. In Wellington. Council meets quarterly. | Many pamphlets, to unions; policy papers; 2-monthly newsletter to unions; some submissions; annual report. |
| New Zealand Returned Services Association | Government grant, and federation's general funds. | 1 half-time executive officer. | 3-4 times a year, for 1½ days in Wellington. | Submissions; newsletter (5 times a year) for members and subscribers; annual report. |
| New Zealand Returned Services Association | Paid through general NZRSA funds. | 6 full-time administrative staff; 2 full-time welfare advocates; 4 part-time administrative and clerical staff. | Every month, for about 4½ hours in Wellington. | Submissions; 2-monthly newspaper to members; 1 information pamphlet for public; annual report. |
| Plunket Society | Paid through Government grant. | Director and deputy-director of medical services; director and deputy-director of nursing services; treasurer and assistant treasurer; about 12 clerks (all full-time). | Every 6 weeks, for 2 days in Wellington. | 2-monthly newspaper for members and public; pamphlets for public; information booklet for media; annual report. |

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